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Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the phenomenon of civil supremacy, and in 
particular how it evolves and is sustained over time. A theoretical case study of Namibia will 
be undertaken to achieve this objective, with three traditions of civil supremacy, namely 
colonial, revolutionary/insurgent and democratic (as well as the relevant mechanisms and 
techniques), being the focus. This dissertation seeks to determine how these traditions 
emerge and develop over time. 
Basically, civil supremacy rests on a set of ideas, institutions and behaviours. Together these 
practices limit the possibility of excessive military intervention in political affairs and 
provide a system that endows civilian officials with the authority and the machinery to 
exercise supremacy in military affairs. 
The structure of the disser tation is as follows : 
Chapter one identifies a theoretical framework in which the various concepts, issues and 
terms of reference are identified and defined. Chapter two provides an historical account of 
the Namibian people and territory prior to the formation of the South West African People's 
Organisation (SW APO). Chapter three analyses the period between 1960 and 1974, which 
saw SW APO become established as a liberation movement with an armed wing. Chapter four 
addresses the period between 197 4 and 1988. Chapter five provides an analysis of the 
transition period (1988 -1992) when the peace agreement was secured between SW APO and 
the South African government. Chapter six assesses the current state of civil-military 
relations Namibia. 
This dissertation generates five conclusions about how civil supremacy evolves and is 
sustained.· 
First, civil supremacy is not a static. It involves a set of fluid relationships, a perpetual 
contest between the strengths of civilian political institutions and political strengths of the 
military. It is a phenomenon that evolves (and devolves) over a period of time. Second, there 
is a gap between enforcing and maintaining civil supremacy in theory and what happens in 
reality. The Namibian case study reveals that internal and external factors impact on civil 
supremacy. Third, the internationalisation of the Namibian conflict, namely the interference 
of powerful international actors, had a critical impact on the evolution of civil supremacy in 
Namibia. This state of affairs impeded the natural emergence of the classical or "pure" 
traditions of civil supremacy. Fourth, state-centric mechanisms of civil supremacy can at 
times be ineffective. Non-state actors and civil society have been involved in the civil 
supremacy's evolutionary process and can play a meaningful role in enhancing and 
maintaining it. Fifth, there is an ongoing debate in historical circles between structuralism 
and agency. Structuralism is a mode of thinking and a method of analysis that values deep 
structures over surface phenomena. Individuals have a negligible impact on the greater 
scheme of things. Agency, on the other hand, maintains that individuals, not structures, are 
largely responsible for the way events unfold. This dissertation strikes a balance between 
these two extremes. 
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Introduction 
An armed disciplined body is in its essence dangerous w Liberty: undisciplined it is ruinous w 
society. 
Edmund Burke, 1815 
The objective of this dissertation is to describe and explain the process by 
which civil supremacy of the military evolved in Namibia. This dissertation 
consists of six chapters. Chapter one identifies a theoretical framework in 
which the various concepts, issues and terms of reference are identified and 
defined. Chapter two provides an historical account of the Namibian people 
and territory prior to the formation of the South West African People's 
Organisation (SW APO). Chapter three analyses the period between 1960 and 
1974, which saw SWAPO become established as a liberation movement 
capable of engaging in guerrilla warfare against the South African security 
forces. Chapter four addresses the period between 1974 and 1988 when 
SWAPO was afflicted by a series of internal crises, which threatened to 
cripple the liberation movement. Chapter five provides an analysis of the 
transition period (1988 -1992) when the peace agreement, under 
international supervision, was secured between SW APO and the South 
African government. Chapter six assesses the state of civil-military relations 
in contemporary Namibia. 
Civil Supremacy in Namibia: An Evolution? 
Robert Griffiths [1996:474], in an analysis of current trends in 
democratisation and civil-military relations in Namibia, South Africa and 
Mozambique, argues that in societies undergoing transition from 
I 
Un
ive
r i
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
authoritarian rule to a democratic dispensation, civil supremacy of the 
military is the product of four factors. These include: the past pattern of civil-
military relations, threats to the armed forces' institutional interests, ethnic 
political fragmentation, and the impact of military restructuring on 
reconciliation, reconstruction and development. Griffiths concludes that post-
conflict civil-military relations and democratic consolidation in these 
countries are largely determined by the nature of transition, namely the 
latter three factors, while he gives scant attention to historical traditions. 
This dissertation seeks to further advance this analysis, and argue that in 
terms of Griffiths' framework, previous patterns of civil-military relations are 
significant. Arising from this, the central question of this dissertation, which 
has two parts, is as follows: How did civil supremacy evolve in Namibia, and 
how was it sustained over time? Is there a distinct evolutionary process or is 
it simply a state of affairs that emerges during a relatively short transition 
period to democracy? 
Civil Supremacy and its Importance 
No regime sustains itself purely on the basis of political legitimacy or 
administrative efficiency. All systems of rule are based on the exercise of 
coercive power through institutions such as the military. The reason for this 
is that the military has the ability to exert coercive power. As the military 
has the capacity to prop up or topple a regime, its loyalty is essential to 
regime survival. 
Generally, civilian forms of government exercise authoritative power, which 
has been established according to regular, known and accepted procedures. 
Military rule, on the other had is considered undesirable because it brought 
about and maintained through the exercise of coercive power. 
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Therefore one of the fundamental dilemmas of human governance has been 
that of securing the subordination of military forces to political authority 
[Kohn,1997:140]. For example, civil control of the military has been a concern 
of democracies like the United States and France, of communist regimes such 
as the former Soviet Union and China, of fascist dictatorships such as in 
Germany and Italy prior to 1945, as well as many states in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa. 
Civil supremacy, which is also referred to as civilian or, at times, political 
supremacy evades a simple definition. Traditionally, civil supremacy of the 
armed forces entails a clear separation between civilian and military powers 
and responsibilities; the accountability of the armed forces to government, 
the party or political movement; and the practice of transparency in the 
conduct of defence and security matters [Edmonds, 1988:70-92]. In short, it 
means civilians formulate policy and the military implements it. 
This does not suggest that the armed forces are excluded from politics. On the 
contrary, the armed forces cannot be precluded from the political arena given 
their organisational identity, autonomy and functional specialisation. In 
reality, the military exercises political influence through regularised and 
accepted channels [Welch,1976:3-4]. In societies where the idea of civil 
supremacy is accepted, the military is content to exert its bureaucratic 
bargaining and accept advice, but it stands ready to accept overall policy 
direction from government officials [Danopoulos, 1992:3]. 
There are various traditions of civil-military relations that strive for civil 
supremacy of the military. However, in the analysis of the Namibian case, 
this dissertation will only consider the colonial, revolutionary/insurgent and 
democratic traditions. 
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Focus on Namibia 
The Republic of Namibia (formerly South West Africa), occupies an area of 
824,268 sq km, and is situated in south-western Africa, bounded on the north 
by Angola and Zambia, on the east by Botswana and South Africa and on the 
south by South Africa. Namibia's current population is estimated to be 1,7 
million. Namibia gained its independence on 21 March 1990. It is, according 
to its Constitution, a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State, 
founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all. 
Namibia's president is the executive and is elected by the voters. Legislative 
authority is vested in the National Assembly, a body comprised of 72 elected 
members and up to 6 appointed representatives. The National Council, made 
up of 2 representatives of Namibia's 13 regional councils, acts as an advisory 
body. 
Prior to independence, Namibia was subjected to successive waves of foreign 
intervention, which culminated in the formation of organised resistance 
against colonial occupation. At the forefront of the resistance movement was 
SW APO, an organisation that was to conduct a struggle for national 
liberation over three decades. 
Since independence Namibia's fragile fledgling democratic dispensation has 
matured into a fairly robust representative system of government. Namibia's 
liberal Constitution, which was held up by the international community as an 
African model at its inception, still stands unviolated as the supreme law of 
the land. However, in recent years, there have been a number of severe 
criticisms levelled at the SW APO-led government. It has been accused of 
failing to deliver the much needed socio-economic reforms and of tolerating 
an arrogation of power by the newly emergent political elite [Africa 
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Confidential 4/8/95]. Certain critics have even made claims that Namibia is 
"increasingly displaying patterns that have characterised autocratic, neo-
colonial states elsewhere on the continent" and in the face of a weak political 
opposition is drifting towards a "de facto one party state" [Tapscott,1997:3]. 
Despite these criticisms, Namibia's mechanisms of securing and maintaining 
civilian supremacy of the military remain resolute and are, in fact, stronger 
than ever. 
Why Namibia? 
The methodological approach of this dissertation is that of a theoretical case 
study. The reason for this is three-fold. First, Namibia is one of Africa's 
newly-established democracies which, by all accounts, boasts comprehensive 
civil supremacy of the military. Second, there is an over-abundance of case 
study analyses concerning Namibia, the majority of which are descriptive 
and/or prescriptive in nature. This dissertation intends to move beyond mere 
description and provide a theoretical interpretation of events from a civil-
military relations perspective. In addition, in the general literature the role 
of non-state actors and their armed forces, such as insurgent or liberation 
movements and their armed wings, has rarely being considered. Only the 
cases of China, Vietnam and to a lesser degree Cuba and Algeria have been 
studied to any significant degree. 1 Very limited research has been 
undertaken to analyse situations where a non-state actor captured the state, 
either through military victory or negotiated settlement. Finally, an 
evaluation of the Namibian case illuminates an older problem; namely, that 
there is a distinct difference between the theory and practice of civil 
supremacy. Civil supremacy of the military is a constant struggle between 
civilians and the armed forces. 
1 Studies have also been conducted of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe to 
name but a few , but this literature still remains underdeveloped. 
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Chapter 1 
The Historical Evolution of Civil Supremacy: A Conceptual and 
Analytical Approach 
1.1) Introducing the Problem 
A fundamental paradox exists between civilians and armed forces. Out of a 
fear for others, an institution of violence is created for the purposes of 
protection, but once this has been achieved, this very institution becomes a 
source of fear for those who created it [Feaver,1996:150]. As armed forces 
possess the monopoly of arms, are expert managers of violence, and tend to 
be highly organised, they have the potential to replace the civilian 
government at will. 
Thus, one of the greatest challenges facing any society is to reconcile a 
military strong enough to defend the society's interests, with one which is 
subordinate enough to adhere to the wishes of civilians, and thus not conduct 
its affairs so that the society it was created to protect, is undermined. 
This dissertation seeks to analyse one of the methods that societies have 
developed to address this paradox, namely civil supremacy of the military. 
This thesis will consider the methods of maintaining and enforcing civil 
control of the military, however, the process by which such an outcome is 
eventually achieved will be the focus. The case study analysis of Namibia will 
illustrate this point. 
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The objective of this chapter is threefold. First, to provide a survey of the 
discipline and a general review of the civil-military relations literature, 
particularly that literature which has been concerned with civil supremacy of 
the military. Second, identify the three traditions of civil supremacy of the 
military, namely, the colonial, revolutionary/insurgent and democratic. Third, 
. outline the means by which this theoretical case study will be undertaken. 
1.2) Civil-Military Relations: Survey of the Discipline and 
Review of Literature 
1.2.1) Civil-Military Relations as a Field of Study 
The distinct academic field of civil-military relations originated during the 
Second World War when the United States government contracted academics 
to study certain aspects of the American war effort, particularly the combat 
performance of servicemen.2 However, studies of the relationship between 
armed forces and society can be traced back as far as Thucydides' account of 
the Peleponnesian Wars [Seegers,1995:9]. In addition, an analysis of many 
major political theorists since the 16th century reveals that either war, or the 
consequence of violent conflict, inspired their argued prescriptions for good 
governance. These prescriptions generally emphasised strict political control 
of the armed forces [Edmonds,1988:10].3 Among the early political theorists, 
Niccolo Machiavelli stands out. His recognition that the relationship between 
those with political authority and those with control over coercive force (the 
military) is fundamental to any prescription for a well-ordered and effectively 
2 The critical study was Samuel A Stouffer et al, The American Soldier and Combat and its 
Aftermath (1949). 
3 For instance, Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan discusses a "social contract", a situation that leads 
to the formation of government in order to overcome the perils of the "state of nature". 
Embodied in this social contract is the authorisation of a sovereign that will uphold the laws 
chosen by the people and provide protection. Should the military not be brought under 
civilian control, then the whole "social contract" would be undermined. 
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governed state. Machiavelli ascertained that the only successful way to retain 
political authority, even when a ruler had popular support was to keep a firm 
control over the armed forces. 
In the immediate period following the World War II the rapid expansion of 
the social sciences, and more specifically the acceptance of sociology as a 
legitimate and potentially fruitful field of study of the military, provided the 
impetus for the field of civil-military relations to be expanded. In addition, 
the financial burden of armed forces, their performance in large numbers and 
the continued threat of violent conflict with the onset of the Cold War all 
ensured that civil-military relations became a focus of investigation, interest 
and concern [Edmonds,1988:13]. 
The study of civil-military issues received a major boast in the mid-1960s 
with the establishment of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and 
Society, founded by Morris Janowitz. This institution pioneered and 
sponsored the study of the relationship between armed forces and society. In 
addition it encouraged further scholarly endeavours through its journal, 
Armed Forces and Society, which was established in 1976. Up until now 
scholarly interest with respect to civil-military relations has manifested itself 
in the publication of numerous books and monographs. The majority of 
publications consists of single case studies or edited volumes consisting of 
case studies of several nation-states. 
1.2.2) Review of the Civil-Military Relations Literature 
An analysis of civil-military relations literature reveals a wide variety of 
issues and debates. Despite the eclectic nature of the literature, three 
conceptual themes standout: the cause of military coups, military 
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professionalism, and comparisons of governmental performance between 
civilian and military regimes [Kennedy & Louscher,1991:1-2]. 
Research into military intervention in political affairs was inspired by the 
frequent incidents of coup d'etats instigated by members of the armed 
services in the 1950s and 1960s, especially in Africa, Latin America and 
south-east Asia [Edmonds, 1988:73].4 Numerous approaches to studying such 
military coup d'etats emerged. For example, one approach saw the military as 
a vehicle of progress and development,5 while another held that militaries 
perform much like interest groups, so that when their interests are 
negatively affected, military officers tend to intervene in politics.s 
In terms of the military professionalism literature, arguably the most 
influential book is Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State: The 
Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations (1957). Huntington 
emphasises the importance of adequate political control over the armed forces 
and the need for healthy, open and stable civil-military relationships. Central 
4 Most of this research was influenced by the likes of Harold Lasswell and Stanislav 
Andreski Lasswell is renowned for his Garrison State hypothesis, which was first published 
as an article in the American Journal of Sociology in 1941. His concern was with the role of 
specialists in society, more specifically those that specialised in the use of violence. He 
argued that these specialist groups represented powerful interests and exercised immense 
influence within society. He concluded that the intensity of security crises and the threat of 
war would affect the interests of these specialist elites and motivate them, and in particular 
those with security interests, to become increasingly involved in the policy making process as 
well as the government. Stanislav Andreski in his book Military Organisation and Society 
(1952) addressed the issue of the influence of military organisations on the structure and 
development of society, which was largely attributed to their ability to use violence. Probably 
one of the more prominent coup scholars is Samuel E. Finer with his influential book The 
Man on Horseback. Given the common occurrence of military coup d'etat he asked the 
question why it was that armed forces did not intervene in politics, thereby recognising what 
had been the case throughout history, that individuals with access to, and control over, 
physical force have influence and immense potential political power. The critical question for 
him was clearly why those who are in such a position choose not to use it. For Finer the 
answer lay with political culture. 
5 Advocates of this approach included: Morris Janowitz (1964); Manfred Halpern (1963); and 
Lucian Pye 1962). · 
s Examples of scholars who have adopted this approach include Eric Nordlinger (1970) , Ruth 
First and William Thompson (1973). 
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to political control is the professional soldier, a military ideal that embraces 
expertise, corporateness and responsibility.7 As an expert in the management 
of violence the military professional is unique in society, as he is loyal to the 
state, obedient to civilians, and dedicated to using his expertise for the 
protection of the state. As such, the professional soldier is politically neutral. 
Other scholars concerned with military professionalism include, amongst 
others, Morris Janowitz (The Professional Soldier, 1960), Bengt Abrahamsson 
(Military Professionalism and Political Power, 1972) and Amos Perlmutter 
(Political Roles and Military Rulers, 1981). 
In terms of the governmental performance literature there are three 
contrasting views. The first viewpoint regards military regimes as 
progressive forces that promote social change and positively affect economic 
growth.8 The second approach holds the military as averse to development, 
claiming that when the military is in power it favours its own corporate 
interests at the expense of the rest of society.9 The third approach adopts a 
more informed analysis, with scholars arguing that there is a degree of 
diversity within military regimes determined by a number of variables 
[Kennedy & Louscher,1991:7]. 10 For instance, Huntington (1968) argues that 
the performance of the military is dependent upon the level of economic 
development of the respective state: in underdeveloped states military 
governments tend to be progressive and reformist, while in more wealthy 
countries the role of the military tends to be conservative and/or reactionary. 
7 Huntington asserts that the military officer in Western societies, particularly the United 
States military, meets the ideal characteristics of professionalism. 
s See Manfred Halpern (1963); John Johnson (1962). 
9 See Eric Nordlinger (1970; 1976), and Henry Bienin (1971). 
10 See R. D. McKinlay and A S. Cohen (1975) and Robert Jackman (1976). 
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1.2.3) Focus on Ci vii Supremacy 
The question of civil supremacy is a common thread in all three of the above 
conceptual themes. Military professionalism is regarded as a subjective 
means of securing civil supremacy. The coup literature is concerned with the 
shortcomings or failure of civil supremacy. And, in terms the governmental 
performance literature, given the numerous perspectives on the relationship 
between governance and the armed forces, the utility of civil supremacy is a 
matter of debate. 
In essence, the civil supremacy literature is preoccupied with the mechanics 
of civil supremacy or control, such as legislative provisions and military 
professionalism. Detailed case analyses of the factors and processes 
contributing to civil supremacy (or the lack thereof) over extended periods of 
time are in short supply, particularly those that consider factors that 
contribute to its maintenance, as well as how this phenomenon adjusts and 
changes over time. Edited volumes by Claude Welch (1976)11 and 
Constantine Danopoulos (1992)12 seem to be the exception to the rule. This 
dissertation attempts to make a modest contribution to this gap in the 
literature by undertaking an historical case study analysis of the 
phenomenon of civil supremacy of the military in Namibia. 
11 Welch's edited volume includes the following case studies: India, the Philippines, China, 
Guyana, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Finland and Chile. 
12 Danopoulos' edited volume incorporates studies of Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Guyana, Jamaica, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania 
and Zambia. 
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1.3) What is Civil Supremacy? 
1.3.1) An Overview of Civil Supremacy 
To reiterate what been presented in the introduction: civil supremacy (or 
civilian supremacy or political supremacy) is a phenomenon that exists when 
there is a distinct separation between civilian and military powers and 
responsibilities; the accountability of armed forces to government, the party 
of political movement ; and the practice of transparency in the conduct of 
defence matters [Edmonds, 1988:70-92]. 
Civil supremacy exists when the military is content to exert its influence 
through bureaucratic bargaining, lobbying and expert advice, but is willing to 
accept overall policy direction from government officials [Welch,1987:9-14]. 
The central issue of civil supremacy is one of setting limits within which 
members of the armed forces, and the military as an institution, accept the 
government's definition of appropriate areas of responsibility [Welch,1976:2]. 
In simplistic terms, civilian supremacy is a matter of degree. A continuum of 
relationships exists between the power of the armed forces and the power of 
civilian institutions. Schematically this continuum can be illustrated as 
follows (adaptation of Welch's [1976:3] continuum): 
~. I I I ._ 
Civil Supremacy Mixed Civilian 
/Military Supremacy 
Military 
Supremacy 
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When the armed forces question the legitimacy and judgement of civilian 
authorities and insist on direct participation in the decision-making process, 
the principle of civilian supremacy is violated. The result is a mixed system of 
civilian military government, where political decisions are made by a 
combination of civilian and military leaders. [Danopoulos, 1992:3]. This might 
be the result of political leaders who, confronted by conflicting demands, turn 
to the armed forces as props for their power. Senior military personnel may 
be co-opted, placed in cabinet positions, to provide the tottering regime a 
veneer of stability and support [Welch,1976:4]. 
Finally, when military officers step in and occupy the top governmental posts 
and civilian officials are relegated to minor roles, military supremacy or 
praetorianism exists. In the end, the key indicator that distinguishes civilian-
led versus praetorian regimes comes down to personnel. A military regime is 
a form of government in which executive power rests within a military junta 
using the army as its main power base [Danopoulos,1992:3]. 
1.3.2) A Question of Bias 
With few exceptions the civil-military relations literature, civil supremacy is 
interpreted in a state-centric manner. This dissertation will continue this 
tradition. However, the question is raised: are state institutions consistent 
with the political aspiration and cultural habits of the citizenry, 
An analysis of the concept of civil supremacy is not complete without an 
analysis of the traditions of civil supremacy, as well as the various techniques 
that have been developed to encourage and enforce civil supremacy. 
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1.4) Civil Supremacy Traditions 
Namibia encountered three traditions of civil supremacy namely, colonial 
occupation, insurgent or revolutionary response, and finally a democracy. 
What follows is an analysis of how these three broad traditions dealt with the 
issue of civil supremacy: 
1.4.1) Colonial 
Numerous variations of this tradition have existed. Each variation was 
dependent on the national characteristics of the particular colonial power, the 
sophistication of the colonial administration and the resources that had been 
devoted to maintaining the colony. British, French, and German colonialism, 
for example, had their own unique characteristics of civil supremacy. 
However, certain basic commonalties can be identified. The more advanced 
colonial regimes made use of ascriptive methods of civil supremacy. 
In terms of British colonial Africa and India civil supremacy was facilitated 
through the recruitment to the rank and file of politically reliable and pliable 
individuals and the staffing of the officer corps by expatriates or a relatively 
small proportion of carefully selected indigenous personnel who had imbibed 
British norms. Stephen Cohen [1976:46], in his analysis of civil control of the 
military in India, observed that, 
"[t]he British were interested in seeing that the prospective Indian officer conformed 
to their notion of the "right type" of officer. The man was quite conservative, but not 
outspoken; he was obedient; he came from a wealthy, landed, aristocratic 
background, which eased his adjustment to the semi-feudal Indian army; he came 
from a "martial" community, such as Sikhs, Jats, Punjabi Muslims or Rajputs; he 
was a "gentleman". 
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In other British colonies the indigenous populations were relatively small, 
which enabled the armed forces to subdue them with relative ease. 
Consequently, the military establishments could remain relatively small. 
Similar circumstances existed in German colonies. Germany, a late-comer to 
the colonial club, had to make do with the less desirable territories, such as 
Togo, German East Africa (now Tanzania), Cameroon and South West Africa 
(now Namibia). Germany had less ·resources than Britain and France to 
devote to their foreign land acquisitions. Similarly to British colonies, the 
indigenous populations involved were relatively small, which enabled 
Germany to post small garrison forces in these colonies. In the case of 
German East Africa, small contingents of Askaris and mercenaries, 
reinforced the military might of the German garrisons [Pakenham,1991:617-
618]. 
1.4.2) Revolutionary/Insurgent 
This tradition consists of attempts to engender civil supremacy through 
direct party surveillance of the military establishment, as well as party 
dominance of decision-making. In the case ofinsurgencies13 the instruments 
of violence are subordinated to the civilian-oriented party regime, where the 
movement/party dominates the machinery for political mobilisation, and 
imposes a hierarchy of political overseers or commissars on the military. 
1a Insurgency is one of the broader terms often used to describe a wide variety of forms of 
internal political violence. Academically it is useful given its relative neutrality. It does not 
inspire connotations and emotions that terms like "revolutionary warfare", "civil war" and 
"terrorism" have the tendency to do. Insurgency can be defined as "a struggle between a non· 
ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employs political 
resources (organisational skills , propaganda, and/or demonstrations) and instruments of 
violence to establish legitimacy for some aspect of the political system it considers 
illegitimate. Legitimacy and illegitimacy refer to whether or not existing aspects of politics 
are considered moral or immoral by the population or selected elements therein. In short, 
insurgency is essentially a political illegitimacy crisis of some sort [O'Neill, 1980: 1-2). · 
Insurgency can also include political, economic, social, psychological, cultural and ideological 
aspects of conflict. 
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There has, however, been limited research concerning the civil supremacy of 
the armed forces with respect to insurgent movements. What does exist 
usually consists of a chapter of a book or a short journal article. 14 The two 
exceptions are the writings of Mao Tse-tung (and subsequent scholars of 
insurgent warfare) and Amos Perlmutter's "Revolutionary Soldier" model 
(The Military and Politics in Modern Times, 1977). 
1.4.2.1) The Influence of Mao Tse-tune: 
In Maoist writings the relationship between politics and war is strongly 
emphasised, a relationship in which military operations must be 
subordinated to political objectives and direction, and enforced through 
particular infrastructure considerations. Mao emphasises the need for a dual 
structure in which the cell system will provide the necessary political 
direction of the insurgent movement [Baylis,1975:135]. According to Mao 
[1963:97-98], 
War cannot for a single moment be separated from politics ... politics is war 
without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed. 
14 See Annette Seegers (1986) and James D. Jordan (1980). 
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1.4.2.2) The "Revolutionary Soldier" 15 
Perlmutter's "revolutionary soldier" ideal, an analysis of an armed faction of 
a revolutionary movement, provides a rough guide in identifying certain key 
components that are crucial to understanding the civil-military dynamics of 
insurgent movements. Perlmutter [1977:211] distinguishes four types of 
revolutionary soldier: romantic revolutionaries (e.g. SS Stormtroopers); 
Marxist national liberation army; the Maoist Chinese Peoples Liberation 
Army; Zionist Israel Defence Force. However, only the Marxist national 
liberation army will be considered, as it is the model that most closely 
approximates an insurgent movement, as was the case with SWAPO. 
Perlmutter [1977:207] points out that no insurgent movement conceives of its 
army as an independent, autonomous organisation or as an end in itself. The 
revolutionary soldier is integrated within the revolutionary movement. His 
role is to participate in, and serve the movement, simultaneously. Typically, 
the revolutionary soldier is subordinate to the movement, but perceives 
himself to be a senior partner in the revolutionary movement, a "defender of 
the revolutionary order" [Perlmutter, 1977:207]. 
The revolutionary soldier has two functions; to mobilise the masses for 
political action, and act as the revolutionary instrument of violence 
[Perlmutter,1977:215]. In terms of violence, the revolutionary soldier must 
15 The "Revolutionary Soldier" is one aspect of a three-part comparative model focusing on 
military professionalism. The other two component types are the professional and praetorian 
soldiers. The professional soldier is a military force that is an outgrowth of the state. Its duty 
is to serve the state and consequently remains loyal to the state regardless of what political 
party or group is in power. Examples include the militaries in many of the developed, 
Western democratic nations, such as the United States and Great Britain. The praetorian 
soldier, a military group that functions as a militarised police force, is usually associated 
with a relatively weak state and disrupted society. As such, the praetorian soldier is prone to 
intervene in the political process and challenge the state. Societies with praetorian militaries 
have typically been located in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, 
and are easily detected by the regular occurrence of military coup d' eta ts. 
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either eliminate the professional army of the "old regime" or integrate it into 
a new army, thereby helping to replace one regime with another through the 
reform and change of both regime and the military organisation. 
Consequently, the revolutionary soldier is not a permanent type 
[Perlmutter, 1977:209; Seegers, 1986:54]. 
The revolutionary soldier has a dislike of ceremonial and hierarchical 
relations among military personnel, preferring more egalitarian or informal 
styles of clothing and forms of address. Egalitarianism also tends to inform 
such matters as recruitment and training, and revolutionary soldiers rarely 
represent/perceive themselves as a single class or group. Recruitment tends 
to cut across social groupings, and promotions and training are determined 
according to the criteria of merit and political dedication. Cohesion does not 
come from fear of commanders but belief in the political cause 
[Seegers, 1986:53]. 
In the post-insurgency period, the symbiotic relationship between the party 
and the army in theory precludes efforts by the military to replace the 
civilian leadership, as the orientation of the revolutionary soldier is to 
maintain the revolution and to protect the territorial integrity of the 
revolutionary state. Given this state of affairs, the revolutionary army starts 
to accept the properties of the professional soldier, an independent and 
coequal part of government. However this represents an idealised description 
of the professional revolutionary soldier's self-image and of his interaction 
with the civilian leadership, and in reality there are tensions that develop 
both within the military and between soldiers and civilians 
[Perlmutter, 1977:217]. 
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1.4.2.3) Insurgent Strategies 
Strategy has a fundamental impact on civil supremacy of the military, as it 
specifies both the nature and characteristics of political and military 
organisation of the insurgent movement, how they relate to each other, and 
. the process by which the insurgency will be conducted. The three most 
common insurgent strategies are Leninist, Maoist and Cuban. 
1.4.2.3.1) Leninist 
Those who follow this strategy believe that a secretive, disciplined and highly 
organised group of professional revolutionaries that is supported from major 
discontented social groups, such as the military or the working class, provides 
the most effective means of bringing about revolution [Lenin,1961:13-24; 
Lenin, 1988: 186-187]. 
For the most part, insurgent activity takes place in urban centres where the 
major concentration of political and economic power is located. The 
insurgency will then spread to the rural areas [Lenin,1964:415-420]. This 
approach assumes a government that is alienated from its population; hence 
it will capitulate when confronted by low-level terrorism, subversion of the 
military and police, and the seizure of radio stations, government offices and 
other state institutions. 
1.4.2.3.2) Maoist 
Maoist theoreticians ascribe great significance to popular support, extensive 
organisational efforts and the environment as resources necessary for a 
protracted conflict with an enemy perceived as being in a superior position 
prior to the hostilities. It is a sequential strategy, that is, it unfolds in distinct 
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stages, each of which is designed to partially achieve the revolutionary goal 
and is dependent on the outcome of the previous step [Tse-tung,1965:201]. 
Both scholars and practitioners of Maoist strategy have identified three 
distinct steps: political organisation and terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and 
mobile-conventional warfare. 
In the first stage, clandestine cellular guerrilla networks are created in the 
country-side and supported by the establishment of political-propaganda 
groups, which generate popular support amongst the rural inhabitants [Tse-
tung, 1965: 165-166]. Teams of guerrillas are trained to engage in selective 
intimidation of recalcitrant individuals. At this point, fronts may be 
organised along with pressure groups and parties in order to facilitate the 
acquisition of popular support. Simultaneously, insurgents usually try to 
infiltrate enemy institutions; foment strikes, demonstrations, riots and even 
sabotage. Terrorism during this period serves many functions, including 
acquisition of both popular and external support. It may be very significant 
where the insurgent population and/or terrain are insufficient for guerrilla 
warfare [Tse-tung,1963:349-350; O'Neill et al,1980:28-29]. 
Guerrilla warfare is the second stage in the Maoist scheme. The earliest part 
of this stage is characterised by armed resistance carried out by small highly 
mobile bands operating in rural terrain which is generally rugged with 
government control weak [Tse-tung,1963:349-350] . If guerrillas face 
significant government opposition, they have the option of reverting to stage 
one. During the second stage, the insurgent's aim is to isolate the people from 
the government. The organisational apparatus established in stage one 
begins to supply small guerrilla units and full- and part-time personnel play 
a more prominent role. However, organisation remains localised with groups 
operating from shifting and remote bases. Military actions are hit-and-run 
attacks against convoys, military and economic installations, and isolated 
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outposts. These scattered attacks are intended to provoke the enemy into 
adopting a static defensive posture that stresses the dispersal of forces in 
order to protect many potential targets. If military successes occur, expansion 
of the guerrilla movement and its organisational structure usually follow. In 
the military realm, recruitment of full-time guerrillas, establishment of 
extensive reserve system, and creation and training of regular army units are 
emphasised [O'Neill et al,1980:29-30; Scott, 1970:8-9]. 
The third and final stage is civil war, characterised by the regularisation of 
guerrilla forces and mobile-conventional warfare. The objective at this point 
is displacement of the regime and authorities. Regular units conduct 
conventional operations, heavier weapons are used, and periods of combat 
become extended. Small bands support the main effort in an ancillary role 
[Rice, 1988:80]. 
1.4.2.3.3) Cuban Strategy 
The Cuban strategy is seen as an alternative to the Maoist strategy of 
protracted warfare. Its central point, as expressed by Che Guevara, its 
greatest advocate, is not necessary to wait until the conditions for making 
revolution exist; rather popular insurrection can catalyse existing grievances 
and inequalities into positive action, thereby creating the requisite conditions 
[Guevara,1961]. Whereas Mao stressed the leading role of the party and the 
need for political preparation before military struggle, scholars like Regis 
Debray argued that the Cuban case made it clear that military priorities 
must take precedence over politics [Debray,1967]. Rather than wait for the 
emergence of an organisation, it is necessary to proceed from what he calls 
the guerrilla foco , the nucleus of the popular army. Critically, the foco idea 
stresses the importance of strategic mobile forces constantly changing their 
location to avoid detection and surprise the enemy [Baylis,1975:139]. 
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Irrespective of what strategy an insurgent movement adopts, in insurgencies 
geared towards national liberation, the movement will seek to raise the cost 
to the occupying power of retaining the colony. The cost can be measured in 
money, human lives, loss of international prestige and loss of domestic 
political support. At some point, the insurgents hope, the occupying power 
will conclude that the colony is not worth the maintenance cost and 
withdraw. Pursuit of military victory is a possible technique for the 
insurgent. In view of the probable disparity in military strength between 
insurgent and the government, however, a strategy aimed at the opponent's 
will to resist is usually more realistic than one aimed at direct military 
victory [Scott,1970:25]. A struggle for national liberation may also 
incorporate diplomatic elements into the overall strategy. It is usually not 
very difficult for an insurgent movement to muster diplomatic support from 
nations that are anticolonial in orientation. 
1.4.3) Democratic 
Civil supremacy of the armed forces in a democracy focuses on the idea of the 
will of the people, where the military is subordinate to civilian officials who 
are elected by the people. This ensures that the nation in question is in a 
position to base its values, institutions, and practices on popular will rather 
than on the choices of military leaders, whose outlook by definition focuses on 
the need for internal order and external security [Kohn,1997:141]. 
Under a democratic tradition several methods of civil supremacy are utilised. 
First, civilian elites exercise control over the military through numerous 
constitutional and legal mechanisms, which specify the functions of the 
military and the conditions under which the military may exercise its power. 
In particular, these mechanisms exclude the military from involvement in 
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politics. Second, military personnel are professionals in the employment of 
the state. Military leaders obey the government because they accept the basic 
national and political goals of a democracy and because it is their duty and 
profession to fight [Janowitz, 1964:79]. 
Democracies, depending on their physical, strategic, economic and 
demographic characteristics have also been known to employ other means of 
civil supremacy, such as ascriptive and geographic techniques. In terms of 
ascriptive techniques, Danopoulos [1992:7], states that in a multi-ethnic 
society, in which no ethnic group is dominant, it is essential that all ethnic 
groups are represented in the military. This prevents social and military 
fragmentation that may lead to praetorianism. 
One of the unique aspects of civil supremacy in a democracy is the indirect 
public oversight through open debate, media scrutiny, academic debate, and 
independent research around issues of force design, defence policy and threat 
perceptions [Nathan, 1996:64]. 
1.5) Mechanisms of Civil Supremacy 
Five broad categories of mechanisms of civil supremacy can be identified in 
the civil-military relations literature. They are as follows: 
1.5.1) Constitutional Constraints 
This category involves the enforcement of civil supremacy through legislation 
and legal provisions, where military obedience to the executive, legislative 
and judicial arms of government is enforced by law. For instance, the 
definition of the military powers, mission, role, organisation and composition 
is usually outlined through an act of Parliament (i.e. Defence Act). Executive 
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control usually involves making the President the Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces, with the power to appoint top military leadership. 
There tends to be two complementary methods of legislative control of the 
military. First, legislative control includes the creation of a civilian 
dominated department of defence (DoD) or ministry of defence, which is 
accountable to government. A DoD is an entity instilled with civilian 
expertise in defence matters and exercises political authority over the armed 
forces [Na than, 1994:65]. It assists the minister of defence to prepare the 
defence budget and acts as a formulator and interpreter of defence policy for 
the armed forces. 
Second, the legislative possess oversight and investigative powers, which 
includes the enactment of legislation to prevent excessive secrecy. In order for 
this to function effectively legislators must have the relevant capacity, that 
is, a special knowledge of defence issues. In the case of a democracy, this 
capacity can be achieved through multi-party parliamentary committees.is 
These committees are devoted exclusively to the overseeing and monitoring of 
their countries' armed forces, and have professional staff that specialises in 
matters of military budgeting and strategy [Stepan, 1988: 133]. Fourth, the 
authority to declare war or a state of emergency is vested in legislature. 
1.5.2) Budgetary Control 
Civil supremacy, particularly in a democracy, can be effectively maintained 
through the legislature's monopoly of the "purse-strings", that is, its 
16 Defence committees are known as standing committees, that is they function on a 
permanent basis. When members of both houses of the legislature are represented on one 
committee, it is known as a joint standing committee. 
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determination of the military's budget allocation and procurement 
expenditure. 
This mechanism is reinforced through ensuring that the minister of defence, 
a civilian member of Cabinet, is responsible for preparation of the defence 
. budget. This is a process by which the military is both consulted as well as 
being able to make proposals. The military budget must however, be 
approved by legislature. 
1.5.3) Ascriptive Factors 
This category of civil supremacy methods focuses on issues of class and 
ethnicity that affect the relationship between civilians and the armed forces. 
Such methods can be divided into two schools of thought. First, civil 
supremacy based on ethnic and/or class congruence between civilian and 
military leadership. Second, civil supremacy that is enforced through the 
intentional isolation of the armed forces from the rest of society 
[Welch, 1976: 10]. 
Methods of civil supremacy involving ethnic and class congruency form part 
of a broader grouping known as "penetrative" (Nordlinger, 1977) or 
"subjective" (Huntington, 1957) civilian control. According to Huntington 
[1957:80-85], subjective civilian control, "the product of identity of thought 
• 
and outlook between civilian and military groups," is derived from the close 
co-ordination existing between political and military ways of thought. Such 
subjective techniques were extensively utilised in Western Europe in the 
period leading up to the late nineteenth century, where the "ruling class" 
combined political and military responsibilities, and in many cases command 
positions were held by family members of political leaders [Welch,1976:11]. 
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Deliberately isolating the armed forces from the society they defend, was a 
common method of civil supremacy of colonialism, particularly British 
colonial activities. British recruitment of colonial soldiers often centred on 
"pliable" and so-called martial peoples, at times drawn from other British 
colonial territories. The Indian army under the British Raj predominantly 
recruited Pathans (from Afghanistan) and Gurkhas (from Nepal). 
Consequently, certain groups became closely linked with the maintenance of 
British power, thereby becoming isolated from the general oppressed 
populace [Cohen, 1976:4 7]. In many African situations, indigenous soldiers 
under the authority of colonial masters, acted with typically mercenary 
behaviour, conquering and subjugating their fellow Africans, usually from 
other ethnic groups. Consequently members of such armies were despised by 
their neighbours. 
However, in a situation outside of the colonial environment, the isolation of 
the armed forces might not run counter to civil supremacy, if officers 
interests are recognised and protected. If this is the case, civil supremacy 
may well require shared sentiments of class or nationality affecting the 
behaviour of the officer corps and the rank and file alike [Welch,1976:16]. 
Ascriptive techniques have also been used on a broader scale, through the use 
of universal conscription. Conscription may be used as a means of civil 
supremacy in two instances. First, the establishment of a conscript army 
precludes the problems and political hazards associated with standing 
armies. Second, conscription is a means to civilianise existing standing 
armies, with substantial numbers of civilians being introduced into the 
military to prevent the over-development of corporate interests. 
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Welch [1976:17] concludes that ascriptive ties provide an flimsy foundation 
upon which to erect a structure of civil supremacy, and such techniques must 
be reinforced by other means of control. 
1.5.4) Party/Political Movement Controls 
In revolutionary regimes or one-party states, such as China and the former 
Soviet Union, civil supremacy tends to be enshrined through a myriad of 
party controls of the armed forces. These party controls can be divided into 
the following two sub-sections: 
The first sub-section is that of organisation. Party/political movement control 
can be realised through the establishment of a hierarchy of politically reliable 
officials parallel to the existing military chain of command [Welch,1976:19]. 
This includes the appointment of political commissars during the period of 
revolutionary combat with powers equal to, or superior to military officers. 
These commissars play a "watchdog'' role, approving military plans and other 
military activity at each level of the military's organisation. There essential 
functions can be summed up as follows: to observe activities in the units and 
to pass the information to higher levels of the apparatus; to politicise military 
personnel through intensive indoctrination and political education; to 
regulate the advancement of officers so that only those who are desirable 
from the party's point of view are promoted to positions of authority; to 
supervise and control military as well as political activities within the unit 
[Colton, 1979:3-4]. 
In addition party control can be achieved through the creation of organised 
and omnipresent security networks to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces 
and eliminate possible praetorian activities [Janowitz,1964:80]. 
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The second sub-section is that of recruitment and promotion. Civil supremacy 
can be enhanced in the following ways: making it a prerequisite for military 
officers to meet certain party or ideological criteria for appointment and 
promotion, or even insisting that officers join the ruling party; recruitment of 
the rank and file from socially dispossessed groups; and the election of 
military officers by rank and file soldiers on certain occasions. 
1.5.5) Geographic Factors 
Civil supremacy of the armed forces can be enhanced by geographic factors in 
two respects. 
In the first instance, the physical geographical location and qualities of a 
country have a significant influence on the perception of security threats. 
States boarded by friendly neighbours, or those states whose security is 
guaranteed by powerful allies or geographic barriers, may be able to 
maintain relatively small standing forces, over which civilian control may be 
more effectively exercised [Welch,1976:24]. 
In the second instance, geography may be intentionally exploited by a 
government or party. For example, a government may insist on armed forces 
that are divided, by maintaining separate and even competing command 
structures in the different services, and to keep the military dispersed around 
the countryside and metropolitan areas. This unleashes competition with 
regard to weapons, resources, turf and responsibility. This undermines the 
military's ability to intervene and establish praetorian regimes 
[Danopoulos, 1992: 17]. 
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1.5.6) Professional Responsibility and Objective Control 
In general, the greater the sphere of responsibilities that are apportioned to 
the armed forces, the greater the possibility of active military involvement in 
politics. Conversely, the more limited their responsibilities, the greater the 
potential for their subordination to civilian control [Welch, 1976:32]. 
Therefore a clear distinction should exist between the duties of the armed 
forces and civilian government, as well as those responsibilities of the armed 
forces, the police and para-military units. 
"Professionalising" the military, has the effect, according to Huntington, of 
improving "objective" civilian control, as such a process renders the armed 
forces "politically sterile and neutral" [Huntington,1957:84]. The 
"professionalisation" of the military is a process whereby the professional 
characteristics of the armed forces are encouraged through enhancing the 
military's specialisation and expertise in the management of violence, 
increasing the educational opportunities available to the officer corps, and 
boosting the corporate nature of the military. Such a state of affairs results in 
clear areas of responsibility being assigned to the military 
[Huntington, 1957: 11-18]. 
Each of these techniques have been beneficial in facilitating and 
administering civil supremacy of the military, however, their effectiveness 
has often tended to be constrained to particular historical and socio-political 
circumstances or civil supremacy traditions. In many instances certain 
techniques and methods are more potent when used in combination with 
other techniques and methods. 
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1.6) The Way Forward 
This chapter has provided an analysis of civil supremacy; an examination of 
the colonial, revolutionary/insurgent and democratic traditions; as well as an 
assessment of its various methods and techniques. This has been done to 
provide a starting point, a rough travel guide that defines the basic layout of 
the territory and points this dissertation in the direction of interesting and 
otherwise lesser trodden pathways, in order to answer two interrelated 
questions. First, how does civil supremacy evolve? Second, how is civil 
supremacy sustained over time? 
In analysing the evolution of civil supremacy, its various traditions (and the 
mechanisms and techniques involved) will be the focus. This dissertation will 
be concerned with how these traditions emerge (or fail to emerge), develop, 
overlap, and are transposed by other traditions over time. In addition, 
comparisons will be made between these classical or "pure" traditions and the 
Namibian experience. 
What follows is an historical case study analysis of Namibia, viewed through 
the lens of civil supremacy of the military. A chronological approach will be 
adopted. Chapter two covers Namibia's history of colonial occupation up until 
1960. Chapters three and four survey the insurgent response to foreign 
occupation. Chapters five and six consider the transition to, and the 
consolidation of, the Namibian democratic regime, respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
Legacy of Resistance: Namibian History Prior to the 
Formation ofSWAPO 
This chapter describes Namibia's history prior to the formation of SWAPO. 
Three broad historical periods, each corresponding to the occupation of the 
Namibian territory by a foreign power, will be considered namely, Oorlam 
hegemony, German rule and South African occupation. The foci of this chapter 
are the traditions of civil supremacy that emerged during these episodes of 
foreign occupation. 
2.1) The Oorlam Hegemony 
Prior to European colonial intervention, Namibia17 was home to a variety of 
indigenous ethnic groups, such as the nomadic Khoi, the pastoralist Nama 
tribes, the Hereros, W ambo, the Damaras, and a number of Tswana groups 
[Totemeyer,1977:3; Lau,1987:3]. However, given the semi-arid/arid nature of 
Namibia, population numbers remained small. 
2.1.1) The Migration 
Between the late 1700s and early 1800s, a group of people of Khoi or mixed 
descent known as Oorlams, or "hat-wearers"18 entered Namibia from the south 
and established settlements. They had formerly served as guides, scouts, 
11 The term Namibia only came into general use in 1968. Before that the territory was referred 
to as South West Africa, der ived from its geographical position, and before that, during the 
German occupation, it was known as German South West Africa. However, for the purpose of 
consistency, the territory in question will be referred to as Namibia throughout this paper. 
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herders, domestic servants and agricultural labourers for the Dutch farmers. 
These Oorlams were a product of colonialism in the Cape, as they were 
Christians, spoke Dutch and wore European clothing. They survived through 
hunting and trading, as well as stealing livestock and supplies from the local 
indigenous people. 
Oorlams were a militaristic people, with each political community being 
dominated by a para-military group, known as a commando. 19 The most famous 
Oorlam family was the Afrikaners, under Jager, who settled in southern 
Namibia in the 1790s [Lau,1983:25].20 
Initially, the relationship between the Nama inhabitants and the Oorlam 
intruders was characterised by hostile tolerance on the part of the N ama 
population, with trade and the occasional skirmish being the only interaction 
between these two groups. However, relations between these two groups 
became increasingly strained as the Oorlams became more expansionist. The 
Oorlam groups, seeking to cement their presence in Namibia, utilised their 
superior firepower to secure further access to land, water and livestock. 
The decade from 1820 to 1830 was one of intense turmoil, with N amas being 
driven from areas of land by force, their cattle herds raided and much of their 
property destroyed. Relative peace was achieved in the early 1830s with an 
alliance being brokered between Jonker Afrikaner, third son of Jager, and 
Oasib, head of the most senior Nama lineage of Gai-//khaun. It was agreed that 
18 This was the term used by the Nama people. 
19 The commandos usually consisted of 10-20 armed men on horseback, but were known to be 
larger in number if the situation demanded it. 
20 For a more in-depth analysis of the Oorl,ams, their social organization, activities and 
conquests see: Lau, B. 1983. "The Kommando in Southern Namibia 1800-1870" in: C. Saunders 
(ed), Perspectives on Namibia, Occasional Papers No.4. (University of Cape Town: Centre for 
African Studies); Lau, B. 1987. Southern and Central Namibia in Jonker Afrikaner's Time 
(Windhoek: Windhoek Archives). Other families/groups included: the Khauas people, the 
Berseba people, the Witboois, the Swartboois, the Veldskoendraers, to name but a few. 
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Na.mas and Oorlams shared equal rights in Namibia, however, the Na.mas had 
been significantly weakened, both militarily and economically, by the decade of 
war, and so the Afrikaners gained control over the entire area east of Windhoek 
and north of Kuiseb. This enabled the Oorlams to control the trade route to the 
Cape (via Wal vis Bay) and have the monopoly of access to labour and cattle 
from Hereros living in those areas [Lau,1983:28-29]. 
2.1.2) The Emergence of the Afrikaner Regime 
Settled regional communities began to emerge, which were governed by 
constitutions or Ryksbeks. Churches were built and a system of roads 
constructed. The commando became the dominant institution for political 
organisation and identification, with leadership primarily determined by 
military skill and expertise. Jonker Afrikaner emerged as the sovereign over 
much of southern and central Namibia. Due to a system of alliances, mixing 
and intermarrying, old tribal structures, as well as social differences between 
Oorlam and Na.ma were discarded [Lau,1987:41-52].21 
From the 1840s, the Oorlams!N a.mas, due to their superior military strength, 
were able to establish and maintain feudal and tributary relations with the 
Herero and Damara people. Herero chiefs had to take care of large numbers of 
Afrikaner cattle, provide manpower support (servants) for commandos, and 
extract tax revenue from their dependants for the Oorlams!N amas. In return, 
Herero chiefs were issued with guns, their own cattle posts were not taxed, and 
they were allowed to enrich themselves when accompanying Afrikaners on 
various raids. In order to maintain control over the Herero people, foreigners, 
especially traders and missionaries, were prevented from gaining access to 
Hereroland [Lau,1987:107-110]. 
21 This is particularly evident in primary and secondary documentation when all references 
to historical distinctions between Nama and Oor/,am ceased. 
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2.1.3) The Demise of the Afrikaners 
By the early 1860s other Oorlam!N ama groups, backed by European traders, 
entrepreneurs and missionaries, began to challenge the Afrikaners' monopoly 
over the extraction of tribute and labour from the Herero. This involved 
sporadic clashes and complex political manoeuvring, which, combined with a 
scarcity of resources (surface water, fertile pastures and game reserves), the 
outbreak of disease (smallpox and cattle lung sickness) and the death of Jonker 
Afrikaner in 1861, significantly weakened the Afrikaner hegemony. 
In 1863 full-scale war erupted. British and German traders, with the support of 
indigenous mercenaries and N ama groups clashed with the Afrikaners and 
their allies (e.g. the Swartboois, Rehobothers and Witboois [First,1963:66]. In 
1970 a . peace agreement was brokered. The war had impoverished the 
Afrikaner regime to the point of collapse, and thus the Europeans were able to 
almost exclusively exploit the resources of the northern and eastern territories 
[Lau, 1987:111-141]. This marked the beginning of the European colonial epoch 
for Namibia. 
In summary, the period of Oorlam hegemony was characterised by deep 
ingrained militarism, where the reliance on force to settle disputes was the 
order of the day. Individual leaders used their political and military skill to 
gain control over a territorial area. Economic and material resources, including 
private armies, were employed to enlarge their domain of effective influence. It 
was a situation where the gun dictated power, a period characterised by a 
complete lack of political relations of consent. It was a time of warlords. 22 
22 According to Sheridan [1966: 1] a warlord "exercise[s] effective governmental control over a 
fairly well-defined region by means of a military organisation that obeyed no higher authority 
than himself" 
34 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
2.2) The Establishment of a German Colony 
2.2.1) The Germans Arrive 
The "scramble for Africa" in the nineteenth century between the European 
powers, driven by imperial greed for colonies, transformed any unclaimed area 
on the African continent into a desired commodity. Following the missionary 
incursions into Namibia, Britain and Germany competed with each other to 
gain control of this territory. In 1883 Adolph Luderitz purchased land from the 
Nama/Oorlam chief, Josef Fredericks of Bethanie for R200 and 200 rifles, and 
established trading posts at Angra Pequena (now Luderitz) and Bethanie 
[Mason,1995:248]. In August 1884, Germany annexed western Namibia and 
installed a very basic colonial administration. 
The formal colonial status of Namibia, like that of many African countries was 
eventually determined by the European powers at the Conference of Berlin in 
1884. Namibia was allocated to Germany, with the exception of Walvis Bay, 
which remained under British control. 
As Germany was the last European power to acquire colonies, 23 the necessary 
administrative experience and colonial policy was undeveloped. Perceiving 
economics to be the primary rationale for the acquisition of a colony (that is, to 
secure a market for German infant industries), and not wanting to overburden 
the German taxpayer , Chancellor Bismarck endowed German industrialists 
with the responsibility for colonial development in Namibia. In order to 
accomplish this the Deutsche Kolonwlgesellschafi fur Deutsch Sudwest-Afrika 
23 Most of Germany's colonial empire was the product of one year: Togoland and the 
Cameroons in July 1884, South West Africa in August, New Guinea in December and 
German East Africa in May 1885 [First, 1963:69]. 
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was established in 1885. Its primary focus was mining, but the company hoped 
that this industry would stimulate development in other sectors such as 
agriculture and trade [Esterhuyse,1968:121, 237-38]. However, these 
develop men ts were slow to take effect and the area was scornfully referred to as 
sandpotjie (little pot of sand) in Germany [Esterhuyse, 1968:66]. 
As with other African colonies, many of the governors of German colonial 
territories were men of military background, retired soldiers looking to acquire 
a professional reputation in the colonies. This was the case with the Governor 
of German South West Africa, Col. Theodor Leutwein. However, as the era of 
German conquest drew to a close, an increasing number of senior colonial 
positions were taken up by civilians. The Governors office supervised the entire 
administration, including armed forces and police. The Governor was also 
responsible for drawing up the territory's budget, but the Reichstag, the 
German legislature had to approve it. The Schutztruppen (colonial military) 
high command in Berlin was attached to the colonial ministry rather than to 
the army high command, an illustration of the low priority of colonial forces 
within the German military hierarchy. [Gann,1978:469-471]. 
German colonisation mimicked the model pioneered by the English and the 
French. Charted companies were granted concessions in exchange for capital, 
and the merchant missionaries replaced professional traders [First,1963:72]. 
With Bismarck being succeeded by Graf von Caprivi as Imperial Chancellor, 
alternative means were sought to make the colony more economically viable, as 
well as to establish and enforce German sovereignty and authority 
[Bley, 1971:36]. To achieve this, the colonial authorities saw it necessary to 
extend German influence and control further east. 
The German settlers had not attempted to occupy the northern areas, 
particularly Ovamboland, as they were perceived to be economically 
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unproductive, and the Ovambo inhabitants were heavily armed. Colonial 
officials relied on "protection treaties" instead, which facilitated the flow of 
migrant labour to the southern mines. Communication with Ovambo leaders 
was mainly through sympathetic missionaries [Hayes,1993:90]. 
The Berlin Conference led to the signing of the General Act of Berlin (1885), 
which stipulated that in order for a European power to effectively occupy a 
territory in Africa, it had to govern it [Pakenham,1991:253]. Consequently, the 
German administration encouraged colonists to move into areas that were not 
yet under German control. Armed colonists moved into the southern · and 
central areas, depriving the indigenous inhabitants of their land. This 
encroachment was met with minimal resistance due to the hostile rivalry 
between the Herero and the N ama24 as well as their constant feuding over land 
and cattle [Werner, 1993: 138-139]. 
2.2.2) The Indigenous Response 
Hendrik Witbooi, leader of the Witbooi clan, was able to mobilise significant 
Nam.a resistance colonial expansion, however, it was relatively short-lived as 
the Witbooi were forced to surrender at the Battle of Naukluft (1894) 
[First,1963:75]. This led to the Witbooi's collaboration25 with, and military 
allegiance to, the German colonial authorities, especially with respect to the 
pacifying of any anti-colonial insurgencies and assisting in the subjection of the 
Herero people to conditions of semi-serfdom [Alexander, 1983:53-56; 
24 Tensions between these two parties erupted in 1880 with the outbreak of the second 
Herero-Nama war, which was eventually brought to an end with the Peace of Rehoboth 
(1882) [Esterhuyse,1968:36] . This, however, did not prevent further hostilities between the 
two parties. 
25 Historically there has been much debate as to why the Witbooi collaborated with the 
German authorities. Currently, the generally accepted explanation is that Hendrik Witbooi 
adopted this strategy so that his people could retain their firearms, cattle and land, as well 
as their continued autonomy [Alexander, 1983:62]. 
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Bley,1971:33].26 The Khoua rebellion of 1896, for instance, was brough to an 
end by a combination of German military power and Witbooi commando force. 
The result was that the Khoua were interned in forced labour camps 
[Bley, 1971: 13]. 
There was a duality in terms of German policy towards the Herero. First, the 
Herero, not willing to co-operate with the colonial authorities as the Witbooi 
and Nama groups had, were perceived as a threat to German sovereignty and 
supremacy in southern and central Namibia. Second, the Herero, due to their 
accumulation of cattle and their opposition to "trading'' in livestock, were 
viewed as impeding the prosperity of the colony, which at the time was in 
financial difficulty. Cheap labour was required for the colony to become 
economically viable, and the Herero were earmarked to provide it 
[Bley,1971:113]. In order to achieve this the German Colonial Administration 
attempted to fragment the Herero people by restricting the power of the chiefs 
through "protection treaties", and undermined the Herero social system by 
exploiting intra-tribal rivalries [Bley,1971:117]. 
By 1903 these divide-and-rule policies, in conjunction with unscrupulous 
trading deals, resulted in more than half of the Herero's cattle wealth being 
transferred into German hands [First,1963:76]. 
The Hereros, fearing for their survival, rebelled against the colonial 
administration in January 1904.27 Settlers and soldiers were attacked, colonial 
infrastructure and farms were destroyed. The Herero regained complete control 
2s Other indigenous groups, such as the Swartboois and Rehoboth Basters were also 
conscripted to serve under German military authority. 
27 Herera Chief Maharero wrote to Hendrik Witbooi appealing for him to assist the Herera in 
their campaign: "Rather let us die together and not die as a result of ill-treatment, prison or 
all the other ways." However, his letter did not reach Witbooi, as the Rehoboth captain who 
was supposed to deliver it handed it to the German governor instead [First, 1963:78]. 
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of Hereroland. With the aid of German military reinforcements, the rebellion 
was eventually crushed in August of that year at the Battle of W aterberg. 
German dealings with the Herero did not end here. General von Trotha, the 
German Chief of Staff issued a Vernichtungsbefehl (extermination order) for the 
entire Herero population. This genocide was not purely for reasons of revenge, 
it had a more pragmatic end. Von ·Trotha, under increasing pressure from the 
German settlers, wanted to eliminate the Herero threat once and for all 
[Dedering,1993:84]. Thousands of Herero men, women and children were 
massacred by the German Schutztruppe (colonial military). The genocide order, 
however, was reversed before completion for economic reasons. A labour force 
for the period of post-war reconstruction was required [Soggot,1986:11]. 
Following the Herero defeat, and fearing the end to their autonomy (especially 
their access to arms) and even extermination, the N ama people under the 
leadership of Hendrik Witbooi and Jacob Marenga, revolted in October 1904 
[Alexander,1983:63]. They embarked on a guerrilla warfare campaign that 
lasted two years. However, organised resistance in the face of superior 
firepower of the colonists could not be sustained indefinitely, and the Nama 
were eventually defeated in 1906. The German Supreme General Command 
(1907) put the number of military encounters between the German forces and 
the rebels at 295 over this period. The final statistics of the war: sixteen 
thousand Hereros survived out of a population of eighty thousand. Amongst the 
Nama's the death tool was 10,000 in a population estimated at 20,0002s 
[Soggot,1986:11]. 
2s Amongst scholars of Namibian history there has been much confusion and debate with 
respect to the casualty figures following the genocide. Statistics from that particular period 
are not reliable, as they were largely incomplete and inaccurate estimates of the Herera and 
Nama populations made by German officials and missionaries. Recently, Brigitte Lau (1989) , 
in an article, "Uncertain Certainties: The Herera-German War of 1904", which appeared in 
Mibagus 2, argued that the extermination order was a means of psychological warfare, which 
was never physically realised. Lau claimed Horst Drechsler's authoritative work, Let Us Di,e 
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Survivors were interned in prison labour camps on the coast, where thousands 
died from starvation and disease. Leaders who were not killed were sent into 
exiled. By 1907, the Nama were divided politically, fragmented socially, and 
destroyed economically [Mason,1995:256].29 
2.2.3) The Consolidation of the Colony 
In the wake of the uprisings, central and southern Namibia became reserved 
for colonial settlement, and this was enforced through effective political and 
military control. This area became known as the Police Zone. 
In 1907 legislation was introduced to address the labour supply shortage which 
the genocide had brought about. This legislation sought to undermine tribal 
society by prohibiting Africans in the Police Zone from owning land or cattle, in 
order to force Africans to provide labour for the colonial administration 
[Soggot,1985:x; Katjavivi,1988:11]. Nevertheless, this legislation failed to 
release the necessary labour for colonial expansion, and the German authorities 
were forced to rely on migrant labourers from the north. 
No administrative inroads were made into Ovamboland, the area to the north 
of the Police Zone, as the inhabitants were armed and coherently organised. It 
Fighting (London, 1980) is ideologically biased and distorts statistical figures and historical 
facts. Randolph Vigne and Henning Melber responded to Lau's allegations in the Southern 
African Revww of Books (February/March and August/September 1990), by implying that 
Lau misunderstoOd some statements concerning the statistics of surviving Hereros and 
Namas by Drechsler. 
29 In May 1906 Jacob Marenga, fearing extermination by the Germans surrendered to the 
British in the Cape, where he was interned in Tokai Prison. He was released in June 1907, 
and made his way back to Namibia where he was re-united with some of his followers. The 
German authorities anxious that Marenga might return to arms, and provoke another war, 
pressurised the British to hunt him down and kill him. On the 20 September 1907 a British 
armed force of about a hundred men caught up with Marenga's party at Eensaamheidpan in 
Botswana and massacred them [Mason, 1995:247-256]. 
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was too much of a military obstacle to be overcome with the limited resources at 
the German Governor's disposal. Consequently, the colonial authorities entered 
into an official treaty with Ovambo tribal heads: in exchange for recruiting 
rights for labour, German protection would be guaranteed [Soggot, 1986: 19]. 
In the Police Zone, Africans had either been forced to work on white-owned 
farms or were being settled into impoverished "reserves". All in all the 
indigenous people of Namibia had very few political or social rights from birth, 
and the valuable resources ofland, cattle and minerals were in the handCJ of the 
white elite. The basic features of this colonial system were to remain fairly 
constant in the following decades. 
The growth of the copper mining industry and the discovery of diamonds in the 
Namib coastal belt near Luderitzbucht in 1908 stimulated industrial 
development leading to an increased demand for labour. The demand for labour 
was mostly met by Ovambos from the north of Namibia on fixed term contracts 
[Katjavivi, 1988: 12]. The harbour at Swakopmund was developed, and by 1912 
exports exceeded imports for the first time, as a result of diamond production 
[First, 1963:87]. 
In 1913 the colonial regime began to establish "reserves" on government-
owned farms in order to restrict Namibians to small areas, to exert political 
and economic control and ensure a steady supply of labour. The system also 
acted to fragment any indigenous political leadership that might pose a 
threat to tlie status quo. [IDAF,1989:13] By the time the First World War 
broke out, the basic structure of what would become the apartheid system in 
Namibia was already well established. 
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2.2.4) The Final Days of German South West Africa 
In much of the literature, the post-war period (1907-1915) has commonly been 
described as a time of African anguish and torment, devoid of anti-colonial 
resistance. Nevertheless, there were isolated incidents of indigenous defiance 
against the colonial regime, but lack of lack of military capacity and ideological 
unity precluded any coherent opposition [Prein,1994:99-101]. This defiance took 
many forms, such as the obstinacy to provide labour, and the formation of 
armed gangs that resorted to banditry30 [Prein,1994:103-107]. However, these 
acts of resistance did not have a significant impact on the maintenance of 
German sovereignty. 
In July 1915, following the outbreak of World War I, South Africa invaded 
Namibia at the request of the Allied powers.31 Fifty to sixty thousand South 
African troops easily overwhelmed the German garrison, who almost 
immediately surrendered. Martial law was declared and the territory was 
placed under the control of a South African military governor for the duration 
of the War [Cooper,1991:33]. 
2.2.5) Summary 
Civil-military relations within German South West Africa were influenced by 
five factors. First, even though Germany was not a democracy, constitutional 
techniques of civil supremacy were in existence, in that the colony's annual 
ao The most notorious group was the 'Rolf Gang' , comprised ofBondelswarts who attacked 
farms owned by Germans and stole cattle. The members of this gang were hunted down and 
hanged in October 1909 by the German authorities. 
s1 Namibia lay along the sea route between Europe and the East, and consequently could 
hinder the Allied transport of troops. Of equal importance, the German-built radio 
transmitter in Namibia, which allowed Berlin to communicate with the German naval fleet 
in the South Atlantic needed to be neutralised. 
42 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
budget, including military expenditure, had to be approved by the German 
legislature in Berlin. 
Second, the colonial military, the Schutztruppen, resembled a small 
professional force that was located within the colonial ministry rather than to 
the German Army High Command, further reinforcing civil control of the 
armed forces. 
Third, as Germany was late to the colonial game, German South West Africa 
did not experience the depth of colonial penetration that the British, French 
and Portuguese had in their colonies. Assimilation of local populations into 
German cultural traditions was virtually non-existent. Consequently, the 
military did not recruit from the indigenous population. The only exception was 
that armed indigenous groups that had been temporarily subdued by the 
colonial military, such as the Witbooi, were co-opted into assisting the colonial 
authorities in clamping down on local insurrections. 
Fourth, even though the military was relatively small, it was still able to wield 
significant influence in times of crisis, as was indicated by General von Trotha's 
extermination order. 
Fifth, the military was unable to penetrate the Ovambo areas in the North 
beyond the Police Zone. This meant that these areas remained relatively free 
from direct colonial involvement. 
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2.3) The South African Occupation 
2.3.1) South Africa's Mandate 
At the Treaty of Versailles, the colonies of the defeated Germany became the 
responsibility of Britain, France or their allies, under a mandate system 
administered by the League of Nations. On the 17 December 1920, Namibia 
was entrusted to South Africa on the behalf of Britain as a mandated territory. 
This brought an end to the period of martial law in Namibia. Under the 
mandate system, South Africa's obligation was to govern the territory and to 
promote to the best of her ability the moral and material welfare of the 
inhabitants [Katjavivi,1988:14]. South Africa would have preferred to annex 
the territory and rule it as part of the Union, but international and domestic 
pressures prevented this from happening [IDAF,1989:14]. 
The relationship between the League of Nations and South Africa deteriorated 
during the 1920s as a result of South Africa's discriminatory policies and 
actions. The Mandates Commission formally deplored the absence of "social 
progress" of indigenous Namibians, and the disparity of wealth between blacks 
and whites [Soggot,1986:20]. Consequently, South Africa became the target of 
much international criticism. 
With the demise of the League of Nations in April 1946 and its reformation as 
the United Nations Organisation (UN), the South African government lobbied 
for Namibia to be incorporated into South Africa. The South African 
government motivations for this request. First, the legal justification that 
South Africa's mandate had lapsed with the demise of the League. Second, 
South Africa claimed that, on the basis of a "referendum" amongst the 
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indigenous population, that Namibians favoured incorporation into South 
Africa32 [Soggot, 1986:21]. 
The United Nations rejected this request, stating that the former League of 
Nations mandate remained valid. This refusal was also motivated by the Scott 
Papers (documents presented before the UN by Reverend Michael Scott) that 
exposed the suspicious nature of the referendum, in which various chiefs had 
been deceived or misinformed. The UN requested South Africa to place 
Namibia under Trusteeship,33 as had been done with other mandated 
territories [du Pisani.1987:20]. 
After the election of the National Party Government in South Africa in 1948, 
the said government refused to place Namibia under the UN Trusteeship 
system. In 1949 South Africa discontinued its annual reports to the UN on the 
administration of the territory [Cooper,1991:73]. In 1950, after much legal 
wrangling, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the international 
status of Namibia could not be unilaterally altered by South Africa; in short 
South Africa's obligation as mandatory power prevailed [Soggot,1986:23]. 
Throughout the 1950s, international action concerning Namibia was depicted 
by a series of complex, but ineffectual attempts to negotiate with South Africa 
over the status of the Territory. In the face of this international pressure, South 
Africa merely strengthened her resolve, and claimed that the international 
community had no right to interfere with South Africa's administration of 
Namibia [Sparks & Green,1992:28]. 
s2 This so-called referendum was highly dubious. Individual votes were not required, instead 
pre-printed petitions appealing for Namibia's incorporation into South Africa were 
distributed by Native Commissioners to be signed by chiefs, headmen and counsellors on 
behalf of their followers. There was no official voters role, and the wording of the petition was 
vague and obscure. The South African Report on the outcome of the referendum revealed a 
poll of 208,850 in favour of incorporation; 33,520 voted against; 56,870 were not consulted. 
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2.3.2) Discrimination and the Imposition of Apartheid 
At first many black Namibians hailed the South Africans as "liberators". Some 
Herera and Rehobothers even offered the South Africans' military assistance 
against the Germans. A proclamation by General Louis Botha at the Versailles 
Conference raised Namibian expectations that land confiscated by the Germans 
would be returned to the original owners. In addition, Lord Buxton, Governor 
General of the Union of South Africa at the time, pledged the restoration of 
Herera "freedom, cattle and land" [du Pisani,1987:18].34 However, these 
promises did not materialise, as the South African government proceeded to 
settle white farmers, in large numbers, on Namibian soil [First, 1963: 106]. This 
was followed by the territory's incorporation into South Africa's monetary zone 
and customs union [Gottschalk,1983:72]. 
By 1926 it was evident that the South African administration held the white 
population's interests to be paramount, and viewed the non-white community 
as a potential pool of cheap labour. White settlers from South Africa and 
Angola, encouraged by incentives such as cheap loans, streamed into Namibia, 
where they were allocated farms on the fertile grazing lands of central Namibia 
[First,1963:107-108]. Black Namibians, on the other hand, were forced live in 
the marginal "reserve" areas, endure inferior education, low wages and poor 
working conditions, relative to what was offered to whites. Segregation was also 
enforced in the urban areas, where Africans were compelled to live on the 
33 Amongst other issues, the Trusteeship system paved the way for self-government in the 
respective territory. 
34 Added to this, the South African authorities established special criminal courts which tried 
cases of inhuman treatment and murder of Africans by Germans. A Special Commission of 
Inquiry was also appointed to investigate conditions under German rule. The Commission's 
findings were published in 1918 (the Blue Book), depicting the gruesome details of German 
colonial regime. These actions were not really for the benefit of the indigenous people of 
Namibia, but rather to undermine Germany's reputation as a colonial power [First,1963:92-
93]. 
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fringes of towns in "locations" [IDAF,1989:14]. In short, all the South African 
occupation represented was a substitution of one colonial master for another. 
The importation of the South African constitution and laws intensified the 
discriminatory practices. This legislation prohibited Africans from owning land, 
and restricted livestock ownership. Hunting was limited by taxes on the dogs 
which were used to track game. As the South African Administration became 
more entrenched in Namibia, so more apartheid legislation was introduced to 
the detriment of the indigenous inhabitants.35 
A measure of self-government was introduced to the territory in 1925, but for 
whites only. The South West Africa Constitution Act No. 42 of 1925 established 
a Legislative Assembly of which six were appointed and eighteen elected by the 
white constituency. The Assembly was endowed with limited legislative 
capacity, however, Native Affairs, Justice, Defence and a number of other 
legislative fields were reserved for the South African Parliament 
[Soggot, 1986:20]. 
2.3.3) Civil-Military Relations 
2.3.3.1) Civil Control: Constitutional and Professional Military Issues 
With Namibia being governed as an integral part of South Africa, and the 
South African constitution and legislation being effective in Namibia, there 
were some important implications for civil-military relations in the territory. 
35 Curfews were imposed on Africans in urban areas. Under the Masters and Servants 
Prodamatwn No. 34 of 1920 corporal punishment could be imposed on workers for desertion or 
disobedience; the Vagrancy Prodamatwn of the same year entitled the authorities to imprison 
or fine Africans not in officially approved housing or employment. The 1922 Pass Laws (No.11) 
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The Defence Act of 1912 granted Parliament supreme legislative supremacy 
in defence matters relating to South Africa's territorial integrity. A civilian 
Secretariat was created in the Department of Defence, which was based in 
Pretoria and had a financial oversight function [Seegers, 1996:20-35]. 
In addition, the composition of the Union (South African) Defence Force 
facilitated greater civil supremacy. It was comprised of a small Permanent 
Force component of professional soldiers and an Active Citizen Force made 
up of conscripted white males. 
2.3.3.2) The Military and Domestic Insurrections 
The military had an important role to play in Namibia, particularly in the 
pacification of the regions to the north of the Police Zone and in suppressing 
domestic insurrections. 
In 1917, in an attempt to extend South African control over Ovamboland, a 
joint South African-Portuguese military force was dispatched against Chief 
Mandume of the K wanyama, the second largest tribe in Ovamboland. 
Mandume had, up until that time, resisted both South African colonialism to 
the south and Portuguese rule to the north (in Angola) . The military foray was 
successful and Mandume and a hundred of his followers were killed. The head 
of Chief Mandume was then taken to Windhoek and displayed in public as a 
visual testimony to what would become of those who resisted South African 
rule [Katjavivi,1988:18; First,1963:98-99]. This was the beg.inning of what was 
to become strong military involvement in the region. 
restricted the movement of Africans and compelled them to carry identity documents in the 
Police 7.cme [Soggot,1986:18]. 
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In 1922 the Bondelswart Na.mas rebelled against the South African authorities. 
This was in response to their living conditions,36 debilitating stock controls and 
the increased taxation (especially taxes on their dogs, which were vital for their 
survival as hunters) that had been imposed on them. Without hesitation the 
South African security forces bombed and machine-gunned the Bondelswarts 
into submission, indiscriminately killing over one hundred men, women and 
children [Cooper, 1991:39]. 
In 1924 the army was once again used to subdue a further indigenous uprising, 
namely the Rehoboth Baster rebellion. This community had negotiated limited 
self-government for a small republic in central Namibia during the German 
colonial period. In response to the Rehoboth agitation against full incorporation 
into the South African Administration, the Rehoboth capital was surrounded, 
and over 600 Rehobothers, together with Herero and N ama supporters were 
arrested. The result was that the Rehoboth Council was stripped of all its 
powers [First, 1963: 104-105]. 
In all three instances the message by South African security forces was clear. 
Opposition to the South African regime, particularly armed resistance would 
not be tolerated. 
2.3.3.3) World War II and Recruitment 
During World War II, some 7000 black Namibians where recruited into South 
Africa's Union Defence Force to assist the Allied war effort. This was almost 
twice the number of black recruits that signed up from Rhodesia and South 
Africa combined. In terms of the League of Nations Mandate, it was illegal to 
recruit indigenous Namibians into military service, however, the South 
African administration, by only utilising Namibians as guards, drivers, 
36 The Bondleswart:s had been confined to a small arid reserve. 
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stretcher-bearers and medical and hygiene personnel, was able to avoid the 
legal implications. The Union Defence Force targeted the Herera speaking men 
primarily, as they were seen to embody a particular martial spirit. 
[Gordon, 1993: 14 7-148]. 
This military service lasted from December 1941 to January 1944. The recruits 
did not experience much of battlefront action, as the majority of the Namibian 
soldiers were used as labourers in South Africa [Gordon, 1993: 148-154]. 
Even though Namibia had been captured through military venture, and the 
armed focus remained the primary tool for securing effective South African 
governance in Namibia, active steps had been taken to ensure civil supremacy 
of the military. Constitutional arrangements and the presence of a small 
professional armed force supported by conscript battalions made up of civilians 
facilitated civilian control. In addition when the need arose, indigenous recruits 
were incorporated into the armed forces with ascriptive methods being applied. 
2.4 The Formation of National-Based Resistance 
2.4.1) The Emergence of Politically-Based Movements 
In the face of large-scale white immigration, pressures over land, highly 
exploitative labour practices, and a constitution that effectively ignored a vast 
majority of the population, black Namibians adopted a more organised and 
coherent response to the South African Administration through the formation 
of political organisations. Many of the earliest political parties in South West 
Africa began as non-political associations, which tended to focus on religious, 
cultural, economic or social matters. By the 1920s many of these organisations 
turned their attention to political issues. 
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Branches of the Universal Negro Improvement Association of Marcus Garvey 
were established in Windhoek and Luderitz in the 1920s and several hundred 
members were signed up. A branch of the Industrial and Commercial Union 
(ICU) was also established in Luderitz at roughly the same time. Ovambo 
contract workers on the diamond fields formed a benefit society whose primary 
objective was to compensate striking workers for the fines they incurred in the 
Labour Courts37 [SWAP0,1987:164]. 
In the wake of large scale dispossession of the Herero people's land, the Herero 
Chiefs Council, a traditional organisation, was established. Apart from 
providing leadership for the Herero, the Council acted primarily to observe, 
publicise and protest against discriminatory policies of the South African 
Administration. The Herero Chiefs Council became very active in petitioning 
the UN about the conditions in Namibia [Katjavivi,1988:39]. 
These first political associations were small, elitist and dominated by strong 
personalities. They were fraught with ideological divisions, ethnic tensions, as 
well as organisational and financial problems, and as a result many of these 
political associations were unable to sustain themselves [Sparks & 
Green,1992:24]. 
These political groupings crucial as that they gave workers a means of 
expressing themselves collectively, and played co-ordinating with respect to 
protest action. This led to strikes on the Luderitz (1923), Oranjemund (1937), 
Tsumbe (1939) and N ageib (1939) mines [Katjavivi, 1988:21]. 
37 In terms of the labour legislation (Labour Code), a striking worker would be fined R60 (a 
year's worth of wages, on average), or three months imprisonment. 
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2.4.2) The Rise of Trade Unionism 
Organisers of the Cape Town-based Food and Canning Workers Union 
introduced trade-unionism to Luderitz, the fish canning centre of Namibia, in 
the early 1950s. The Union began to lobby the South African Administration 
and the Legislative Assembly to bring about labour reform legislation. In 1952, 
the Union resorted to strike action, which achieved limited success, as workers 
gained an incremental increase in wages and an improvement in working 
conditions. This success contributed to the momentum for further campaigns, 
including a more prolonged strike in 1953 that nearly paralysed the Luderitz 
crayfish industry. 
The South Africa regime responded by declaring war on labour activism, with 
extensive efforts being made to crush the movement through physical and 
legislative repression38 [Sparks & Green,1992:25-26]. Labour leaders were 
constantly harassed, and many were imprisoned [Sparks & Green, 1992:26]. 
2.4.3) The Formation of the Ovamboland People's Organisation 
One of the most significant events of the 1950s was the creation of the 
Ovamboland People's Congress (0PC)39 (1957). The OPC grew out of the 
combined efforts of a group of some 200 Namibian workers and students based 
in Cape Town, who had been influenced and supported by the African National 
Congress (ANC), the Communist Party and the Liberal Party. These 
Namibians desired to improve the working conditions of Namibians, and 
38 For instance, the Terrorism Act was broadened to include activities that prejudiced 
industry or caused financial loss to any person or the state. Thus workers campaigning for 
higher wages and/or better working conditions were classified as terrorists. The penalties for 
contravening this law were severe, with the maximum sentence being death. 
39 Despite the name, the OPC was not made up of exclusively Ovambos, but it was largely the 
Ovambo people who were negatively affected by the contract labour system. 
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ultimately eradicate the discriminatory contract labour system in their country 
[SW APO, 1987: 172]. 
Among the founding members of OPC were Andimba Toivo Ja Toivo, Peter 
Mueshihange, Solomon Mi£.ma, Andreas Shipanga, Jackson Kashikuka, Jacob 
Kuhangua and Joseph Mutongolume. A group of Namibian students studying 
in Cape Town were also associated with the OPC, including Emil Appolus, 
Jariretundu Kozonguizi and Ottilie Schimming Abrahams [Katjavivi,1988:20]. 
At some point in 1958 the OPC was reconstituted as the Ovamboland People's 
Organisation (OPO). 
In April 1959 the OPO opened an office in Windhoek, and later Walvis Bay (as 
well as a number of branches in various locations throughout the country, 
including worker compounds). Its membership was open to all Namibians who 
subscribed to the OPO's objectives, namely, the abolition of the contract labour 
system and the achievement of national independence for Namibia 
[SWAP0,1987:173]. At this time Sam Nujoma was elected President; Louis 
Nelengani, Vice-President, while Lucas Nepela and Jacob Kuhangua were 
other prominent leaders. 
The OPO attracted substantial support, with a membership of several 
thousand. Although the OPO focused primarily on the position and welfare of 
contract workers from the north, it did however, attract people from other 
walks oflife [Katjavivi,1988:22-23]. 
The leadership structure of the OPO was robust, in that it effectively withstood 
constant harassment from the South African Police (SAP) and employers, 
without collapsing. Ja Toivo, after smuggling a tape containing oral evidence of 
South African oppression to the UN in a hollowed out copy of Treasure Island 
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was deported to Namibia (from South Africa), where he was placed under house 
arrest [SWAP0,1987:172]. 
2.4.4) The Creation of SW ANU 
In May 1959 the South West African National Union (SWANU) was created. It 
was an organisation that sought to provide a united front against South African 
occupation. SW ANU was primarily comprised of an alliance between urban 
youth, intellectuals4D and the Herero Chiefs Council. In September, several 
leaders from the OPO and other organisations joined the SW ANU executive, 
thereby broadening its national character [Soggot, 1986:25]. 
SW ANU, the Herero Chiefs Council and the OPO went on to facilitate protest 
action, including a defiance campaign which involved the boycott of municipal 
services in Windhoek. This campaign was launched in response to the City 
Counsel's decision to forcibly remove the entire black population from the "Old 
Location" to a township called Katatura, situated on the outskirts of Windhoek. 
This meant increased rent and transport costs for the already poverty stricken 
people. This protest action culminated in a march by mainly women from the 
"Old Location" in early December 1959 to the South African Administrator's 
residence [First,1963:200-201]. The Police refused to negotiate with the 
protestors, and attempted to arrest the leaders. Tensions flared and the police 
opened fire on the crowd. Thirteen people were killed and fifty-two were 
injured. 
40 These Namibians, who had studied in South Africa (as the secondary education system in 
Namibia was virtually non-existent), and influenced by the Defiance Campaign, formed an 
organisation called the South West African Student Body (SW ASB). On returning to 
Namibia, these youths spearheaded the formation of the South West African Progressive 
Association (SW AP A), an educational and cultural organisation. 
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In the aftermath of the massacre, police clamped down on the nationalist 
leadership. Kuhangua was deported to Angola, and Nujoma· to Ovamboland, 
but the latter escaped to lead the liberation movement in exile. 41 Louis 
Nelengani, Nathanill Mbaeva and many other leaders of the emergmg 
nationalist organisation were imprisoned, banned or restricted 
[SWAP0,1987:174-175]. 
Given intense police repression, ethnic tensions within the movement (SW ANU 
was dominated by Herero, while the OPO had mainly Ovambo membership) 
and rivalry between the youth and the traditional leaders of the Herero Chiefs 
Council, the fragile national alliance collapsed [Sparks and Green,1992:26]. In 
the years that followed SW ANU increasingly found itself unable to fulfil its 
objective of establishing a national liberation movement based on mass support. 
This was to be the OPO's role, which reconstituted itself as SW APO in 1960, in 
order to broaden its support base. 
2.4.5) Summary 
Ironically, the early period of South African occupation, from 1915 to 1960, saw 
more effective (democratic) methods of civil supremacy being employed. This 
was due to Namibia being regarded by the South Africa government as part of 
the Union. The South African system of civil supremacy, which had certain 
democratic characteristics, was extended to Namibia. 
It was also a period marked by the extensive use of the armed forces to pacify 
previously untouched areas and subdue domestic insurrections. 
41 Nujoma fled through Botswana, Zimbabwe, and settled in Dar es Salaam where he was 
accommodated by Julius Nyerere. After a few weeks Nujoma travelled to Nairobi, Kenya and 
caught a plane to Kartoum, Sudan. From there he travelled to New York. 
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The nationalist-based resistance to South African occupation that emerged 
during this period was to provide a solid foundation for the period of insurgency 
that was to follow. It is significant that after several unsuccessful attempts at 
military-inspired resistance, it was civilian oriented, socio-economic protest and 
opposition that ultimately led to the formation of SW APO, the organisation 
that was to lead the liberation struggle for the next thirty years. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that a tradition of civil supremacy, colonial in nature, 
emerged over three distinct phases in Namibia. Each phase corresponded to the 
intervention of a different colonial power, namely Oorlam, German and South 
African. The common trend running throughout all three phases was that there 
was almost a complete absence of political relations of consent. The coercive 
exercise of power was the order of the day. 
Each colonial power gained control of the territory through the use of armed 
force. The amount of military power at their disposal determined the extent of 
their territorial influence. The warlord-like Oorlams, who had fairly limited 
military strength, were only able to secure control of certain regions in the 
south of Namibia. The Germans, with more firepower at their disposal, but 
limited manpower and a lack of political will in Berlin, were prevented from 
pacifying areas to the north of the Police Zone. South Africa's military capacity 
was greater than that of the Germans. The South African security forces were 
able to cease control areas to the north, and draw on much needed labour in 
those areas for the development of the Namibian mining and fisheries industry. 
Despite the dominance of coercive political relations during this period, three 
contradictions can be identified. 
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First, the Germans introduced constitutional mechanisms of civilian control, 
and utilised a small professional colonial force, a hallmark of the democratic 
civil supremacy tradition. Second, South Africa introduced more rigorous 
methods of civil supremacy, such as parliamentary oversight and budgetary 
control, as well as a professional military supported by conscripts. Third, from 
the 1950s, through the influence of trade unions, the OPO and other political 
associations, democratic demands began to emerge in the workplace. 
These contradictions are, in all probability, due to the absence of a dominant 
tradition. There was always a rival tradition to the established one. As a 
result the civil supremacy did not remain static. Namibia was constantly 
invaded, thus preventing a single tradition from taking root. 
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Chapter 3 
SW APO: Development of a Nationalist Resistance Movement 
(1960-197 4) 
In SWAPO we don't divorce military matters from political matters - it is always politics 
which leads the gun. 
Andreas Shipanga, 1972 
Namibia's struggle for independence and liberation from South African 
occupation spanned a period of approximately thirty years. Starting with the 
emergence of small resistance organisations the struggle quickly escalated 
with SW APO talcing the lead and driving this resistance to greater heights. 
The struggle eventually culminated in a negotiated settlement with SW APO 
being installed in government through democratic elections. The historical 
analysis of this liberation struggle period will be divided into two fairly equal 
time periods, namely, 1960-1974 and 1974-1988. The dividing point is the 
Portuguese coup d'etat, an event that had a fundamental impact on southern 
African regional dynamics. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of SW APO during the 
period 1960 to 1974. The traditions of civil supremacy that emerged during 
this time will constitute the focal point of this chapter. 
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3.1) SWAPO: A Movement Born Out of Necessity 
3.1.1) The Formation of SWAPO 
By early 1960 the OPO had reached a crossroads. A large number of its 
influential leaders were either in exile, imprisoned, or confined to remote 
regions in Namibia by banning orders. Its development as an organisation 
was limited due to its narrow ethnic and political appeal. OPO still co-
operated with SW ANU and Herero Chiefs Council, but its role in the national 
liberation movement was uncertain. Tensions between the young nationalists 
in SW ANU and OPO members on the one hand and the Chiefs Council on 
the other undermined its effectiveness. In addition, a personal rivalries 
between two of Namibia's key international lobbyists, Kozonguizi and Kerina, 
possibly contributed to an increasing rift between the OPO and SWANU. 
In early June 1960 Kozonguizi met with Nujoma in Monrovia to discuss a 
possible merger between SWANU and the OPO. The merger was opposed by 
Kerina and the Chiefs Council, and therefore never materialised. In the 
immediate aftermath of this aborted merger, OPO leaders reconstituted the 
OPO as the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). This was an 
attempt to transform an ethnically and regionally based organisation into one 
non-ethnic and national in character that would have broader populist appeal 
[Soggot, 1986:28]. 
It is often erroneously held that SW APO was established on 19 April 1960. In 
fact, it was not until June 1960 that SW APO was officially inaugurated. This 
confusion arises as SW APO consistently celebrates its birthday on the 19 
April, which actually coincides with the formation of the OPO 
[Katjavivi,1987:45] . This is not surprising, as all SWAPO was at its inception 
was the OPO by another name, with most of the OPO leadership retaining 
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their original political positions. Sam Nujoma became President; Mburumba 
Kerina, Chairman; Ismail Fortune, Secretary General; and Jacob Kuhangua, 
Assistant Secretary General. 
The interests' of the contract workers remained close to the SW APO's 
leadership heart. This was indicated by SWAPO's motto: "Work in Solidarity 
for Justice and Freedom". The only significant change with respect to the 
OPO was the broadening of its aims and objectives. According to its 
Constitution, SW APO's aims and objectives were as follows: 
• ... to establish a free, democratic government in South West Africa founded 
upon the will and participation of all the people of our country and co-
operate to the fullest extent with all our African brothers and sisters to rid 
our continent of all forms of foreign domination and to rebuild it according 
to the desires of the African peoples. 
• To work for the unification of all the people of South West Africa into a 
cohesive representative, national political organisation, irrespective of 
their race, ethnic origin, religion or creed. 
• To work for the achievement of a complete independence for South West 
Africa and the removal of all forms of oppression such as Apartheid laws, 
contract system, Bantu education, and the introduction of universal adult 
suffrage and direct democratic representation of all inhabitants of South 
West Africa in all organs of the government. 
• To work for a speedy reconstruction of a better South West Africa in which 
the people and their Chiefs shall have the right to live and govern 
themselves as free people. 
• Reconstruction of the economy, educational and social foundations which 
will support and maintain the real African independence which our people 
desire for themselves. 
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• Maintenance of contact, exchange of views and information and co7 
operation with organisations and individuals dedicated with us to the total 
emancipation and reconstruction of our continent [Katj&vivi,1988:45-46]. 42 
3.1.2) The Establishment of an International Diplomatic Campaign 
As with the more established Namibian resistance movements, like the 
Herero Chiefs Council, international diplomacy was the principal strategy of 
the SWAPO leadership. The United Nations, especially the UN South West 
Africa Committee, was the prime target. 
Like many other anti-colonial movements of the time, SW APO established its 
political headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1962.43 Lacking 
sufficient financial and human resources the SW APO exile leadership had to 
make do with modest arrangements. Their offices were small, cramped and 
located in the back streets of Dar es Salaam. SWAPO's military camp , once 
established, was also modest, and was situated among the camps of other 
anti-colonial movements at Kongwa, in central Tanzania [Leys & 
Saul,1995:41]. At this time a small group of SWAPO members were sent back 
to Namibia to assist in the development of organisational structures of the 
internal wing of the Party [Putz et al, 1989:254]. 
Numerous attempts to reconcile SWAPO and SWANU, in order to establish a 
united front against South African occupation, were attempted, but without 
42 These aims and objectives were only formally framed some years after the formation of 
SW APO. In the interim the OPO constitution remained the guiding document for this 
liberation movement. 
43 Other liberation movements included the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(FRELIMO), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the People's Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-African Congress, and 
the South African Unity Movement (APDUSA). 
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much success.44 Kerina campaigned so strongly for this unity, that he 
alienated himself from the rest of the SW APO leadership. He eventually left 
the organisation in 1962.45 
SW APO established offices in New York, London, Moscow, Helsinki, 
Stockholm, Dakar, Algiers, Cairo, Francistown, and later Lusaka 
[Soggot, 1986:28]. SW APO representatives in these offices were able to 
establish support networks in their host countries. Over time they became 
increasingly effective in facilitating the isolation of South Africa in diplomatic 
circles [Saul & Leys,1995:41]. 
3.2) Recourse to Arms: The Launching of the Armed 
Struggle 
3.2.1) The Decision 
From the 1950s the idea of armed struggle had been actively debated in 
Namibian resistance circles, but was always dismissed as the necessary 
organisational and resource capacity was lacking.46 In addition, early forms 
44 Ajoint initiative by SWAPO and SWANU executives, with the co-operation of the South 
West African United National Independent Organisation, the Burgher Association of 
Rehoboth Council and th e Volks-Organisasie van Suidwse-Afrika, in October 1963, in 
Windhoek saw the formation of the South West African National Liberation Front 
(SW ANLF). It aimed to: solicit aid for the liberation movement in Namibia; inform the world 
at large about South West Africa; to represent the people of South West Africa in the councils 
of the world; to acquaint the people of South West Africa of the developments in the world at 
large. This initiative did not achieve all that much. The Herero Chiefs Council did not join it, 
and the SW APO leadership abroad did not endorse it. Consequently, the SW ANLF was 
short-lived, with the result being that SW APO and SW ANU went their separate ways, and 
continued to be rivals even today [Katjavivi, 1987:51]. 
45 Kerina claimed he resigned, but SW APO stated that he had been expelled. 
46 In fact before the formation of SW APO, a small clandestine military study group, the Yu 
Chi Chen (Chinese for "guerrilla warfare") was established in South Africa. It was made up 
of South Africans and Namibians, many of which would become members of SW APO. The 
group studied Marxism-Leninism and the writings of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara 
[Shipanga(a), 1972:7] . 
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of indigenous armed uprising had been met with a ruthless response from the 
colonial power. 
It was not until the early 1960s, with the formation of SW APO, that an 
armed struggle option began to be taken seriously. There was the increasing 
realisation that diplomatic solution could not unilaterally achieve the desired 
results. This strategy needed to be supplemented with more diversified 
action, and given the experiences of other liberation movements the most 
obvious choice seemed to be the armed struggle. 
From SW APO's inception, there was a major dispute within the organisation 
over how the armed struggle should manifest itself. The younger more 
militant members advocated a full-scale guerrilla war, while the older, more 
established leadership wanted this strategy to take the form of "armed 
propaganda"47 [Saul & Leys, 1995:42]. Due to the powerful influence of the 
latter group, the "armed propaganda" version was initially embraced, and 
would be actively pursued for the first decade of the struggle. This debate, 
however, was to continue throughout the duration of the armed struggle, and 
at times would even lead to open conflict within the SW APO structures. 
From 1962 onwards, six developments made the recourse to armed struggle 
attractive for SW APO. 
First, the advent of an anti-colonial war in Angola led to a co-operation 
agreement being brokered between SW APO and the liberation movements in 
Angola in 1962. 
47 Activists like Kenneth Abrahams advocated the "people's war" strategy arguing for the 
rooting of military action in the mobilisation of popular resistance within Namibian itself. 
Nujoma, and others seemed more inclined to see military activity as being primarily a matter 
of "armed propaganda", that is a cosmetic military wing, largely ineffective, but designed to 
push the United Nations into more assertive action. 
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Second, in the same year, SWAPO's external wing established a military 
training programme and dispatched a group of volunteers to Egypt, the only 
independent African country with a capacity for training prospective 
guerrilla insurgents [Soggot, 1986:29].48 A year later a group of SW APO 
members were sent to Ghana and Algeria for military training 
[Brown, 1995:20]. 
Third, the Organisation of African Unity, which was to provide financial 
support and political recognition of liberation movements, was also 
established in 1963.49 
Fourth, in 1964 SW APO was included among the movements receiving Soviet 
aid, including military hardware. 
Fifth, Zambia gained independence, which opened up the possibility for 
SW APO to move its h eadquarters from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka so that it 
could be closer to the Namibian border. 50 
48 In terms of the literature there is a lack of consensus as to how many SW APO recruits 
received military training abroad. David Soggot [1986:29] estimates the number at around 
200. This is confirmed by Shipanga(a) [1972:6] . Susan Brown [1995:20] , in a more recent 
analysis estimates number of cadres undergoing military training as "tens rather than 
hundreds". As SWAPO in exile was still very much in the embryonic stages, with limited 
funding, it would have been highly unlikely that they could have effectively maintained 
several hundred cadres in training, thus the latter authors estimations are probably closer to 
the truth. 
49 The April 1963 SW APO Congress confirmed the party's commitment to the armed 
struggle, and discussed many of the practical and logistical problems of preparing for armed 
struggle. Arrangements were made to accommodate the return of trained SW APO 
insurgents, such as improved communication and the creation of reception centres 
[Shipanga(a), 1972:6] . 
so According to Helao Shityuwete [1990:99], there were less than a 100 trained guerrillas 
when he arrived in Tanzania for training, however during the course of 1964, the numbers of 
recruits increased to approximately 300, with more awaiting training. SW APO was not the 
only Namibian liberation movement to send cadres abroad for military training. The 
National Unity Democratic Movement (NUDO), primarily a traditional Herera political party 
spearheaded by Mburumba Kerina, is also believed to have sent several hundred cadres out 
of Namibia in the mid-1960s for military training. Helao Shityuwete [1990:78] , a SW APO 
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Finally, SW APO merged with the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), 
which operated in the Caprivi strip. This allowed for the much needed 
material support and assistance for SW APO cadres when they infiltrated the 
Caprivi area. 
The official launching of the armed struggle was a matter of precise timing. 
The SW APO leadership did not want to derail the delicate diplomatic 
successes they had achieved, nor negatively deflect the highly valued 
international opinion away from SW APO. In addition, such a declaration, 
given the appropriate situation, could generate significant political and 
diplomatic leverage. In essence it was a situation that had to show that 
SWAPO was not "trigger-happy", and that the resort to armed force was 
morally justifiable. The 1966 International Court of Justice's ruling 
presented the perfect circumstances. 
Between 1960 and 1961 Ethiopia and Liberia, with the support of the United 
Nations General Assembly and the Second Conference of Independent 
African States51 initiated proceedings against South Africa at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). These two countries asked the ICJ to 
force South Africa to: fulfil its obligations and cease violations of the 
Mandate; to abolish apartheid in South West Africa; and to report to the 
United Nations concerning its administration [UN Office of Public 
Information,1971:22]. On the 18 July 1966, after some six years of 
deliberations, the ICJ made what was to become a highly controversial 
decision. The Court claimed that it could not rule on the substance of the case 
activist at the time, encountered a group of 150 NUDO members in April 1964, who were in 
the process of crossing over into Botswana with the ult imate objective of obtaining military 
training in a sympathetic African country. What became of these NUDO members, and their 
subsequent role in the armed struggle is only known to those who were involved. 
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as Ethiopia and Liberia had not established any legal right or interest to 
bring the case before the ICJ.52 
SW APO was disappointed by this decision, but was able to turn this 
diplomatic defeat to their advantage, using this date to officially launch the 
armed struggle. 
Apart from the diplomatic kudos.that the launching of the armed struggle 
brought about, there were two other major reasons for the SW APO leadership 
making such a decision, namely financial and political considerations as well 
as mobilisation potential. 
3.2.2) Financial and Political Considerations 
In May 1963 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was founded to 
promote organised and coherent policies among the non-aligned African 
nations, and to assist in the eradication of the remaining vestiges of 
colonialism in Africa [Robertson,1993:358]. An influential organ of the OAU 
was the Co-ordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa which was 
situated in Dar es Salaam. This Committee administered the Special 
Liberation Committee Fund made up of contributions from each member 
state. This Committee's function was to facilitate assistance to the nationalist 
movements in African countries where independence had not yet been 
achieved. Unity was encouraged where there was more than one liberation 
51 This conference held in Addis Ababa was the forerunner to the Organisation of African 
Unity. 
52 The Court declared that the League Covenant made no provision for individual League 
Members to institute actions in regard to the administration of a Mandate. The Mandatories, 
it said were to be "agents of the League" and not of the individual countries in the League; 
and the interest of individual States in regard to the Mandates could be exercised only 
through the appropriate organs of the international body. Therefore Ethiopia and Liberia 
were not entitled to the pronouncements they had asked of the Court, even if the various 
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movement, and those movements engaged in armed struggle received 
preferable treatment. Armed struggle was perceived to be the only indication 
that a liberation movement possessed the capacity to actively resist the 
colonial regime. 
The OAU endorsement also provided the bridge to obtaining funding from 
other sources. For instance, following its recognition by the OAU, SW APO 
began to receive material support from the Soviet Union [Brown, 1995:20]. 
Initially, both SW APO and SW ANU were recognised by the OAU, despite the 
competition between the two movements. By mid-1965, SW APO acquired 
formal political recognition from the OAU as the exclusive Namibian 
liberation movement in its eyes. This was due to intensive lobbying and 
diplomatic skill by the SWAPO exile leadership, as well as SWAPO's alleged 
willingness to initiate an armed struggle against the South African 
occupation regime [Brown,1995:20].53 SWANU, on the other hand, committed 
itself to the armed struggle option much later, and consequently found 
themselves out in th e cold. [Putz et al, 1989:255]. 
In reality, the designated liberation movements received very little financial 
assistance from the OAU, as it tended to spend more money on its operating 
budget than on aid to liberation struggles. This led Charles Chaliand 
[1969:108-109] to contend that the OAU was nothing more than a highly 
conservative organisation, with "all sorts of contradictory ambitions." This 
organisational ineptness combined with the fall of Nkrumah, the driving 
force behind the liberation struggle in Africa, led to the limited logistic and 
financial support almost drying up completely. Thus SW APO was forced to 
allegations of the Mandate violations had been established. The "moral ideal" must not be 
confused with the legal rules, the Court declared [UN Office of Public Information, 1971:30] . 
53 SW APO at this time already had members undergoing military training in various African 
countries. 
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make appeals to the international community for financial support. Petitions 
to Western countries fell on deaf ears and SW APO had to turn to Cuba, East 
Germany and the Soviet Union for assistance. 
3.2.3) Mobilisation of Support 
The fundamental advantage of SW APO's late entry into the liberation 
structure was the benefit of hindsight. SWAPO could learn from the 
successes and failures of the more established organisations. The 
fundamental guideline to be closely adhered to was that the masses had to be 
drawn into actively supporting and participating in the liberation struggle. 
During the mid-1960s the exile leadership came under increasing criticism 
within its own ranks. Accusations were being made about the leadership's 
lack of accountability and absence of commitment to the military solution. Its 
representativeness within Namibia was shrinking, and the SW APO 
leadership was losing touch with its membership. Armed struggle was seen 
as the means by which support could be mobilised. 
In summary, for SWAPO, the decision to engage in armed struggle was by no 
means based purely on military considerations, but rather involved more 
intricate motivations, determined by the framework within which insurgent 
movements had to operate that was well beyond their power to influence and 
change. It was a question of "adapt or die" . The only reprieve for these 
organisations was to manipulate the circumstances to their best advantage. 
Financial considerations were at the heart of decision, as armed struggle was 
an effective means of achieving international political recognition and access 
to resources, such as funding. Armed struggle could also be used as a 
valuable strategy to mobilise greater support for SW APO's cause within 
Namibia, and reinforce cohesion and control within the exile body. However, 
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the fact that SW APO l~gitimately desired to bring about its own liberation, 
on its own terms, and by its own means, cannot be underscored. 
3.3) Early SWAPO Military Operations within Namibia 
3.3.1) Teething Problems 
3.3.1.1) Omgulumbashe and Other Incidents 
By the end of 1965 small guerrilla groups, part of the South West African 
Liberation Army (SW ALA), were dispatched from Tanzania to positions 
inside the Namibian border in anticipation of the official launching of the 
armed struggle. Helao Shityuwete who was in the second group of ten 
insurgents, left Tanzania in February 1966 and moved south through Zambia 
and then west through Angola before entering Namibia. Shityuwete 
[1990:101] described the objective of the "G2" mission as follows:54 
Our mission was not to engage in military activity but rather to organise and 
prepare for the time when it would become necessary. 
The mission did not go according to plan as five of the guerrillas were 
captured by the South African Police (SAP) in Kavango in March 1966. Other 
guerrilla groups m anaged to evade police detection. 
Six SWAPO guerrillas under the leadership of John Nankuthu infiltrated 
northern Namibia and constructed a training and recruitment camp at 
54 The code name of this mission was G2. The members of this unit were "Castro" Awala 
(second in command of the SW APO armed forces) , Lazarus Haidula Zacharia (chief of the 
Military Police), Helao Shityuwete (Defence Secretariat), Elia Nduma (Medical Corps), 
Julius Shilongo (Reconnaissance unit) , Eino Kamati Ekandyo (Demolition Squad), Jonas 
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Omgulumbashe, which was betwee·n the village of Okayoko and the Finnish 
mission settlement at Okwaludhi. 
The sudden arrival of this insurgent group caused considerable anxiety for 
the internal SW APO political leaders, both in Windhoek and the north. The 
internal leadership had wanted more time to educate the local population in 
preparation for guerrilla warfare. This indicated a lack of consensus, if not 
communication, in terms of the type of insurgent strategy that SWAPO 
should adopt. 
The external leadership , divorced from the realties in the north of Namibia, 
were pursuing the romantic strategies of Che Guevara which postulated that 
the mere appearance of guerrillas would lead to mobilisation of the local 
population. The internal SW APO, more mindful of the conditions in the 
operational areas, realised that the more pragmatic, Maoist strategy was 
required. 
The Omgulumbashe base attracted about forty recruits, but was soon 
discovered and destr oyed by a SAP helicopter-borne offensive. Two guerrillas 
were killed, nine were captured together with the forty recruits from the 
surrounding area. For the SW APO leadership this defeat hammered home 
the reality that conducting a military campaign from Tanzania was a 
logistical nightmare. 
3.3.1.2) Post-Omgulumbashe 
Following the Omgulumbashe incident there were further guerrilla attacks in 
central Ovamboland against pro-South African chiefs and some white 
Shimweefelini, Festus Nehare, Nghidipo Jessaja Haufiku and David Hamunime (all from the 
"Gunners") [Shiyuwete, 1990: 101]. 
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farmers near Grootfontein. An escalation of these actions, however, was 
prevented by the SAP sealing off SW APO infiltration routes through Angola 
and Kavango. From this point onwards guerrilla action was restricted to the 
eastern half of the Capri.vi Strip until the Portuguese Coup in 197 4 
[Brown, 1995:21]. 
The relative military inactivity that followed the Omgulumbashe ensured 
that the military effort remained loosely organised. However, in 1973 
SW APO's armed wing re-organised and was re-named the People's Liberation 
Army of Namibia (PLAN). 
3.3.2) Tactics and Strategy 
Military operations conducted between 1966 and 1974 were Maoist in 
character. SWALA, unable to launch a direct assault against the South 
African forces, deployed small, armed groups who used hit-and-run tactics. 
The objective was to harass the SAP and SADF in an attempt to wear down 
their resolve. SW APO's military operations were, however, restricted by one 
crucial factor, namely demographics. Namibia's sparse population meant that 
SW APO could not survive the loss of more than a few thousand troops. 
Tactics consisted of mainly small-unit sabotage, ambush and harassment of 
enemy posts. South African patrol boats and police convoys were frequent 
targets of ambushes. South African military installations were also attacked, 
in which the SW APO guerrillas used bazookas, rifles, machine guns and 
hand grenades. 
SW APO did not have sufficient funds or supplies to equip all its cadres with 
modern weaponry. Some units had to make use of rifles of World War II 
vintage, while other fighters had no arms at all. Therefore, the capturing of 
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arms from the South Africans was an important objective in SW ALA 
operations. 
SWAPO's base areas within Namibia did not consist of fixed structures, but 
rather a combination of tunnels or sheltered areas. Some of these bases were 
used for the storage of arms and other material, while the others, located 
separately from the arms caches for security ·reasons, served as temporary 
base camps for SW APO guerrilla .units. Both were frequently relocated, due 
to the strength and prevalence of the South African security forces 
[Nganjone,1976:41]. 
In summary, SWAPO's early military activities were mediocre at best. They 
were characterised by humiliating setbacks, an extended period of inactivity 
and high profile insubordination. However, a basic revolutionary/insurgent 
tradition of civil supremacy had started to emerge. 
3.4) SW APO: An Assessment of the Organisation Dynamics 
The first five years of SW APO's organisational life were fairly stormy. It had 
inherited its original structure from the OPO, but SW APO's new role and 
mission, as well as the logistical, organisational, and communication 
problems of conducting a liberation struggle both from within Namibia and 
from exile meant that many changes had to be made to the organisation. The 
situation became more complicated with the advent of the armed struggle 
and increased popular support. It was only from the mid-1960s that SW APO 
took on a more coherent organisational form. 
What follows is an analysis of SW APO and its armed wing. 
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3.4.1) The Basic Structure of the Organisation 
The supreme organ and central policy-making body of SW APO was the 
National Congress. It included delegates from all sections of the party, 
including those mass bodies aligned to the party such as the Elders' Council, 
Women's Council (later Women's League), Youth League, SWAPO Branch of 
Journalists, and the Association ·of Democratic Lawyers of Namibia. It was 
the National Congress' responsibility to elect, and where necessary suspend, 
members of SWAPO's two other national organs - the National Executive and 
the Central Committee. 
The National Executive (which later became known as the Politburo) was 
composed of 11 members selected from the Central Committee, and was 
responsible for the day-to-day implementation of SW APO policy. It was also 
the Executive's responsibility to ensure that the resolutions of the Congress 
were carried out by all the organs of SW APO. 
The Central Committee consisted of 35 members. It was the "watchdog'' of 
the National Executive, overseeing the Executive's work, and often making 
recommendations to it. All major decisions of the Executive had to have the 
approval of the Central Committee. Between Congresses the Central 
Committee acted as the policy-making body [Shipanga(a),1973:7-8]. 
Those bodies aligned to SW APO proved to be crucial, especially in their 
ability to mobilise support. The Youth League was effective at the grassroots 
level, the Elders Council provided for consultation with traditional leaders, 
and the Women's Council sought to unite women in the struggle against 
colonialism domination [SW APO(a), 1986: 179]. 
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Departments were established to provide for the efficient running of specific 
areas of the organisation. For example, there were Departments of Health, 
Education, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Legal Affairs, Labour, Transport, as well 
as Information and Publicity [Nujoma(a),1976:28]. 
The system of national branches constituted the basic units of SW APO, each 
representing between 200 to 600 members. Their purpose was to carry out 
political education, agitation and recruit new members. Branches would 
organise public meetings, rallies and demonstrations. After the clampdown in 
1966, the national branches, in order to overcome these restrictions were 
converted into cells, which were much smaller units that operated 
underground. 
The cells co-ordinated their activities either directly among themselves at the 
district level or by meeting with SW APO regional leadership. It was the 
regional leadership's responsibility to co-ordinate the work of SW APO 
activists throughout the seven regions of Namibia and was directly 
responsible to national leadership. These organisations also recruited 
potential guerrilla insurgents and supplied fighting units in the field with 
food and shelter, and where possible transport. However, the effectiveness of 
early military operations into Namibia was hindered by weak or non-existent 
cell structures in northern Namibia and the presence of the South African 
security forces. See Appendix 1 for organisational diagram of SW APO. 
The National Congress was supposed to meet on an annual basis inside 
Namibia, however, this became unworkable due to the security clampdown 
following the announcement of the armed struggle and the fact that most of 
SW APO's leadership was in exile. From 1963 until 1989 the Congress only 
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met a few times on an ad hoc basis outside Namibia.55 As most of the 
members of the Central Committee were often in different parts of the world 
campaigning and lobbying for the liberation of Namibia, the Central 
Committee did not meet as regularly as it should have. This state of affairs 
led to the movement being dominated by the Executive, with many important 
decisions being made without consulting the Central Committee. 
3.4.2) SWAPO's Armed Wing and its Military Program 
The actual date of the creation of SW APO's armed wing is unclear, but at the 
1961 SW APO Nation al Congress it was decided to send a group of individuals 
abroad for military t raining. They received eight months basic instruction in 
small arms, explosives, mines, radio communications and politics [Herbstein 
& Evenson,1989:14] . It was anticipated that on their return they would 
constitute the core of what would become a national liberation army 
[SW APO(b),1977:14]. 
As the· number of military-trained cadres increased, and with more recruits 
awaiting training, it became necessary to create a body capable of organising 
and co-ordinating military activities in a coherent fashion. In addition, as 
these cadres had been trained in a number of different countries with 
different weaponry, it was crucial that an organised structure be created to 
55 One of the most significant Congresses was held in Tanga, Tanzania (December 26, 1969 to 
January 3, 1970), where the progress of the struggle was assessed, and the SW APO's 
commitment to it strengthened. Also at this Congress policy, organisational and certain 
leadership changes were made, and the leadership was criticised and in certain instances 
replaced. The resolutions of this Congress set the principles and policies of the organisation 
that would guide the work of all SW APO members in the future [SW APO(a) , 1986: 179]. It 
was attended by 30 people, including the external leadership, military wing, students, 
women, SW APO diplomats, where the SW APO external leadership claimed to be acting on 
the behalf of the internal leadership. There was much unfinished business, such as the 
drafting of a new constitution. A task group was created to draw up proposals for a new 
constitution for the next meeting in late 1974, and a special organising committee would be 
appointed, at least a year in advance of that date, to make preparations for it. However, no 
such draft constitution or congress was forthcoming. 
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facilitate unified training and retraining. As a result the South West African 
Liberation Army (SW ALA) was born. With the advent of material support 
from the OAU and foreign donors, SW ALA grew in size and stature. By the 
late seventies it become a fairly effective insurgent organisation. 
3.4.2.1) Military Structure (see Appendix 2) 
SW ALA was hierarchical in nature. At the top of the hierarchy, and 
responsible for political leadership, was the Commander-in Chief (President 
of SW APO). Directly under the Commander-in-Chief was the Deputy 
Commander-in Chief who was responsible for all military operations. There 
was also the Secretaries of Defence and Transport, who were in charge of all 
logistical operations, and reported to and advised the National Executive 
[Nganjone,1976:40]. The armed wing was initially divided into various 
sections: Demolition Squad, Military Police, "Gunners", Reconnaissance 
Squad, and the Medical Corps [Shityuwete, 1990: 10 l]. 
In the various operational areas SW APO guerrillas were organised into 
platoons, or smaller groups if the situation demanded it. In the case of large-
scale offensives, several platoons were often amalgamated into one fighting 
force. 
Each unit was led by a political commissar and a commander. The political 
commissar was responsible for maintaining morale and discipline, as well as 
conducting political education within the unit. It was his responsibility to 
ensure that the fighters acted in accordance with SW APO's basic political 
principles, especially in relation to the local population. Moreover, the most 
important task performed by the political commissar was political oversight 
of military decision-making. 
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The commander was primarily responsible for military issues, such as 
logistics, tactics, the conduct of operations, and discipline. The platoon 
leaders were assisted by a deputy commander, deputy political commissar 
and other officers who were responsible for tasks such as first aid and 
reconnaissance [Shipanga(a), 1972: 14]. 
Within each operational zone the platoon leaders co-ordinated their work 
through the regional leadership headed by a political commissar and a 
commander. At the national level there was the SW APO Military 
Commission, comprised of military commanders, as well as leaders from the 
non-military spheres of the struggle, such as the Secretaries of Defence and 
Transport. The Military Commission was responsible for determining overall 
military strategy. The Commission travelled throughout the operational 
areas and met with the platoon and smaller unit leaders, who advised the 
Commission about conditions in their areas [Shipanga(a),1972:14]. 
3.4.2.2) Military Programme 
Up until 1973 SW ALA had four operational zones within Namibia, areas 
where SW APO guerrillas were active on a regular basis. These operational 
zones were as follows: Kaokoveld, Ovamboland, Okovango and Grootfontein 
District, and the Caprivi Strip.56 
The most of the inhabitants of these zones were African peasants. At certain 
points, especially in the Okovango, they were evicted from their traditional 
56 Kaokoveld, which is situated in the north-west of Namibia, below the Cunene River is a 
dry and mountainous area with forests and grasslands further to the north near the Cuene. 
Ovamboland is essentially flatland with some semi-tropical areas near the Angolan border. 
The Okovango was the so-called "native reservation" where there are thick forests and 
grasslands. Grootfontein is a farming area that was occupied by mainly white settlers. The 
Caprivi Strip is situated between the Zambezi River in the east and the Okovango River to 
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areas and relocated to "strategic hamlets" where they were surrounded by 
South African security forces and were only permitted to leave the camp with 
special passes. s7 Outside these villages most Africans were engaged in 
subsistence agriculture and cattle-raising. 
The geographical position of the Namibian border area made the conduct of 
guerrilla warfare difficult for SW APO insurgents. In addition, the South 
Africa security forces compounded this problem by attempting to close off 
Namibia's northern borders. They even went so far as to erect a barbed wire 
fences along the borders with Angola and Zambia. 
SW APO guerrillas derived most of their food, clothing and medicine from the 
local Namibian people, with SW APO cells being tasked to co-ordinate these 
logistics. The platoon's political commissar would arrange with local cell 
leaders to supply his unit. Sometimes the units would pay for supplies, but if 
funds were lacking, then other items of value, such as tobacco, salt or even an 
overcoat could be traded for an ox or goat. In some places the insurgents grew 
their own food, such as tomatoes, or even maize - but generally only crops 
that would ripen quickly. 
In summary, the manner in which SW APO and its armed wing were 
structured indicated that civil supremacy was a priority for the leadership. 
Political control of the armed forces, from the executive right down to the 
local level (including a system of political commissars), was envisaged. 
However, these systems still had to be put to the test. 
the west and south. It is a lush area criss·crossed by many streams and thick vegetation. 
Large expanses of land were cleared to make way for South African military bases. 
57 This in the true tradition of counter-insurgency warfare, that had been employed by the 
South African security forces. 
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3.5) "Between a Rock and a Hard Place": Conditions in 
Exile 
During the 1960s SW APO's external leadership naively perceived life in exile 
to be a temporary arrangement, simply to be tolerated until their diplomatic 
efforts in combination with external factors, such as international pressure, 
could create conditions favourable for their victorious return to Namibia. 
However, as months turned into years, coupled with limited successes on the 
domestic and international fronts, SW APO was forced to confront the reality 
of a prolonged period of exile. In order to survive, the SW APO leadership 
embarked on a number of strategies to secure long term financial and 
material support. 
The leadership sought to project an image of SW APO as an effective and 
unified organisation campaigning against the evils of colonial oppression. 
There was no room for dissenting voices or signs of weakness within the 
movement. Any competition to SW APO was not to be tolerated, with the 
demise of SW ANU bearing testimony to this. It was a situation that 
demanded strong, competent leadership that could make decisions on the 
spur of the moment and not have to consult its entire constituency on a 
regular basis. There was limited room for the luxuries of democratic process. 
3.5.1) Strategies for Survival 
3.5.1.1) The United Nations 
During the 1950s the majority of African liberation movements sought to 
utilise the United Nations, and its concepts of trusteeship, in their campaigns 
to bring an end to colonialism. After much lobbying they were eventually able 
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to secure a broad moral condemnation of colonialism and racism. In essence 
the UN was able to offer a symbolic legitimisation of liberation movements' 
aims, and in certain cases tacit acceptance of guerrilla/revolutionary action. 
However, as time progressed the absence of support from its more powerful 
members (namely the Western powers), the UN was unable to support such 
aims with any real conviction, and rather became an arena for the non-state 
actors to relieve psychological tensions and frustrations through rhetoric. For 
SW APO, excessive dependence on the United Nations' political and legal 
processes became demoralising. 
3.5.1.2) Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
SW APO's second port-of-call was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 
Initially, African backing for revolutionary action was provided by the Pan-
African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (1958-63), 
and its co-ordinating Freedom Council. Even though this organisation only 
contributed on average $3000 a year to a given exile movement, it did, 
however, manage to establish the principle of collective African responsibility 
for the liberation of Southern Africa. 
This body was superseded by the formation of the OAU (1963), a political 
compromise between two factions of African leaders, namely the Casablanca 
Group and the Monrovia Group.58 The OAU adopted principles that 
envisaged harmony, co-operation, nonalignment with respect to the Cold War 
58 Despite the overwhelming agreement among African leaders that the promotion of pan-
Africanism required the creation of a transcontinental organisation, major disagreement 
existed over the proper structure and goals of such an organisation. According to Nkrumah 
and other African leaders who belonged to the Casablanca Group, the success of pan-
Africanism required a political union of all independent African countries patterned after the 
federal model of the United States. The Monrovia Group rejected the idea of political union 
as both undesirable and unfeasible, primarily due to the assumption that African leaders 
would jealously guard their new-found independence. Led by Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa 
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ideological blocs, as w~ll as the emancipation of all colonial territories in 
Africa. The OAU Liberation Committee assumed the function of translating 
unity, solidarity and the need for anti-colonial revolution into endorsement of 
particular Southern African movements. This Committee provided funding 
for these movements. Consequently, the Liberation Committee became an 
important arbiter and conciliator of revolutionary exile politics. 
For SWAPO, being a small liberation movement with limited resources and a 
very low international profile, OAU recognition was critical to its survival. In 
most cases OAU endorsement of a liberation movement operating beyond the 
borders of their native country was key to guaranteeing asylum, securing 
additional financial and logistic support, and ensuring safe passage through 
neighbouring countries. This was the primary motivation behind SW APO's 
attempts (which were successful) to sideline its immediate competition, 
namely SW ANU, politically. Without OAU recognition SW APO would not 
have been able establish its headquarters in Tanzania, then Zambia, and 
later Angola. 
The OAU Liberation Committee, however, was unable to acquire the 
necessary professional proficiency and generate sufficient funding to realise 
its objectives. Liberation movements, and especially SW APO, had to look 
elsewhere for external assistance. 
3.5.1.3) East Vs West Support 
As most anti-colonial revolutionary struggles were perceived by the United 
States and many European states to be the preserve of the Communist 
powers, such as the Soviet Union and China, significant Western support, 
Belewa, prime minister of Nigeria, the Monrovia Group , instead called for the creation of a 
looser organisation of Afr ican states. 
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except in the case of certain non-military related training, was not 
forthcoming. In fact, United States (US) endorsement or even presumed 
assistance became a liability for many exile groups. It got to the point where 
allegations of covert US assistance became a convenient weapon with which 
to discredit a rival. 
Initially, SW APO was able to secure both Chinese and Soviet assistance but 
with conflict increasingly characterising the relationship between these two 
powers, SW APO became increasingly reliant on Soviet support 
[Shultz, 1988: 120]. The increasing reliance on Soviet support was to have a 
significant impact on the way SW APO conducted its military operations, as 
they were to become more conventional in nature, with the military victory as 
the ultimate objective. The Chinese model, on the other hand, advocated a 
protracted war of attrition. 
3.5.2) Dissatisfaction and Insubordination 
For most SW APO members life in exile was difficult. Namibians had to 
endure gruelling conditions just to reach SW APO's external head quarters. 
Most individuals lacked adequate funding, food, water, transportation, and 
often had to travel long distances on foot. There was always the constant 
threat of being captured and imprisoned by the South African security forces 
and their allies. Once under the protection of SW APO living conditions were 
equally difficult. At times there was insufficient food, clothing and weapons. 
For many Namibians, this was the first time away from home from their 
families and they h ad difficulty adapting to these trying circumstances. 
These conditions were exacerbated by SW APO's defeat at the hands of the 
South African security forces at Omgulumbashe. This led to a relatively 
prolonged period of military inactivity. As result SW APO cadres began to 
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display dysfunctional behaviour, such as personal aggression, in-fighting, ill-
discipline, alcohol abuse and desertions.59 John Marcum [1972: 270-273] 
identifies this behaviour as typical to exile condition of liberation movements. 
These difficult conditions of exile were intensified by the advent of two other 
phenomena. 
3.5.2.1) The "Castro" Incident 
The commander of SW APO's armed wing, Leonard Phillemon (combat name 
"Castro") was suspected of being in collaboration with the South African 
regime, especially after his capture and subsequent release. He was believed 
to have alerted the police to the Omgulumbashe base, informed on SW APO 
leaders within Namibia, which lead to their arrest and directing SW APO 
cadres into South African security force ambushes [Shityuwete,1990:167-
168]. The SW APO leadership were loath to take these accusations seriously, 
and as a result combatants felt their lives were endangered by passive 
attitude towards him [Saul & Leys,1995:43-44]. 
Castro was eventually imprisoned by the SW APO leadership in 1970. 
3.5.2.2) The "China-men" Incident 
In the latter part of the 1960s, a group of seven SW APO cadres, who had 
received rigorous military training in China, returned to SW APO's military 
59 These phenomena did not only plague the rank-and-file SW APO members, but were also 
evident among the SW APO leadership. For instance, in December 1965 Louis Nelengani, 
then SW APO Vice-President was involved in a knife-fight with Jacob Kuhangua, SW APO 
Secretary-General. During the fight Nelegani stabbed Kuhangua, permanently paralysing 
him from the waist down. A local court in Dar es Salaam found Nelengani not guilty of any 
charge because of the provocation from Kihangua. However, Nelengani soon returned to 
Namibia a disillusioned man [Katjavivi, 1988:62]. 
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headquarters in Kongwa, Tanzania. This group criticised the SW APO 
leadership's understanding of military strategy and tactics. These cadres 
perceived the inadequate supply of weapons and other essentials as signs of 
mismanagement and corruption. These observations and critiques were 
summed-up in a memorandum which was read to officials in the camp. It 
demanded Castro's dismissal, the end to "Ovambo-rooted tribalist behaviour", 
and for a party Congress to be held [Saul & Leys, 1995:44]. 
This memorandum was not well received by the SW APO leadership. The 
"China-men" fearing arrest, attempted to resign from the movement, but 
were prevented from doing so. The camp commanders detained the seven and 
handed them over to the Tanzanian Army. They were later arrested and held 
for 6 months in Dar es Salaam Central Police Station, followed by 18 months 
in Keko prison, before they were moved to a low-level security Ndabaro camp 
in a remote region of Tanzania. After some time they were able to escape to 
Kenya [Saul & Leys, 1995:44]. 
John Saul and Colin Leys [1995:44-45] attribute the SW APO leadership's 
draconian response to the criticisms and protests by the "China-men" as a 
manifestation of a strong authoritarian culture that had evolved within 
SWAPO's corridors of power. Any challenge to the leadership's entrenched 
position of power was severely dealt with. There is no doubt that 
authoritarian tendencies had begun to take root. Given this fairly fragile 
stage of the struggle, it was inevitable that a democratic culture had been 
suppressed within SW APO. 
There was more to the SW APO leadership's knee-jerk reaction than mere 
political insecurity. The fact that the "China-men" were highly skilled 
guerrilla fighters, who had rejected SW APO's "soft" utilisation of the armed 
struggle and accused the leadership of being inept in the area of military 
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strategy was critical. They were also capable of mobilising significant 
numbers of SW APO cadres to their cause. There had been a potential threat 
of military intervention or coup d'etat, which would have brought about the 
demise of SW APO's civilian leadership. Consequently, it can be argued, that 
one of the motivating factors behind the SW APO leadership's reaction was a 
desire to maintain civil supremacy over the military wing. 
3.5.3) The Tanga Congress 
The SW APO Executive Committee, in the face of a certain degree of internal 
dissent organised a Consultative Congress in Tanga, Tanzania in late 
December 1969. This was an attempt to pre-empt further crises, as well as 
deal with issues of organisational management and constitutional 
amendments. Organisation issues to be attended to included the system of 
financial accounting, and communication between external and internal 
components [SWAP0,1965]. The armed struggle still had to be 
constitutionally ratified. 
Thirty participants attended the Congress, with all elements of the 
organisation being represented except for the internal body, whose delegates 
could not leave Namibia for security reasons. At this Congress several 
leadership changes were made. Vice-President Louis Nelengani was expelled 
for turning state witness in the 1967/8 "treason" trial. In order to reinforce 
the strategic alliance with CANU, former-CANU President, Brendan 
Simbwaye was elected as SW APO Vice-President.60 Moses Garoeb and Toivo 
Ja Toivo were elected as Administrative and Secretary General respectively 
[Katjavivi,1988:105]. At the end of the Congress a number of issues were still 
60 As Simbwaye was in detention in Namibia at the time, his immediate former subordinate, 
Mishake Muyongo was elected as Acting Vice-President. 
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outstanding, particularly communication between the external and internal 
bodies. 
3.5.4) Summary 
The late 1960s and early 1970s severely tested the SW APO leadership's 
ability to enforce civil supremacy. South African security force crackdowns, a 
lack of funding and a desire not to undermine diplomatic successes, forced 
SW APO's armed wing into a state of relative inactivity. The SW APO 
leadership, inexperienced in dealing with military concerns, did not maintain 
its military wing adequately. Weapons, food, clothing, as well as combat 
action, were in short supply. This inevitably led to insubordination, which 
could have developed into a coup d'etat, if it had not been rapidly contained. 
As shall be seen in later chapters, this was simply a taste of things to come. 
3.6) SW APO Inside Namibia 
Unlike the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) in South Africa, SW APO was never formally banned during the course 
of the liberation stru ggle. South African authorities, however, made it illegal 
to endorse or openly support armed struggle. This allowed some form of 
visible party apparatus within Namibia, but also enabled the security forces 
to monitor SWAPO's activities with greater ease [Cliffe,1994:20]. As a result, 
up until mid-1960s SWAPO was able to function openly with regional and 
local branches, as well as public meetings with minimal disruption by the 
security forces. However, as SW APO's struggle for independence intensified, 
especially after the launching of the arined struggle, SW APO's activities 
became increasingly restricted and in certain areas (particularly in the north) 
outlawed completely, thereby forcing SW APO to operate increasingly 
underground. 
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Between 1960 and 1974 SWAPO's domestic activities were dominated by 
three events: the Treason Trial (1967), the General Strike (1971-1972) and 
the boycott of local elections in Ovamboland (1973) [Katjavivi,1988:65]. 
3.6.1) The Treason Trial 
Following the declaration of armed struggle between 100 and 250 SWAPO 
activists were arrested under the Suppression of Communism Act, including 
Nathaniel Mahuilili (Acting President), John Ya Otto (Acting Secretary 
General), Andimba Ja Toivo (Regional Secretary for Ovamboland) and Jason 
Mulumbulua (Secretary for External Relations). They were taken to Pretoria 
and detained. 
In an attempt to crush SWAPO, the South African regime introduced new 
legislation in the form of the Terrorism Act in July 1967. This act was made 
retroactive to 1962 to cover many SW APO activities, and extended the period 
of detention without trial indefinitely and introduced the death penalty for 
certain crimes. Thirty-seven Namibians were formally charged under the 
Terrorism Act [Katjavivi, 1988:61]. 
The case was held in late 1967 and early 1968. During the trial one of 
SW APO's founders and former SW APO Vice-President, Louis Nelengani, 
after intense torture and interrogation by the Security Police, turned state 
witness. The defence team realising that prosecutions against the SW APO 
activists in an partial apartheid court was a forgone conclusion, concentrated 
on minimising their clients' final sentences. However, the accused, not 
wanting to be perceived as collaborating with the South African regime, took 
a defiant stand. Ja Toivo acting on the behalf of all the 37 accused condemned 
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the judge and the system, which had put them on trial in his final sti;ttement 
[Ya Otto,1982:129] . 
The outcome of the trial was as follows: twenty of the detainees were 
sentenced to life imprisonment. Nine, including Ja Toivo got twenty years 
hard labour; Jonas Nashwela and Nathaniel Lot Hamateni got 5 years; Ya 
Otto, Mutumbulua and Mahuilili were sentenced under the Suppression of 
Communism Act to five years with four years and eleven months suspended. 
Matheus Joseph was discharged; Simeon Ipinge Iputa was acquitted 
(Ephrain Kaparo died during the trial). In addition eighty-one other SW APO 
activists had been named as co-conspirators, who included the SW APO · 
leadership abroad and certain members within Namibia, but in the end they 
were never brought to trial [Katjavivi,1988:63-64]. 
3.6.2) The General Strike 
In 1971 protests took place throughout Namibia. By late December a nation-
wide strike was in effect, which according to Ya Otto [1982:141], had been 
strategically planned many months before. Approximately 20 000 workers 
(over half of the total Namibian work force) participated in the strike action, 
and an ad hoc strike committee led by Johannes Nanutuuala was established 
to represent their workers, direct strike activity and formulate a manifesto 
that outlined their grievances. The objective of this strike was to incapacitate 
Namibia economically, which was to be achieved by having contract workers 
return to Ovamboland until the contract labour system had been abolished 
[Soggot, 1986:48-49] . 
Some 18 000 returned to Ovamboland, 13 500 of which were deported by the 
South African regime in an attempt to break the strike. Other measures such 
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as intimidation and arresting prominent strike leaders, were attempted, but 
without much success [Katjavivi, 1988:68-69]. 
Eventually, through the series of promised concessions, and some underhand 
tactics by the South African authorities, the strike was brought to an end.61 
However, with the new labour dispensation workers came to realise that in 
fact no significant changes had materialised, and labour unrest and acts of 
violence began to increase, with the Namibia/Angolan border fence being 
broken down [Soggot, 1986:49]. White women and children in the northern 
regions were evacuated to areas in the south of the country. The South 
African Defence Force (SADF) was sent in for the first time and Portuguese 
troops moved south across the border with Angola to assist them. Strike 
meetings were broken up, and people were rounded up en mass. 
On 4 February 1972 a state of emergency was declared in Ovamboland under 
Proclamation Rl 7. Proclamation Rl 7 remained in force until 1977 when 
other security legislation affecting the whole country replaced it 
[Katjavivi, 1988:69]. 
3.6.3) The Ovamboland Election Boycott 
In 1973 the South African regime introduced the Self-Government for Native 
Nations in South West Africa Amendment Act, which provided the basis for 
elections to be held for legislative assemblies in Ovamboland and Okavango, 
leading to their attainment of "self-governing" status. Through such moves 
the South African government hoped to deflect national and international 
pressure on it to withdraw from Namibia [Katjavivi,1988:74]. However, in 
Ovamboland, the Legislative Council ruled that only approved parties could 
s1 For instance, Johannes Nangutuuala was persuaded to endorse the government's new 
scheme on Radio Ovambo. 
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participate in the elections. All SW APO aligned political parties were 
disbarred in terms of Proclamation Rl 7. Only one party was permitted to 
contest the elections: the Ovamboland Independence Party (OIP) largely 
comprised of traditionalists and government supporters, which controlled the 
Legislative Council [Soggot, 1986:56]. 
A campaign of mass meetings and rallies spearheaded by the SW APO Youth 
League and the Democratic Co-operative Party (DEMKOP) agitated for the 
boycott these elections. The South African Police, with the assistance of tribal 
authorities, reacted by arresting the boycott leaders, disrupting protest 
meetings and physically assaulting demonstrators. These actions hardly had 
any impact on the effect of the boycott as there was a very low turn out for 
the August 1973 elections in Ovamboland [Katjavivi,1988:74-75]. 
3.6.4) The Suffocation of Internal Resistance 
In addition to the arrest and imprisonment of prominent resistance leaders 
by the South African authorities, the South African Special Branch developed 
an extensive system of informers that reported on most SW APO rallies and 
meetings. There was heavy surveillance, and as a result, correspondence and 
communication between those within Namibia and those in exile, had to be 
conducted through the use of couriers, mainly church officials. Repression of 
the internal movement, led to a further dynamic in which the internal 
leadership gradually came to cede all authority to the leadership abroad. The 
fac;ade was maintained that, apart from the SW APO President and Vice-
President, the leaders in exile were acting on the behalf of the leadership 
inside the country. 
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In July 1973 the SADF became responsible for security within the 
operational zone, an indication that the South African government began to 
view SWAPO as a serious threat to South African occupation of Namibia. 
In summary, SWAPO's actions of resistance and defiance within the borders 
of Namibia had mixed results. However, due to the repressive actions of the 
South African Police, no momentum was ever able to develop. SW APO merely 
scored isolated victories. This had implications for civil supremacy, as there 
were no areas free from police intervention the local population to actively 
support SW APO's guerrilla actions in the north. 
3. 7) Conclusion 
From 1960 to 197 4 SW APO's primary strategy was the petitioning and 
lobbying international organisations, such as the UN. The reason being that 
the military option, up until the mid-1960s, was both logistically impossible 
and politically unattractive. This strategy proved to be relatively successful 
in isolating South Africa internationally, however, severe financial 
constraints prevented it from being more effective. In addition, such actions 
brought SW APO no closer to its goal of national liberation and independence 
for Namibia. Consequently, an armed wing was envisaged and created in the 
mid-1960s. 
At its inception SW APO's armed wing was based on the classical Maoist 
guerrilla model, which meant that the armed wing would be unconventional 
in character, with its military objective being attrition, rather than conquest. 
There were deviations from this model in terms of the strategy and tactics 
the armed wing employed. SW APO's armed wing was unable to secure the 
necessary popular support for insurgents to survive in rural areas in 
northern Namibia. SWAPO's defeat at Omgulumbashe was a case in point. 
91 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
This can be attributed to three factors: the South African security forces' 
ability to subdue any significant resistance within Namibia; arid nature of 
the terrain, and the substantial distance between Dar es Salaam and the 
Namibian border. 
As SW APO became increasing reliant on Soviet patronage, the armed wing's 
character outlook ch anged, with it becoming more conventional in nature and 
the idea of military victory over the SADF being seriously considered. This 
development was to become more pronounced from the mid-1970s. 
As the military grew in size and influence so did tensions develop between 
civilian leadership and the armed wing. The SW APO leadership, concerned 
about being usurped by the military, implemented measures of civil 
supremacy. Party controls, such as the Commissar system and political 
indoctrination of cadres were introduced. Geographical methods of civil 
supremacy were employed, as the armed wing was stationed in isolated 
camps in Tanzania, and kept in a state of relative inactivity. However, 
neglecting the interests of the armed wing had certain drawbacks, as was 
illustrated by the "China-men" incident. 
In the first fourteen years of its political life SW APO developed from a labour 
movement into an anti-colonial political party/movement. This process was to 
have important implications for future civil-military relations in Namibia, as 
both the labour movement and anti-colonialism were primarily concerned 
with equality, a central pillar of any democracy.62 Of equal significance was 
the tolerance of SW APO within Namibia by the South African authorities. It 
was not banned like the ANC and the PAC in South Africa. Consequently, a 
62 Anti-colonialism strove for the equality of nations and the labour movement was concerned 
with equality in the marketplace. 
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limited civilian political experience, free from military intervention, was 
sustained. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
. Chapter 4 
1974-1988: The Road to Negotiated Liberation 
We [SWAPO] prefer to rely on our own strength, but when there is assistance avai/,able which 
can bring about the desired results much quicker, we are not going to sleep in the bush for 
hundreds of years. 
Andreas Shipanga, 1976 
This chapter provides an overview of SW APO, its activities, successes, 
failures and crises, over the years 1974 to 1988. As in the previous chapter, 
the focus is on the process by which civil supremacy developed, and in 
particular how it is enforced and maintained in a revolutionary or insurgency 
context. 
4.1) The Implications of Portuguese Decolonisation 
4.1.1) The Coup d'etat 
In April 1974 a military coup d'etat took place in Portugal which resulted in 
the Caetano Regime being ousted. The military had intervened because they 
perceived the colonies to be a burden on the domestic economy and they felt 
that the military risks and casualties involved in maintaining the colonial 
empire was unwarranted. 
Arrangements were made for the colonial administrations to be withdrawn 
from Angola and Mozambique and independence to be granted these to these 
countries. In Mozambique, the dominant insurgent movement, Frente de 
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Libertar;ao de Mor;ambique (FRELIMO) was installed in power. In Angola the 
situation was more complex. 
In January 1975 the three Angolan liberation movements, Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Angolan National Liberation 
Front (FNLA), and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) signed the Alvor Accords that set 11November1975 as the date for 
independence. Before formal independence could be achieved, UNITA and 
FNLA withdrew from the Accords, which led to the outbreak of civil war. 
Despite this state of affairs, Agostinho Neto, MPLA leader, unilaterally 
declared Angolan independence from Portugal in November 1975. In order to 
consolidate their position the MPLA requested financial and military 
assistance from Cuba. In a short space of time an estimated 40,000 Cuban 
troops arrived in Luanda. 
4.1.2) SWAPO Reacts 
The coup in Portugal and the subsequent move towards independence in 
Angola had three critical implications for SW APO's exile organisation and its 
operations. 
First, the risks associated with deploying cadres from Tanzania were 
reduced, and the common border between Angola and northern Namibia, 
fundamental to the effectiveness of PLAN operations in the Namibian 
interior, was opened up. Such actions were facilitated by SW APO's strategic 
alliance with UNITA who permitted SW APO to establish several camps in 
southern Angola.63 
ss There was only one obstacle to making this change in SW APO's military strategy which 
was the movement's association with UNITA. A co-operation agreement had been forged 
between these two liberation movements out of necessity in the late 1960s, as UNITA 
occupied south-eastern Angola, an area which was essential to the success of SW APO cadres' 
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Second, there was an increased exodus of political refugees from Namibia 
sympathetic to the SWAPO cause. By the end of 1974 several thousand 
Namibians had fled the occupied territory in the wake of extreme military 
and police repression in the North and joined the liberation movement in 
Zambia [Brown, 1995:23]. 64 
Third, as a result of the latter two implications, conditions for the conduct of 
armed struggle had dramatically improved. There was a major shift in 
SW APO's military strategy and tactics. Previously, PLAN units had 
embarked on ''hit-and-run" operations limited to north-eastern Namibia 
(mainly in Caprivi) . From the mid-1970s SW APO's military objective 
changed, with a PLAN infiltration of Namibia beyond the "Red Line" 
becoming the focal point. The "Red Line" was a tightly controlled stock fence 
system, dividing the Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi regions along the 
northern border from the white farming areas. Up until this time the "Red 
Line" had separated the war zone from the rest of the Namibia. 
The aim of these operations was to attack white farming areas. Military 
operations involved larger PLAN units than before, numbering between 40-
60 cadres, which were divided into smaller squads all under the same platoon 
commander. More conventional methods of warfare were employed focusing 
on sabotage, abduction and assassination [Brown, 1995:27]. This was largely 
the result of SW APO becoming more dependent on Soviet military and 
financial support, which advocated a more conventional approach to warfare. 
infiltration of the Caprivi region. However, due to UNITA's defeat at the hands of the MPLA 
in the pre-independence civil war and UNITA's relationship with the South African security 
forces , SW APO broke off the association with UNITA and entered into an relationship with 
theMPLA 
64 No accurate figures exist as to the number of Namibian exiles that left their country of 
birth. South African authorities estimated that some 3000 individuals departed for exile, 
while SW APO puts the figure at 6000. 
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This change in milit ary tactics became evident in August 1975 when Chief 
Philemon Elifas, the "Chief Minister" of Ovamboland, was assassinated.65 In 
the months that followed Ovambo headmen, white farmers and their 
families , as well as construction workers66 were shot at, abducted or killed. 
Several local businesses were looted and burnt [Brown, 1995:25]. 
Notwithstanding a number of defensive precautions, the South African 
security forces seemed unable to contain or restrict these attacks. 
Despite the intensification of SW APO's military activities, its successes in the 
martial field were hampered by communication problems, as the planning of 
military operations remained the responsibility of SW APO headquarters in 
Zambia. In addition , PLAN cadres still had to be deployed from bases in 
Tanzania. 
4.1.3) The SADF In vasion of Angola 
In August 1975, following the breakdown in the Alvor Accords, the SADF 
invaded Angola "covertly" via northern Namibia and engaged the MPLA's 
armed wing FAPLA (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola). 
The operation was code-named Savannah. After a number of military 
encounters the SADF was able to create a demilitarised zone of ten 
kilometres in width north of the border, and cleared a one-kilometre strip of 
land in the south, which made it easier for SADF patrols to detect SW APO 
insurgents [Seegers, 1996:222]. 
65 Up until his death Elifas was an important motivator of the planned Turnhalle talks, an 
ethnically oriented alternative to SW APO. 
66 The South African authorities began tarring the roads in order prevent the laying of 
landmines, and in addition, as part of its counterinsurgency campaign, water towers, 
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As South Africa had committed most of its forces deep into Angola's interior, 
PLAN was able to operate in shallow Angola (the area near the Namibian 
border) with relative impunity [Brown,1995:25]. The SADF invasion made 
the Namibian situation more complex as it led to an intermingling of the two 
conflicts. The SADF invasion and South African support for UNITA meant 
that SW APO was obliged to align itself with South Africa's immediate rival, 
l\!IPLA and became involved in regular clashes with UNITA and the FNLA 
[Katjavivi, 1988:8 7] . 
The SADF invasion was short-lived. The material assistance promised by the 
United States, who wanted to prevent the Soviet Union, via an l\!IPLA 
victory, from establishing a zone of influence in southern Africa never 
materialised. By January 1976 Operation Savannah was terminated 
[Seegers,1996:220]. This was followed by the withdrawal of the SADF's main 
force from Angola. 
For the next two years, due to the restraints of the domestic political 
situation in South Africa, SADF operations into Angola where limited to 
cross-border ''hot-pursuit". Consequently, Ovamboland became the main area 
of the war with PLAN troops operating from bases close to the border. The 
effectiveness of these units was hindered by weak logistical support, such as 
a lack of combat food, uniforms, arms and ammunition. Despite these 
shortages, SWAPO still held the advantage over the SADF, in that they had 
the support of the local population (due to major politicising work by its 
cadres) in the areas in which they operated [Brown,1995:27]. 
pipelines and canals were also constructed. Therefore SW APO perceived contract workers to 
be legitimate targets. 
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4.1.4) Summary 
The effect of the coup d'etat in Portugal had very important implications for 
the Southern African region, and SW APO in particular. The decolonisation of 
Angola enabled SW APO to use the Angolan territory as springboard for 
guerrilla activities, which led to a intensification of PLAN's operations in 
northern Namibia. It also resulted in a South African invasion of Angola via 
Namibia, and the replacement of the SAP by the SADF as the agency chiefly 
responsible for security concerns in Namibia. In basic terms, these 
developments led to a heightened militarisation of the Namibian conflict. 
4.2 The Zambian Experience and the Crisis of 1974-1976 
4.2.1) The Move to Zambia 
SWAPO, relative to other southern African liberation movements, was a 
small and fairly unsophisticated organisation when it moved its political 
headquarters from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka, Zambia in 1972. A reception 
centre for new SW APO recruits was established at the Old Farm on the 
outskirts of Lusaka. A military complex called Central Base was constructed 
in south-western Zambia. A series of smaller bases near the Caprivi·frontier 
were also erected. 
From 1974, with the increase in exiles and access to greater funding, 
SW APO's infrastructure expanded. The Old Farm was replaced by the 
Nyango settlement, situated several hundred kilometres west of Lusaka. 
Central Base was complemented by the creation of an additional reception 
and training facility called Oshatotwa [Leys & Saul,1994:125-129]. 
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SW APO's expansion was also facilitated by Zambia's formal sanction for 
liberation movements to conduct military training on its soil, but services in 
these camps remained rudimentary. 
4.2.2) The Role of Zambian Policy 
SW APO's activities within Zambia were severely constrained by Zambian 
government policy, which existed for two reasons. First, the Zambian 
government had to supervise and regulate the actions of the liberation 
movements so that they did not destabilise the Zambian .state. Second, up 
until 1974, Zambia bordered on five areas of major guerrilla activity: Tete 
province in Mozambique, the Zambezi, Caprivi and Eastern Angola. Zambia 
was also encircled by target regimes, namely South Africa and Rhodesia, and 
was therefore vulnerable to attack [Anglin & Shaw,1979:234-236]. As a 
result, Zambia sought to strictly monitor the activities of the liberation 
movements in order to minimise the internal and external security 
implications. 
4.2.2.1) Mechanisms of Supervision and Regulation 
The Zambian government made use of four mechanisms for the supervision 
and regulation of the liberation movements under its jurisdiction. Formal 
(official) recognition of a liberation movement was the government's primary 
tool. Recognition entitled liberation groups to utilise the administrative 
facilities of the African Liberation Centre in Lusaka and make use of 
Zambian travel documents. Recognition also permitted these movements to 
gain access to limited financial resources and use Radio Zambia for external 
broadcasting. The threat of withdrawing such recognition was a means of 
bringing dissident movements to heel [Anglin & Shaw, 1979:240-242]. 
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Second, in order to pr~vent the almost inevitable faction fighting, the 
Zambian government constantly policed the resident liberation movements. 
Whenever there was internal conflict, as was the case with the PAC, ZAPU, 
MPLA and later SWAPO, the Zambian security forces were deployed, with 
the disruptive parties being arrested, imprisoned or deported [Anglin & 
Shaw,1979:253-255].67 
Third, the Zambian government sought to isolate foreign nationalist parties 
from close contact with Zambian society, especially members of their own 
communities resident in Zambia. This was to prevent liberation movements 
from developing the kinds of domestic political bases that had given the 
Palestine liberation organisations powerful leverage with the governments of 
Lebanon and Jordan. It was inconceivable that SW APO could have achieved 
such leverage as the Namibia community was relatively small, approximately 
2000, compared to the 40 000 strong Angolan community (1970 figures) 
[Anglin & Shaw,1979:256]. 
4.2.3.2) A Time for Relocation 
In 1976 SW APO's asylum within Zambia came to an abrupt end, the 
consequence of sever al factors. The major geopolitical changes in Southern 
Africa prompted SW APO to look westwards for a new patron and to begin to 
cultivate stronger ties with the MPLA government in Angola. In addition, 
SW APO had just scored a major diplomatic victory with it being declared the 
s7 Following constant in-fighting over personal and ideological differences, as well as an 
alleged plot to assassinate certain Zambian ministers, the PAC was banned and 45 of its 
members were deported to Tanzania. Between 1970 and 1971, a ZAPU faction under the 
leadership of Chikerema attempted to assassinate and/or kidnap rival ZAPU leaders. The 
Zambian military was called in, and after a gun battle, the dissidents were arrested and 
restricted to a remote bush camp. Eventually 120 ZAPU members were deported to Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe), where they were arrested and sentenced to death. Faction fighting took 
place within the ranks of the MPLA in 1973, but the outcome was not as drastic as the 
previous two incidents. 
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"sole and authentic" representative of the Namibian people by the U:o.ited 
Nations and as a result it perceived the need to project its presence in 
southern Africa more actively. 
The most important motivating factor was Zambia's vulnerable geographic 
and economic position. With President Kaunda entering into a detente policy 
with the South African regime, Zambia came under pressure from Pretoria to 
reduce its support of SW APO. President Kaunda consequently ordered 
SW APO to cease all military activities from Zambian soil and vacate its 
headquarters [Brown, 1995:26]. 
4.2.3) Prelude to a Crisis: The Demand for Accountability 
At the Tanga Congress of 1969 it was decided that the next Congress would 
be held in December 1974. The SW APO leadership was tasked with 
formulating proposals for the organisation's new constitution and tabling 
suggestions for the streamlining of SW APO's organisational structure. 
However, by late 1974 it became evident that a Congress would not be held 
that year.68 
By mid 1975 still no Congress had been held. It was a situation that the 
Times of Zambia (6 June 1975) described as "very unhealthy" given that all 
political power was concentrated in the hands of the Executive. The article 
argued that: 
When party Congresses are overdue and the incumbents keep quiet about it, 
this usually brings in some nasty speculations that the "old soldiers" might 
be afraid of changes at a convention ... One hopes that a mature organisation 
ss A steering committee h ad not been appointed to organise the Congress, nor had the 
Central Committee met to determine the agenda and venue. 
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like SW APO has learnt from the bitter lessons of other movements and will 
not fall into similar pits. 
With most southern African liberation movements holding congresses or 
meetings to review their strategy in light of the regional geopolitical changes, 
demands for a Congress began to emerge from within the ranks of SW APO's 
general population [Ship anga, 1989: 100]. 
The SW APO Executive, in the face of organisational turmoil due to the 
massive influx of n ew exiles and challenges to their authority from Youth 
Leagtie members69, as well as an eroding support base, stalled on the holding 
of the Congress [Katjavivi,1988:106]. As time passed and no progress was 
made on the Congress-related issues, groups within SW APO's exile 
population became highly critical of their leaders. Critics began to demand 
greater representivity and accountability from leadership, and insisted that a 
Congress be held [Leys & Saul, 1994: 130]. For example, in February 1975 the 
SW APO Youth League (SYL) Executive drew up a comprehensive 
memorandum seeking a response from the SW APO leadership on the 
following issues: 
• The tendency of SW APO officials to treat all questions as treasonous 
• The constitutional position of SW APO; its ideology, in particular the form of 
government SW APO will establish in Namibia once it gains political power; its 
aims and objectives; its foreign policy; and the conditions under which it was 
receiving aid from other countries 
• Problems of administrative and financial efficiency and control. 
s9 Members of the Youth League who had recently joined SW APO in exile had, before leaving 
Namibia, held a Congress of its own in Oniipa where delegates elected, amongst others, 
Keshii Pelao Nathanael as Youth League President and Reuben Shangula as Secretary 
General. Once in exile, these Youth League members having been democratically elected to 
positions within SW APO's internal body, in whose name the exile body (which had been 
resolved at the Tanga Congress) was operating, began to demand positions of leadership in 
the exile organisation. 
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A few days after this document was published the SW APO Vice-President 
Mishake Muyongo and four other Executive Committee members, namely 
Peter Tsheehama, Andreas Shipanga,70 Peter Nanyemba, and Peter 
Mueshihange, met with the Youth League leaders to discuss the document 
[Leys & Saul,1994: 132]. Vague promises were made by these Executive 
members to address the Youth League grievances. This was followed by a 
formal meeting between the SYL leaders and the complete SW APO Executive 
six months later, after pressure from moderate members of the Executive, 
overseas SW APO representatives and a number of African leaders.71 It was 
agreed that the Congress would be held by 20 December 1975 and that a 
steering committee, representative of all SW APO departments, would be 
established to co-ordinate the holding of the Congress. 
However, the leadership failed to honour this undertaking and in January 
1976 the Youth League declared the SWAPO Executive unconstitutional and 
invited them to resign [Leys & Saul, 1994: 133]. 
The stage was now set for the ensuing crisis, but it was the actions of 
members of PLAN which were to prove crucial. 
4.2.4) The Dissatisfaction of PLAN 
Since the early 1970s many PLAN cadres, including senior military officers, 
became increasingly dissatisfied with the SW APO Executive and began to 
70 Andreas Shipanga, who was becoming increasingly marginalised within the SW APO circle 
of power, was also highly critical of the current state of affairs. In the same year Shipanga 
issued an internal memorandum to the members of the National Executive, Central 
Committee and foreign representatives of SW APO that the Congress should be held by 20 
December 1975. This was a move that ultimately lead to his political demise in SW APO. 
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express a lack of confidence in the political leadership's ability to direct the 
liberation struggle. This was inspired by PLAN's lack of representation on 
the Executive, the management of the armed wing's logistics, SW APO's 
alliance with UNITA and the armed propaganda approach to armed struggle. 
For example, Dimo Hamaambo, the PLAN field commander, dissatisfied with 
the state of affairs, left Zambia with a group of volunteers for Angola in late 
1974 [Leys & Saul, 1994:133]. 
Low morale, influenced by the relative inactivity on the military front and 
weaknesses in PLAN general logistics, pervaded the rank and file. With 
severe shortages of food, clothing, medicine, arms and ammunition, the 
arrival of some 2000 new recruits simply exacerbated these problems 
[Cliffe,1994:22]. The general soldiery was also feeling disempowered, as any 
questions regarding the operational and organisational state of PLAN were 
viewed as criticism of the SW APO leadership. Any overly critical individual 
was arrested. 
These conditions had important implications for SW APO as they ultimately 
obstructed the members of PLAN from fulfilling their primary role, namely 
the defence of the revolutionary movement. 
This dissatisfaction was also linked to rumours that senior SW APO officials 
were misappropriating funds and equipment that had been allocated for the 
liberation struggle.72 Many cadres believed that shipments of AK-4 7 assault 
rifles originating from China had been sold to UNITA and that consignments 
71 Shipanga (fa Search of Freedom, p. 140) alleges that Kenneth Kuanda, in an article 
published in the UNIP party newspaper called for the SW APO leadership not to delay the 
holding of a Congress. 
72 Shipanga [1989:101-103] claims Peter Nanyemba (Secretary of Defence), Peter 
Mueshihange (Executive member) and SW APO President Sam Nujoma owned shares in two 
night-clubs in Lusaka - the Kilimanjaro and the Lagodoro. Shipanga also accuses Nanyemba 
of misappropriating donor funds. 
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of weapons and ammunition were being buried in the ground. Rumours also 
abounded that Shipanga and another Executive member, Soloman Mifi.ma 
were collaborating with the South Africans, and that Peter Mueshihange 
(Secretary of Foreign Relations) had made arrangements to have PLAN 
dissidents assassinated [Leys & Saul, 1994: 134]. Evidence to support these 
claims was circumstantial, but in the context of strict ammunition rations 
and weapons shortages these accusations became more widespread.73 This 
led to the general soldiery increasingly loosing faith in their commanders and 
becoming openly hostile towards the SW APO Executive.74 
4.2.5) The Crisis 
4.2.5.1) The Anti-Corruption Fighters 
The SW APO Executive's inability to effectively address the grievances within 
PLAN lead to the emergence of a group comprising several hundred cadres 
drawn from most military bases in Zambia. This group became known as the 
"anti-corruption fighters" as they began to campaign against perceived 
financial mismanagement in SW APO. They called for an organisational 
overhaul of PLAN and a party Congress to be held. 
Fearing a repressive response from the Executive, the initial meetings of this 
'group were arranged in secret at Central Base. Two committees, an 
Investigating Committee or the "main committee" and an Advisory 
Committee were elected, comprising about 50 members each and were 
73 It was reported that certain PLAN recruits were armed with rifles of World War II vintage 
at best, with some units only having access to sticks. 
74 According to Shipanga [1989: 102] this antagonism developed to such a point that Nujoma 
only visited certain PLAN camps in Zambia on a few occasions, and then only with Zambian 
army escort. 
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supported by a five-man Drafting Committee, which was responsible for 
issuing statements.75 
4.2.5.2) The Crisis Spreads 
In March 1976 fifteen representatives of the anti-corruption group travelled 
to Lusaka to present their demands to the SWAPO leadership, the Zambian 
authorities and the OAU's Liberation Committee. On arriving in Lusaka the 
delegation met with prominent members of the Youth League in which their 
common grievances were discussed. This was followed by a meeting with 
SWAPO Vice-President Mishake Muyongo (the rest of the SWAPO Executive 
refused to meet with the group), the African Liberation Committee of the 
OAU and the Zambian government, under the chairmanship of the Zambian 
Minister of Defence, General Kingsley Chinkuli. 
At this meeting the PLAN delegates expressed their lack of confidence in 
PLAN commanders, and showed extreme distaste for Peter N anyemba, the 
Secretary of Defence. It was decided the current command structure would be 
restructured, however, neither the PLAN leadership, nor the incumbent 
commanders were a party to this decision. 
In the next few weeks tensions between the dissidents and the commanders 
loyal to the SW APO Executive intensified. The anti-corruption group was the 
first to act and seized control of Central Base and a few other satellite camps. 
15 This group of anti-corruption fighters released a series of statements confirming their 
loyalty to the party, but demanding that a Congress be held in which a new Central 
Committee would be democratically elected. In their view this Committee, which would have 
members elected by the PLAN cadres themselves, would appoint capable commanders whom 
the soldiers would be willing to serve under. In a document titled "We Demand the Party 
Congress", the anti-corruption group envisaged a "commission of inquiry", representative of 
all divisions within PLAN and SW APO, which would conduct a meticulous audit of every 
aspect of SW APO operations, and address the many grievances of the PLAN cadres [Quoted 
in Leys & Saul, 1994: 136-137] . 
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The Zambian government, at the request of the SW APO leadership and 
fearing that this unrest could have a spill-over effect, sent in several 
battalions of the Zambian army. The dissidents were forced to surrender and 
48 "anti-corruption fighters" were arrested [Leys & Saul,1994:137-138]. 
In late March cadres in Detachment "B" at the Eastern Front also revolted 
[Katjavivi,1988:106]. This was not only a response to the above-mentioned 
conditions, but to a situation where certain PLAN units found themselves 
fighting alongside SADF troops in encounters with the MPLA's armed wing, 
F APLA and Cuban troops. Such encounters allegedly took place at 
Munhango, Cangumbe, Luso and Serpa Pinto in late 1975.76 These dissidents 
were eventually arrested and taken to Mboroma detention camp near Kabwe, 
where they were imprisoned with the "anti-corruption" rebels. 
During this time Nujoma and other SW APO leaders convinced the Zambian 
authorities to arrest the dissident SYL leaders and their sympathisers within 
the SW APO leadership circle, such as Shipanga and Mifima. These dissidents 
were eventually shipped of Tanzanian jails in order to avoid a writ of Habeas 
Corpus that had been secured in Zambian courts on Shipanga's behalf. They 
were eventually freed, under international pressure in 1978. 
With the crisis brought to an end, Nujoma announced in a press statement 
that, 
The agents of the South African Region and imperialists have been routed 
out of our movement and the Central Committee carried out a systematic 
purge .of all traitors [Windhoek Advertiser, 3/8/1976] . 
76 This state of affairs was the result of the uncertainty surrounding SW APO withdrawal 
from its alliance with UNITA and UNITA's alignment with the SADF. 
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SW APO's military wing had once again provided a significant challenge to 
the status quo within the movement. The leadership's reaction was not only 
an attempt to stifle demands for democratic practices, but more importantly 
to crush another attempted coup d'etat. 
4.2.5.3) Incarceration. Re-education and Ex-communication 
The detainees at Mboromba camp had to endure extreme hardships. In April 
1977, two detainees, Hizipo Shikondombolo and Sakarias Elago, managed to 
escape to Nairobi via Dar es Salaam. They met up with other Namibian 
exiles who had fallen out with the SW APO leadership [Star, 2/5/1977] . A 
press release was drafted in which the plight of the cadres at Mboromba was 
described in detail. This press release drew considerable international 
attention [Leys & Saul, 1994: 139-140]. 
The Zambian authorities, faced with a potentially embarrassing situation, 
intervened and gave the detainees the choice of either accepting the 
protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNH CR) 
or returning to SW APO for rehabilitation. Approximately three hundred 
chose to leave SWAPO and were taken to the UNHCR refugee camp in north-
western Zambia where they stayed until 1989. The remainder, approximately 
one thousand three hundred, opted for rehabilitation by SW APO. It is 
believed that those who led the anti-corruption campaign were put to death 
[Shipanga,1989:134], however, this has never been confirmed. 
4.2.6) Repercussions of the Crisis 
The 1976 crisis had four key repercussions for SW APO. 
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4.2.6.1) International Consequences and Damage Control 
This incident and the leadership's subsequent heavy-handed response 
threatened to undermine SW APO's international reputation as a liberation 
movement of high moral standing as well as its recent diplomatic successes 
[The Guardian, 15/5/1976]. In particular, SW APO was anticipating the UN 
General Assembly declaring SW APO as the "sole and authentic 
representative of the Namibian people"77 [Leys & Saul,1994:141]. This label 
would promote SW APO from a liberation movement to a government-in-exile. 
The SW APO leadership, in order to limit the political fallout, engaged in 
damage control by establishing a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
causes of the PLAN uprising. It was chaired by SW APO stalwart John Ya-
Otto. 
In its report, the Ya Otto Commission acknowledged that there were certain 
structural shortcomings within SW APO that had contributed to the crisis. 
However, it took the scapegoat option and laid the blamed the Youth League 
leaders and SW APO Executive Committee members who had been 
sympathetic to the dissident's cause, particularly Andreas Shipanga. The 
report alleged that Shipanga was a South African spy and had planned to 
disrupt SW APO's operations by undermining its leadership and eventually 
seizing power [SW APO(c), 1976:9-11]. 
Shipanga's actual role in the 1976 crisis is unclear. According, to Leys and 
Saul [1994:141-142], Shipanga was a marginal player, a hapless victim. He 
was selected as the "fall-guy" because of his profile as an Executive member 
and had the greatest potential to embarrass the SW APO leadership, via the 
international press, with claims of authoritarianism within SWAPO. 
Therefore he had to be neutralised. Following the crisis he was used for fairly 
110 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
extensive propaganda purposes by SW APO, where he was blamed for many 
of SW APO's internal problems. 
Shipanga, on the other hand saw himself as one of the central protagonists, a 
major campaigner for democratic reforms within SWAPO. In the introduction 
to In Search of Freedom, an account of Andreas Shipanga's life in exile, Fred 
Bridgland attributes Shipanga's arrest and detention as the spark that 
ignited the PLAN uprising [1989:iii]. 
Evidence in terms of newspaper reports of the time (Windhoek Advertiser, 
Star, Citizen) suggests that Shipanga did play a fairly important role. In-
addition, a hand written statement signed by the other prominent detainees, 
which accuses an "evil clique" within the SW APO leadership circle of human 
rights abuses, lack of accountability, financial mismanagement and 
corruption, as well as conspiring with the Zambian authorities to eliminate 
any opposition within SWAPO, was written by Shipanga [1976]. It also seems 
likely that Shipanga's involvement was not benevolent, but possibly 
motivated by a desire for greater political power [Windhoek Advertiser, 
28/5/1976; Cliffe, 1994:22]. 
4.2.6.2) Process of Reform 
This crisis revealed that there was large-scale dissatisfaction among SW APO 
cadres that could not simply be resolved through mass arrests and 
intimidation. The leadership responded by implementing a package of 
reforms and restrictions to try and prevent similar incidents from re-
occurring. Reforms included constitutional amendments. For example, at an 
Enlarged Central Committee meeting in late July and early August, a new 
constitution and programme of action was adopted. SW APO's new 
77 This was achieved in November 1976 after intense lobbying by SW APO. 
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programme embraced a fairly radical socialist perspective, pledging SW APO 
to, 
unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry and 
the progressive intellectuals, into a vanguard party capable of safeguarding 
national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society 
based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialism. 
According to Saul and Leys [1995:52], this programme did not reflect the 
state of the SW APO leadership's thinking, but was embraced for three 
opportunistic reasons. First, it was hoped that these policy and constitutional 
changes would increase the leadership's credibility in the eyes of the SW APO 
rank-and-file. Second, to curry favour with the Soviet Union, eastern 
European countries and Cuba in order to get access to funding. Third, in 
anticipation of SW APO's move to Angola, the Executive desired to improve 
relations with the Marxist-Leninist government of Angola. 
This programme also set out the conditions under which a settlement with 
South Africa would be acceptable. These conditions included, amongst other 
issues: the right to Namibian independence; release of political prisoners; free 
return of all exiles; withdrawal of the South African security forces; and UN 
supervised elections. 
Restrictions included the issuing of Revolutionary Decrees, in which "crimes 
against the Namibian People's Revolution'', and the requisite punishment 
were identified [SWAP0,1977(b)].78 These Revolutionary Decrees were a 
warning to anyone who sought to challenge the authority of the SW APO 
Executive. Similar sentiments were reflected in, The Struggle for Total 
7s Crimes included espionage, treason, conspiracy, military disobedience, to name but a few. 
Penalties ranged from capital punishment and imprisonment, to monetary fines. 
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Liberation: a Political Manual of the Namibian Institute of Revolutionary 
Studies (1977) . 
4.2.6.3) Combat Paralysis 
PLAN became temporarily paralysed as over half its combatants, 
approximately between 1600 and 1800, had been imprisoned [Leys & 
Saul, 1994: 138]. With the move to Angola, PLAN became revitalised fairly 
rapidly. 
4.2.6.4) National Congress 
There was a National Congress of SW APO's internal wing held in Walvis Bay 
from 29 to 30 May 1976. Apart from dealing with issues of liberation within 
Namibia, the Congress aimed to clarify and re-evaluate the internal. wing's 
position in the liberation struggle following the crisis in Zambia. The internal 
wing unanimously voted to endorse the top leadership and call upon them, in 
turn, to appoint the rest of the outside leadership [SW APO(b), 1976: 11]. 
4.2. 7) Summary 
The time SW APO spent in Zambia was turbulent. The restrictions of 
Zambian government policy, in conjunction with financial, logistical and 
diplomatic factors, impeded the organisational development of SW APO, 
particularly the armed wing. However, despite the armed wing's relative 
underdevelopment, it had been far more confident and assertive. These 
circumstances contributed to increased tensions between the civilian 
leadership and the armed wing, followed by the crisis that culminated in 
SWAPO Executive's authority being seriously challenged by PLAN. 
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The crisis was largely the result of two factors. 
In the first instance, the interests of PLAN were neglected (as was the case 
with the "China-men" incident), in that adequate supplies of food, clothing 
and weapons were not forthcoming. 
Second, PLAN had become increasingly alienated from the rest of the 
SW APO movement, a recipe for disaster in a revolutionary/insurgent context, 
where the military is one of the cornerstones of the party/political movement. 
Communication between the SW APO Executive and the PLAN rank and file 
was poor, with the leadership remaining aloof. 
The civilian leadership, with the aid of the Zambian security forces, was able 
to defuse the crisis, but did not address the underlying causes. In short, this 
crisis can be attributed to ineffective application or enforcement of civil 
supremacy mechanisms. 
4.3) The Intensification of the Armed Struggle 
4.3.1) The Move to Angola 
In 1976 SW APO moved its main area of operations to Luanda, Angola, where 
the organisation was able to develop in a relatively unencumbered 
environment. By 1977 SW APO had established a quasi "state-in-exile" with 
an active army and a fairly well-developed education and health system [Saul 
& Leys, 1995:54]. 
With a new found confidence in the international arena, SW APO began 
publicly stating that 1977 would be the year that it would intensify the 
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armed struggle [Matatu,1976:9-10].79 With increased material support from 
the Soviet Union, Cuba and the MPLA, this change in military objective 
started to become a reality [Shultz,1988:140; Rand Daily Mail, 15/111977]. 
4.3.2) The Struggle Intensifies 
By the beginning of 1977, with SW APO using Angola as a springboard for its 
military actions, PLAN was able to establish three fronts into Namibia: 
northern, north-eastern and north-western. Each of the three fronts had a 
commander, a chief of staff, and a political commissar. Heading different 
sections were a chief engineer, chief medic, chief of anti-air defence, chief of 
artillery and chief of logistics [Brown, 1995 :24-25]. 
In 1978 the SADF estimated that there were a total of 462 contacts between 
security personnel and PLAN in the Namibian operational area. This was to 
increase to 1, 175 contacts in 1980 [Seegers, 1996:230]. The SADF also 
reported that, at any given time, approximately 300 insurgents were in 
Namibia, with some 2000 grouped in Angola for deployment into 
Ovamboland, and another 1,400 in Zambia ready to target the Caprivi region 
[Steenkamp,1989:70-71].80 Other estimates put PLAN's force numbers at 
5,000-6,000 [Shiweda, 1997; Matatu, 1976: 10]. 
4.3.3) The SADF Response 
In response to SW APO's intensification of the armed struggle the South 
Africa military establishment, infused with "total strategy"B1 thinking, 
79 This included numerous press statements, as well as radio broadcasts, especially from 
Radio Luanda. 
so Quoted in Brown [1995:27]. 
s1 From the 1950s key decision-makers within the South African security establishment, 
influenced by the Cold War mentality, saw South Africa as an intrinsic component of 
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intensified its external. operations. These involved pre-emptive attacks on 
selected PLAN targets in Angola, including air strikes and bombing attacks 
with the objective of destroying SW APO's logistics and supply lines, and 
pushing PLAN deeper into Angola [Dale, 1993: 15]. South Africa's most 
significant operation against SW APO was Reindeer, which included a 
controversial raid on the SWAPO's Cassinga camp in deep Angola.82 
The South West African Territorial Force (SW ATF), a small military 
organisation resembling the SADF that conscripted white Namibian males 
and accepted Namibian African volunteers was also created by the SADF 
[Dale,1993:12]. By 1979 SWATF was fully operational and made up of ethnic 
battalions of indigenous Namibians and officered by whites. In addition, 
Koevoet (Crowbar), a South African Police counterllisurgency unit was 
created in 1978. 
4.3.4) PLAN Takes Charge 
By 1978 PLAN, began operating in units of 80-100 guerrillas. Local 
supporters would drive their herds of cattle behind PLAN groups to conceal 
their footprints, and often heavy material, arms and ammunition was loaded 
on the cattle as well. Rural communities and villages, as well as many parish 
Western society, whose duty it was to repel the global spread of communism. These policy 
makers perceived South Africa to be of vital strategic importance to the West due to its 
geographic location, mineral wealth, highly developed infrastructure, strong economy, and 
its anti-Communist stance. The impact of this perception was that a security ideology that 
envisaged the South African state as the target of a "total communist onslaught" directed 
from Moscow began to develop within Pretoria's corridors of power. Throughout the first half 
of the 1970s the notion and means of achieving a total integrated strategy to deal with the 
"total onslaught" slowly evolved, and with the disclosure of the 1975 and 1977 Defence White 
Papers that such a "total strategy" formally entered state policy. 
s2 The Cassinga incident , which is still commemorated in Namibia today, was a major bone of 
contention between the SADF and SWAPO. The SADF claimed that Cassinga camp was 
predominantly a military camp, while SW APO attests that it was predominantly civilian. 
Evidence tends to favour the latter perspective. For more in depth studies see Heywood, A 
1994. The Cassinga Event (Windhoek: Archeia) . 
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churches provided food and shelter-for many of the combatants. A few: 
churchmen helped fighters to cache arms, and at times local businessmen 
provided transport for combatants. PLAN combatants were .able to operate 
intensively as political agitators and intelligence gathers, as well as 
guerrillas within the communities they operated. On average these cadres 
remained in their designated area for periods of up to three months 
[Brown, 1995:29]. 
At this stage SW APO military strategy centred on the escalation of battles 
within Namibia, striking at economic targets, infrastructure and 
communication equipment. PLAN also began to operate in Namibia's urban 
areas, where sabotage actions, particularly against petrol stations in 
Windhoek, Swakopmund and Keepmanshoop were carried out 
[Katjavivi, 1988:87]. 
Due to these activities, as well as the presence oflandmines planted by PLAN 
operatives, certain regions within Ovamboland became "no-go" areas for the 
SADF. However, SWAPO was unable to convert them to liberated zones due 
to the SAD F's air support and the nature of the terrain. These incidents of 
sabotage, assassination, landmine explosions were to increase dramatically 
over the next two years [Brown,1995:29]. 
By 1980 PLAN operational structure started to change, mainly due to the 
PLAN combatants' regular incorporation into F APLA unitsB3 and almost total 
reliance on Soviet financial and material support. A force of mobile guerrilla 
units became an army of semi-regular troops who made use of use of 
trenches, bunkers and outposts. PLAN began to adopt more conventional 
military structures and tactics, especially for defensive purposes. Even the 
war with the SADF was escalating into a more conventional one, with PLAN 
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routing SADF units on a number of occasions. SW APO's armed wing began to 
develop mechanised brigades, which were used to protect both military and 
refugee bases in Angola, and transport troops and supplies. These 
mechanised divisions assisted F APLA as "payment" for the protection the 
MPLA government offered to the liberation movement [Shiweda,1997]. 
In summary, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the high point of PLAN's 
operational life. SW APO's armed wing, more conventional in nature, made 
unprecedented infiltrations into northern and central Namibia where it 
scored numerous military victories against the SADF. These events indicated 
a definite change in military strategy, from a war of attrition to a war of 
conquest. The PLAN high command actually began to toy with the idea that 
SWAPO could defeat the SADF militarily. 
It was also a period in which SW APO cadres were able to conduct political 
education amongst the rural people, and consequently gain essential popular 
support and assistance. The downside of these military successes was that 
certain PLAN members rose to influential positions within the SW APO 
leadership, which would prove problematic in the years to come. 
4.4 From Linka ge to Negotiated Settlement: Diplomatic 
and Military F r ustrations 
4.4.1) PLAN on the Retreat 
From 1982, PLAN's military advantage began to diminjsh due to an 
increased SADF presence in the operational area, which involved the 
stepping-up of patrols in the northern areas and an increase in strikes on 
sa Some 3,600 PLAN troops were incorporated into FAPLA by 1977 [Copley,1977:9]. 
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PLAN bases by the South African Air Force (SAAF), such as the Lubango and 
Ongiva headquarters. These actions had a significant impact on PLAN's cross 
border incursions, which fell to 620 in 1983 [Seegers, 1996:230]. 
Forward command posts, from which guerrillas operated into Namibia, 
became increasingly insecure with their lines of supply constantly disrupted. 
As a result, PLAN combatants, previously based within a few kilometres of 
the Namibian border were forced back into the Angolan interior. This meant 
that combatants had to carry all their equipment themselves, including 
landmines, mortars, automatic rifles and medical equipment for great 
distances. This was not feasible without water, so PLAN operations became 
restricted to the rainy season between November and March 
[Brown, 1995:32]. 
PLAN 's position was further diminished with increased counterinsurgency 
activity within northern Namibia. This included the SADF's deployment of 32 
Battalion, composed of former FNLA guerrillas, who established a buffer 
zone of approximately 40 kilometres into Angola to intercept PLAN guerrillas 
[Jaster, 1990: 12]. 
PLAN activity in the Caprivi region effectively ended in 1980 when the 
Caprivi African National Union (CANU) split from SW APO with mutual 
recriminations. These conditions also affected SW APO's ability to conduct 
political work among the local population. As a result the role of the 
combatants was increasingly forced into an exclusively military mould. 
Despite these setbacks, SW APO was still able to score limited military 
successes. In 1981 PLAN units infiltrated white farming areas during the 
rainy season, with between 500 and 600 guerrillas being active in the war 
zone [Brown, 1995:32]. 
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In 1982, PLAN's TyphoonNolcano unit was active in the Tsumeb white 
farming area for two months, but high casualties forced the survivors to 
withdraw. The 1983 rainy season was the last substantial PLAN military 
strike south of the Red Line. In 1984 there was a heavy concentration of 
attacks in Kavango region. In addition, the Ondangua airbase in Ovambo 
region was mortared with some sabotage and other activity north of the Red 
Line still continued. 
In 1985 PLAN activity in Kavango had declined dramatically, partly due to 
UNITA's expanding presence along the north-eastern border. PLAN still 
remained active in the Ovambo region, with a SADF base at Eenhana being 
mortared and other sabotage actions taking place. Central and coastal cities 
were also targeted for bomb attacks [Brown, 1995:32]. 
With the theatre of war moving increasingly into Angola's interior, PLAN 
activities were increasingly confined to joint operations with F APLA and 
Cuban brigades in conventional clashes with the SADF/UNITA alliance. 
Operations into Namibia became significantly reduced. The consequence of 
these developments was that the resolution of the Namibian conflict became 
directly linked to events within Angola. 
4.4.2) Diplomatic Wrangling 
The SADF, PLAN and Angolan military actions, in most cases, were not 
enacted with simple military victory as the only objective. From the mid-
1970s military action was, in many cases linked to diplomatic negotiations, 
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particularly between South Africa and the UN-endorsed Contact Group. 84 
South Africa, facing increasing pressure for the UN to grant Namibia 
independence, constantly tried to sell the international community the idea of 
the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). The DTA concept incorporated the 
moderate leaders of Namibia's 11 official ethnic groups who would meet and 
draft a constitution for the territory, after which they would establish an 
interim government to lead Namibia to independence. However, SWAPO was 
excluded from this process, which made this option unacceptable to the 
Contact Group and SW APO. Major diplomatic bargaining followed between 
the South African government and the Contact Group. 
With SW APO's military success and intense international pressure targeting 
South Africa, a potential breakthrough was reached in April 1978 when a 
general framework for a settlement of the Namibian conflict was 
provisionally accepted by the South African government and later by 
SWAPO. It was adopted in September 1978 by the UN Security Council as 
Resolution 435. However, major opposition within the South African 
government to the settlement plan prevented further diplomatic progress 
[Jaster,1990:11]. There has been much speculation that the controversial 
attack on Cassinga in May 1978, in which hundreds of SW APO non 
combatants were killed, can be attributed to elements within the South 
African security establishment who wanted to bring about the demise of the 
diplomatic process. 
Up until 1981 complex diplomatic negotiations dragged on with very little 
progress being made. It seemed as though the parties to the conflict placed a 
higher priority on success in battle rather than at the negotiating table. In 
84 The Contact Group comprised representatives of France, the United Kingdom, USA, West 
Germany and Canada. Its job was to negotiate terms for implementing a peaceful settlement 
to the Namibian conflict. 
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1981, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester 
Crocker, in an attempt to address the South African objections to the 
Namibian settlement plan, introduced the concept of ''linkage". "Linkage" 
encompassed the idea of linking South African agreement to Namibian 
independence to a Cuban withdrawal from Angolass [Jaster,1990:13]. 
Linkage was opposed by most of the parties except South Africa and the US. 
This effectively rendered the diplomatic process impotent, with no further 
process being made for several years. 
4.4.3) The Spy Drama 
SW APO's military successes of the late 1970s had a significant implication 
for the movement's civil-military relations. The expansion of PLAN that 
accompanied its increased infiltration of northern Namibia resulted in 
SW APO's armed wing becoming effectively autonomous from the rest of 
SWAPO [Saul & Leys,1995:56]. In addition, a number of military people 
attained key positions of power within SWAPO. This was not problematic for 
the SW APO leadership whilst it was notching successive military victories 
against the SADF. However, in the face of military reverses increased 
military influence began to become a liability. 
From 1981 onwards SWAPO began to suffer major military setbacks which 
led to low moral among many of the PLAN cadres. Rather than face the 
painful truth that the SADF was gaining the upper hand due to superior 
military prowess, SWAPO leadership, particularly PLAN commanders, 
looked elsewhere to point their fingers. 
ss "Linkage" was a response to domestic US politics, where a conservative Republican 
administration desired the tide of Soviet expansion to be stemmed. 
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Since the 1976 crisis dissent within SW APO's ranks was blamed (mainly for 
propaganda purposes) on South African informers and spies who had 
allegedly infiltrated the senior ranks of SW APO. Similar reasoning was used 
for explaining the military reverses, as the SADF seemed to have accurate 
knowledge of PLAN's movements and operations. South Africa's intelligence, 
however, was largely attributed to the SADF's ability to monitor PLAN's 
radio communications rather than from information provided by spies. This is 
not to say that spies did not exist. 
4.4.3.1) The Emergence of an Intelligence Agency 
This state of insecurity, in conjunction with a strong security-centric 
influence by FAPLA, provided the rationale for the establishment of a 
separate SWAPO Military Security (intelligence) Organisation in 1981, under 
the supervision of th e Soviet Union. This organisation was headeded by the 
Deputy Army Commander, Solomon Hawala, who had extensive powers and 
was answerable only to the SW APO President. This security organisation 
consisted of 250 personnel, the majority of which had received security 
training in the Soviet Union and East Germany. Its sole aim was to identify 
potential spies, arrest and interrogate them, and detain those suspected of 
espionage. It had wide-ranging powers of arrest, and could even recall 
SW APO cadres who were studying abroad to Lubango, Angola for 
questioning. However, at this point, the SW APO leadership's obsession with 
spies and informer, particularly their use for propaganda purposes, started to 
backfire, as its security agency turned into an institution of organised terror 
that embarked on a seemingly irrational witch hunt. 
The security organ's mode of operation remained consistent. Detainees who 
refused to admit to being "sent" (i.e. by the South African authorities) were 
tortured until they confessed to various crimes that their captors wanted to 
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hear and gave the names of "co-conspirators". It was understood that any 
person implicated by three such "confessions" might in turn be detained. 
These individuals were then confined to covered pits in the ground, where 
they had to endure harsh conditions, which included poor food and sanitation, 
as well as inadequate medical care. An unknown number died as a result. 
Detainees were rarely released, as they had confessed to being spies in order 
to save themselves from execution, and it kept the outside world in the dark 
as to the events that were unfolding in Lubango [Saul & Leys,1995:56-57]. 
4.4.3.2) Purges and Paranoia 
With many loyal SW APO members being arrested on a regular and random 
basis, and in the absence of accurate information, intense paranoia began to 
take root. As the arrests became more frequent and irrational, members of 
the Central Committee attempted to intervene, but were told to mind their 
own business by Hawala. 
By the late-1980s the situation became critical. Almost one thousand SW APO 
members had been arrested and taken to Lubango. Nujoma's wife was 
interrogated in 1988 and his brother-in-law, Aaron Muchimba, a Central 
Committee member was arrested the following year. Nujoma's was now in a 
vulnerable position as he could be the next victim of the security clique. At 
this point it was rumoured that Dimo Hamaambo, fearing the disintegration 
of PLAN, was contemplating a military assault on Hawala's headquarters 
[Saul & Leys,1995:56]. 
Fortunately for the SW APO leadership a diplomatic agreement was reached 
between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, which paved the way for the 
implementation of UN Resolution 435. This ultimately prevented the security 
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clique from talcing complete control of SW APO, which more than likely, 
would have brought about the movement's demise. 
4.4.4) Summary 
The military setbacks of the mid-1980s and diplomatic stalling had serious 
consequences for SW APO, as it significantly contributed to the breakdown of 
civil supremacy within the liberation movement. SW APO's forced withdrawal 
from northern Namibia led to the movement losing contact with local 
population, the key to its survival and success, as well as being incorporated 
into F APLA, the conventional army of the MPLA. A Stalinist intelligence 
agency was created in an attempt to restore the civil-military balance in 
favour civil control. However, this agency, driven by excessive organisational 
paranoia, engaged in extensive witch-hunts, which virtually incapacitated 
SWAPO. 
4.5) Conclusion 
The decade preceding Angolan independence proved to be the most profitable 
time for SWAPO. It was the period that saw a dramatic expansion of 
SW APO's military operations, especially in the wake of the transfer of its 
political and military headquarters from Zambia to Angola. This was followed 
by an intensification of the armed struggle with PLAN units being deployed, 
in larger numbers deeper into the Namibian interior. By the late-1970s 
PLAN had gained the upper hand over the SADF, which led to the armed 
wing becoming more assertive. Additionally, certain prominent SWAPO 
members took the view that the military option could ultimately bring about 
Namibia's liberation from South African occupation. 
125 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
From the early 1980s, with the theatre of war moving into the Angolan 
interior, PLAN found itself on the retreat. The only means left to SW APO's 
armed wing to challenge the South African security forces was through 
integration with F APLA. This had the effect of "conventionalising" PLAN, 
with it moving away from guerrilla techniques to embrace the doctrines of 
civil war. This reinforced the idea that SW APO could defeat the SADF 
militarily. 
This period was characterised by two separate crises. 
The first crisis, which took place in the mid-1970s, was spearheaded by a 
PLAN uprising in response to the SW APO leadership's perceived lack of 
political accountability. It was also a reaction by an assertive armed wing to 
military inactivity as well as inadequate food, clothing and weapons supplies. 
Civil supremacy was only restored when the SW APO Executive called in the 
Zambia military to quash to military rebellion. 
In the mid- to late-1980s, in the context of a severe civil-military imbalance 
in favour of PLAN, the second crisis emerged. In an attempt to restore the 
civil-military balance, the SW APO leadership created a security (intelligence) 
organ that would dilute the political power of the armed forces. However, this 
organ, driven by extreme organisational paranoia, gained so much power and 
influence, that it almost brought about SW APO's demise. Civil supremacy 
was only restored with the brokering of a peace deal. The end result ensured 
that civil supremacy over the military was secured. 
Both crises were the consequence of ineffective or misdirected 
implementation of methods and techniques of civil supremacy, which had 
also been a factor in the "China-men" crisis. Many of the "revolutionary" 
methods of political control were in existence, such as political commissar 
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Chapter 5 
Namibia's Transition to Statehood 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the transition period 
(1987-1992) in Namibia. The focus will not only be on the political transition, 
but also on the transition from revolutionary or insurgent tradition to that of 
a democratic tradition. 
5.1 The First Steps to Namibian Independence: The 1988 
Peace Accords 
5.1.1) Diplomatic Stalemate 
By the first quarter of 1987 all the parties to the Angolan conflict, motivated 
by economic hardship, military setbacks and war fatigue, began to reassess 
their diplomatic and military positions. 
The Angolan government (MPLA), which was suffering the most in material 
terms, decided to resume talks with Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Africa, in April 1987, with an aim to resolving the Angolan conflict. 
In July the Cuban government, feeling the financial and political pinch of 
conducting a war on foreign soil expressed a desire to participate in talks 
involving Angola (MPLA), South Africa, SW APO, and the United States. 
No diplomatic progress was made until mid 1988, as Cuba and Angola 
refused to accept linkage, that is the withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
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Angola, unless South Africa made certain concessions. These included: an 
agreement to a fixed date for implementing UN Resolution 435; an SADF 
withdrawal from Angola; an end to US and South African aid for UNITA; and 
outside guarantees against South African aggression [Jaster, 1988:20]. South 
Africa refused to make any concessions unless an acceptable timeframe for 
Cuban troop withdrawal was secured. 
5.1.2) Diplomatic Manoeuvring and Successes 
In the wake of a series of humiliating military setbacks86 by the SADF, 
domestic resistance to South Africa's involvement in Angola, and the threat 
of severe United States economic sanctions,87 the South African government 
concluded that a negotiated settlement was the only viable option to save face 
[Dreyer,1994: 174-181; Bridgland,1990:318]. This led to South Africa entering 
into a series of talks with Angola (MPLA), Cuba and the United States, which 
became known as the quadripartite talks. 
During the third round of the quadripartite talks on Governor's Island, New 
York (11-13 July), a diplomatic breakthrough was made where an agreement 
was reached between all parties on fourteen "Principles for a Peaceful 
86 The first military setback suffered by the SADF in collaboration with UNIT A was at Cuito 
Cuanavale, a stronghold of the combined F APLNCuban/SW APO force , located some 300km 
north of the Namibian border. Cuban troops had been sent in to support FAPLA, reinforce 
Cuba's bargaining position at the negotiating table, as well as possibly bring about an SADF 
defeat. For several months the SADF/UNITA alliance had laid siege to Cuito Cuanavale, but 
had been unable to take it. Eventually, in May 1988, the SADF/UNITA force had to 
withdraw due to heavy casualties suffered by white conscripts, which had been brought on by 
South Africa's loss of air superiority to the Cuban/MPLA airforce. The Cuito Cuanavale 
incident was followed shortly by SADF/UNITA defeat at Techipa (another Cuban stronghold) 
at the hand of the F APLA and Cuban troops, as well as a Cuban air strike on Caluque Dam, 
which resulted in the water supply to northern Namibia being cut off. 
s7 In March 1988 the US Congress started considering tougher new sanction bills against 
South Africa. In May, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives 
adopted the so-called Dellums sanctions bill. This bill prohibited all imports from South 
Africa except some strategic minerals, and all exports to South Africa save humanitarian 
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Settlement in South-western Africa". In addition linkage between Namibian 
independence and Cuban withdrawal from Angola were agreed upon. These 
principles were strengthened at a secret meeting of military chiefs at Cape 
Verde (22-23 July). The 5th round of talks in Geneva (2-5 August) led to the 
signing of the Geneva protocol which effectively brought about a cease-fire 
between South Africa, Angola (MPLA) and Cuba. 
It was agreed that Cuba would move its troops 30 miles north of the border 
by 10 August, while South Africa was to withdraw all its forces from Angola 
by 1 September. Cuba and Angola were to use their powers of persuasion to 
press SWAPO to move its bases north of the 16 Parallel, namely, 100 miles 
north of the border [Jaster,1988:24-25]. The issue of a timetable for Cuban 
withdrawal, however, remained unresolved. 
In mid-August SW APO announced its acceptance of the cease-fire which was 
followed by the establishment of a Joint Military Monitoring Committee 
(JMMC). The J.MM:C, which had been provided for by the Geneva Protocol, 
was a body consisting of South African, Angolan and Cuban representatives, 
with the United States and the Soviet Union as observers. Its mandate was 
to monitor the implementation of the agreements, and settle any conflicts 
that may arise in this regard, thereby stabilising the Namibian-Angolan 
border region [James,1990:253].88 On 30 August, Angola and South Africa 
confirmed that all South African troops had departed from Angola. The 
Cubans and SW APO were deployed behind their respective lines 
[Jaster, 1990:26]. 
assistance. Furthermore it proposed a ban on South African investment in the United States, 
and an end to military co-operation between the two states. 
88 The JMMC consisted of middle-ranking military officers from Angola, Cuba and South 
Africa. Every second week a higher-level military meeting was held on the border, and there 
was provision for meetings at foreign ministry level. In order to provide the JMMC with the 
necessary intelligence, 8 observation posts, consisting of about 20 military personnel each, 
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In mid December, South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the Brazzaville 
Protocol, which recommended that the UN secretary-general set 1 April 1989 
as the deadline for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. It 
was also agreed that a 27-month timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops. By August 1989, 15,000 Cubans would have left Angola and the 
remaining 35,000 would be located above the 15th Parallel, some 160 miles 
north of the border. By 1November1989, half of the Cuban military force 
would have left Angola and the rest would be deployed above the 13th 
Parallel, 300 miles north of the border [Jaster,1990:27]. 
This Protocol was reinforced with the signing of the New York treaty at the 
UN Headquarters, facilitated by the United States and the Soviet Union. 
This was followed by a bilateral agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal from 
Angola between the governments of Angola and Cuba. Critically, this Geneva 
Protocol made no direct reference to either UNIT A or SW APO, who had been 
excluded from the negotiations from the start. Chester Crocker defended the 
decision to exclude SW APO, claiming linkage to be a regional strategy and 
not explicitly concerned with internal conflicts. The inclusion of non-state 
actors such as SW APO would have complicated the process and opened the 
door for other parties such as the DTA and UNITA to demand inclusion. 
However, SW APO was an important party and named in the cease-fire, and 
therefore should have been a party to the process [Weiland & 
Braham,1994:78] . 
were set up along the border to monitor the implementation of the various agreements in 
October. However, they only became operational in January 1988. 
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5.1.3) SWAPO's Acceptance of Terms and Conditions of the 
Settlement 
SW APO, given its confinement to state of exile, had never had its popularity 
within Namibia tested. It was aware that it had a significant following, but it 
was unsure of numbers. The DTA process and SW APO's absence in terms 
politicising activities in Namibia from the niid to late 1980s intensified this 
uncertainty. This uncertainty of support meant that SW APO negotiated for 
the fairest possible terms and conditions for a transition period and political 
outcome, namely a liberal democracy, in the instance that it did not achieve 
the majority vote that it desired. 89 
In summary, after a lengthy period of diplomatic bargaining and negotiating, 
a peace settlement, linked to the resolution of the Angolan conflict had been 
achieved, which all parties agreed to. The concern for SW APO was that it 
was only a secondary party to the negotiations and often not invited to 
discussion meetings. In certain situations it was forced to accept dictated 
terms. This state of affairs was to have serious consequences in the near 
future. 
5.2 Implementa tion of UN Security Council Resolution 435 
5.2.1) Uncertainties and Problems of Implementation 
In mid-February 1989 the UN Security Council agreed on the term of the 
implementation of Resolution 435. This was directly followed by the arrival of 
General D. Prem Ch and, Commander of UNTAG's military contingent, and 
twenty other senior military and UNTAG officials in Windhoek. However, 
89 I am indebted to Prof. Annette Seegers for this observation. 
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due to administrative delays within the United Nations bureaucracy over the 
approval of UNTAG's budget, which the General Assembly reduced from 
$700 million to $416 million, the first group of UNTAG troops only arrived in 
mid-March. This meant that the UNTAG components were reduced from the 
planned 9,200 "full strength" to 6,450 personnel [Cliff,1994:90]. 
UN Security Council Resolution 435, in order to make it acceptable all 
parties, remained vague on many of the crucial details of the process of 
transition. These details were set forth in other UN documents and in the 
subsequent series of letters, memoranda and informal understandings 
reached in the ten years after Resolution 435 had been formally adopted. 
However, not all of these documents were approved by the UN Security 
Council, and some were not made public, which resulted in certain 
ambiguities being present following the signing of the Brazzaville Protocol 
[Stedman & Ohlson , 1994: 106]. 
The most important document was the Contact Group's April 1978 
settlement proposal which outlined the various tasks that needed to be 
fulfilled in order to effectively implement Resolution 435. 
The key element was the holding of UN supervised free and fair elections for 
the Constituent Assembly that would draw up a constitution for an 
independent Namibia. The proposal stipulated that the independence process 
be closely monitored and supervised by the UN Secretary-General's Special 
Representative, who would also be responsible for declaring that each phase 
was completed to his satisfaction before the next phase could begin. 
According to Ahtisaari, the UN Special Representative, this gave him 
"considerable leverage and if required, veto power, over the South African 
installed administrator-general" [1994:59]. The reason for this was that the 
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elections were to be run by the latter individual, Louis Pienaar, with the 
South African Police in Namibia (SW APOL) being responsible for law and 
order during the transition period [Jaster,1990:33]. 
5.3.2) The Role of UNTAG 
The United Nations had to fulfil three tasks in the implementation of the 
peace settlement. 
First, a cease-fire had to be secured, which included the confinement of SADF 
and PLAN forces to base, and their monitoring by UNTAG. However, 
UNTAG, incapable of monitoring SWAPO's military forces, which were 
dispersed over a very wide area, relied on the Angolans and Cubans, together 
with five or six UNTAG liaison officers, to monitor SW APO's restriction to 
base. 
Second, UNTAG had to oversee the staged withdrawal of the SADF and 
ensure that they had completely departed shortly after the certification of the 
election. 
Third, the civilian UNTAG component of police, administrative, legal and 
electoral officials h ad to supervise the democratic election of the Constituent 
Assembly. This included overseeing the release of political prisoners, the 
return of exiles, the repeal of discriminatory legislation, the drawing up of 
the electorate, the registration of political parties, as well as monitoring the 
election campaign in order to minimise irregularities and intimidation 
[Jaster, 1990:33] 
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Once elected. the assembly had to.draw up a constitution and adopt it by a 
two-thirds majority, after which the country would become independent on its 
own terms. 
5.3) 1 April 1989 Incident 
5.3.1) The SWAPO "Invasion" 
According to the 1988 Geneva Protocol, the cease-fire between SW APO and 
the SADF was supposed to take effect at midnight on the 1April1989. 
However, between the 31 March and 1 April, between 1,500 and 1,800 armed 
PLAN insurgents entered Namibia from Angola. This was SWAPO's biggest 
cross border penetration ever. 
The JMMC, which was winding down its operations, failed to notice the 
massing of PLAN troops on the border [James,1990:254]. All SADF units in 
Namibia had already been confined to base and Namibian SW ATF battalions 
demobilised. However, the supposedly defunct Koevoet, which had been 
incorporated into SW APOL, engaged the PLAN combatants militarily.9o 
Despite SADF intelligence reports, this incident seemed to have caught most 
parties by surprise.91 The UN Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari, with 
so By all indications, Koevoet was aware of SW APO movements, as a few weeks prior to the 
incident, South Africa warned Western diplomats and UN officials of a heavy build up of 
SWAPO guerrillas in southern Angola. South Africa also raised the issue with the Cuban 
and Angolan members of the JMMC in late March, but was give vague reassurances 
concerning SWAPO's intentions and Angola's efforts to move the guerrilla's north of the 16th 
Parallel. By 30 March, when South Africa reported that SW APO forces were moving to 
within 500 metres of the border, the South African Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha informed 
Ahtisaari, Chand and Pienaar that an incursion was imminent. 
91 D. Prem Chand recalls the situation as follows: ON 31 March, during an official dinner 
hosted by the administrator-general for UNTAG, SADF, and senior South African officials, 
unconfirmed reports star ted to come of armed SW APO activity involving 300-500 men along 
the Angolan border. However, no one at the dinner showed any concern because it was 
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no peacekeeping personnel or capabilities at his disposal, and fearing that the 
South African government would withdraw from the peace process and/or 
take the matter into their own hands, agreed to a limited redeployment of the 
SADF/SWATF to support SWAPOL [Weiland & Braham,1994:81]. 
5.3.2) An Unnecessary War 
SADF troops engaged guerrillas in battles in the border areas, to the west of 
Ruacana, in the remote parts of the Kaokoland and the Okatana, as well as 
other parts of the Ovamboland. In the next few days about thirty small scale 
battles were fought across much of the northern border from Kaokoland 
through Ovamboland to the western border of Kavango. 
There was a common pattern to these engagements: a group of SW APO 
fighters would be spotted and surrounded, usually by SADF helicopter 
gunships, and the highly mobile Koevoet units in armoured vehicles. In most 
cases the PLAN insurgents returned fire, but reports suggest that SW APO 
fighters who tired to surrender were simply killed [Cliffe, 1994:85]. 
Photographic evidence indicates that many of these SW APO soldiers had 
been shot execution style, at close range with a bullet to the back of the 
head.92 
simply inconceivable that SW APO would be in the area: either the reports were grossly 
exaggerated or they were UNITA operations, which is something that had occurred in the 
past [Weiland & Braham,1994:95]. Leon Englebreght, the SADF soldier who took the call 
confirming the SW APO incursion on the 1 April, thought it was an 'April Fools Day' joke and 
hung up the phone only to be called straight back to say that it was a serious situation 
(interview with the author, Parktown, 1997). 
92 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Peter Zuze, former President of the UN Council for Namibia and 
Zambian diplomat who was part of a fact-finding team that investigated the 1 April incident, 
Harare, 30/3/98. 
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5.3.3) A Solution is Sought 
Over the next week the crisis intensified and the peace settlement began to 
slip away. 
South Africa rejected a proposal by the Front-line States for a cease-fire 
under which SW APO infiltrators would be disarmed but allowed to remain 
inside Namibia. On 9 April, the A-G announced a suspension of Resolution 
435 and an indefinite postponement of the preparations for elections. 
In an effort to defuse the crisis, senior officials from Angola, Cuba and South 
Africa held an emergency meeting of the J.MMC at the Mount Etjo Safari 
Lodge near Windhoek , from 8-9 April. The meeting led to the formulation of 
the Mount Etjo Declaration, which called for the safe passage of SW APO 
fighters to designated UNTAG-mandated assembly points. From there they 
would be given UNTAG escort to bases above the 16th Parallel in Angola, as 
stipulated in the Geneva Protocol. All SW APO insurgents would be compelled 
to leave Namibia by the 15 April, after which the settlement process would · 
resume. The SW APO leadership accepted the terms of the Declaration, and 
ordered its forces to stop fighting and report to the designated assembly 
points within 72 hours. 
5.3.4) The Implementation of the Mount Etjo Accord 
The implementation of the Mount Etjo Accord did not run all that smoothly. 
News of the agreement was slow to filter through to soldiers and guerrillas, 
and UNTAG units took several days to reach the designated assembly points. 
As evidence mounted that South African security forces were hunting down 
and killing SW APO guerrillas, Nujoma ordered his forces to return directly to 
Angola to avoid being ambushed near the assembly-points. As the 15 April 
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deadline for the guerrillas' return to Angola passed, there was wide 
disagreement over how many had in fact returned and how many remained 
inside Namibia. 
By the end of April, South Africa claimed 400 guerrillas were still 
unaccounted for in the territory, while UN officials claimed it was closer to 
200. The three-member governments of the JMMC agreed to allow another 
two weeks - that is, until 15 May-for verification of the SWAPO 
withdrawal. On the 13 May South African troops returned to base, and six 
days later confirmed that peace had been restored and that independence 
process could continue. The crisis had lasted 50 days [Jaster, 1990:37]. 
5.3.5) Explanations of SW APO's Intervention 
The critical question remains as to why the SW APO leadership authorised 
such a provocative action, which had a distinct possibility of scuttling the 
entire settlement, when it was generally accepted that SW APO would win 
the election by a substantial margin? The arguments and theories around 
this particular issue are very rich, but are generally unsubstantiated with 
empirical evidence, particularly, as the SW APO leadership remained tight-
lipped about the incident. What follows is an attempt to make sense of these 
various explanations and try and shed some light on the actual course of 
events. 
Since the incident, two major explanations have emerged, both in terms of 
the general literature on post-independence Namibia, as well as comments 
from analysts and prominent persons. This dissertation offers a third possible 
explanation. 
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5.3.5.1) Ignorance and Confusion 
The first argument, which was employed by the SW APO leadership in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1 April incident, focuses on the confusion and 
lack of information that was the result of SW APO's exclusion from the 
negotiating process and the ambiguities and vagueness of UN Resolution 435. 
It follows that there was never a face-to-face signing of the cease-fire between 
the SADF and SWAPO, but only an exchange of letters between the two 
parties through the UN secretary-general. Resolution 435 was unclear as to 
where SW APO insurgents inside had to report for demobilisation. This 
argument, however, was rejected by Martti Ahtisaari at a conference on the 
Namibian peace process in Freiburg, Germany (July 1992), as he claimed 
both SW APO and South Africa were thoroughly briefed as to the logistics of 
the cease-fire. 
5.3.5.2) The Issue of "Liberated Zones" 
The second argument centres around the issue of SW APO's ''liberated zones" 
(or the lack thereof) inside Namibia. 
Since the inception of the armed struggle SW APO continually emphasised 
the importance for guerrillas to establish a visible presence inside Namibia. 
This became increasingly important in the run-up to the implementation of 
Resolution 435, where SW APO wanted to be seen by local inhabitants as 
being their liberators, particularly in Ovamboland, where its greatest support 
base was located. 
SW APO leadership argued at the time of the incident that the SW APO 
insurgents had not invaded, but had been inside Namibia for a significant 
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amount of time. The argument followed that these cadres had been securing 
certain liberated areas, and were simply waiting for UN troops to confine 
them to base when they were attacked by SW APOL. 
This explanation was rejected by UN officials and refuted by President dos 
Santos from Angola, who rebuked the SW APO leadership for failing to 
control its guerrillas and prevent their crossing the border "at the critical 
moment of the start of Resolution 435". 93 
A more credible second argument follows that SW APO's leaders, uncertain of 
SW APO's popular support, gambled on a successful infiltration of their forces 
by 1 April, while the SADF was confined to base and UNTAG monitors were 
only starting to arrive. If the infiltrating guerrillas could have eluded the 
police and located UNTAG officials to protect them, they might have made a 
convincing case that they had been within the borders of Namibia prior to the 
cease-fire taking effect. This visibility factor may also explain why, according 
to SADF officials, the April infiltrators wore new camouflage uniforms rather 
than nondescript clothing that would have reduced their visibility as 
guerrillas. 
5.3.5.3) An Alternative Explanation 
This dissertation offers a third explanation, which draws on the previous two 
explanations, as well as comments from various analysts and prominent 
SW APO figures that have had the opportunity to reflect on this incident over 
the past ten years. 
There were four inter-related reasons for the SWAPO invasion on 1 April. 
93 Since independence, the existence of SW APO liberated zones inside by Namibia has 
generally been refuted by both prominent SW APO figures and SADF personnel alike. 
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First, PLAN cadres invaded Namibia at the request of the SW APO 
leadership in order to secure popular support, and conduct political 
education, especially in Ovamboland. This is reflected in an address given by 
Nujoma at to a Military Cease-Fire Parade at Okatale near the Namibian-
Angola border on 31 March, which was attended by many PLAN cadres. 
Segments of the speech appeared in the March-April 1989 edition of SWAPO 
News and Views, under the sub heading 'PLAN Combatants Mobilising', in 
which Nujoma claimed that, 
on April 1, some of them [PLAN cadres] will be ordered to shed their uniforms 
and put on civilian clothes in order to go to Namibia to carry out the political 
mobilisation of the masses to vote for SW APO and thereby, consolidate the 
revolutionary gains ... " [SWAP0,1989:27] 
Second, SW APO did not trust the South African government, and 
particularly the SADF. Since 1970s, South Africa had gone to extra-ordinary 
lengths to stall and even sabotage an effective political settlement. In 
addition, as SW APO had been excluded from the quadripartite talks, the 
trust that is usually formed between warring parties in a negotiating forum, 
and crucial to the success of a peace settlement, was not established. There 
was also indications that South African security agencies were looking to 
sabotage the elections. Consequently, SW APO invaded in order to hedge its 
bets - should South Africa renege on the Brazzaville Protocol, SW APO at 
least would have been at least able to take control of areas within Namibia if 
the peace process failed.94 
94 It has been reported that these PLAN insurgents were part of a reserve army that was in 
existence in case the peace process failed. After the 1 April affair, an unknown number of 
PLAN insurgents remained hidden in camps in Angola, and returned independently after the 
final SADF withdrawal [Coletta et al, 1996: 132]. 
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Third, there. is also a strong possibility that SW APO invaded due to military 
considerations. As has already been pointed out, the militaristic faction 
within SW APO had grown very powerful, especially under the patronage of 
the MPLA and its army, FAPLA. At the Freiburg conference Theo-Ben 
Gurirab indicated that there were many elements within SW APO that totally 
disagreed with the negotiation process. SW APO had developed a "split 
personality" [Weiland & Braham,1994:79]. For the militaristic faction, 
remembering PLAN's heyday of the late 1970s, a major military victory 
against the SADF would given significant weight to the argument that 
Namibians had been liberated not by SW APO, and not the whims of super 
powers. 
Fourth, SWAPO, was unaware of the limited UNTAG presence in Namibia. 
SW APO assumed, in line with Resolution 435, that UNTAG would be 
deployed in significant numbers throughout Namibia. This was reflected in 
Nujoma's Okatale address, where he claimed that UNTAG's peace-keeping 
force, police force and civilian personnel had already arrived in Namibia 
[SWAP0,1989:26]. This was the real impact of not being party to the 
negotiation process. 
It was envisaged that after PLAN had entered Namibia it would locate 
UNTAG forces so th at the PLAN forces could be confined to base for 
demobilisation inside Namibia, thereby protecting them from possible 
SW APOL/SADF ret aliation, as well as claiming that liberated zones had 
existed within Namibia for some time. This was illustrated by certain 
comments made by Brigadier Opande, deputy military commander of 
UNTAG, that appear in Cliffe [1994:88]. Opande interviewed two PLAN 
survivors who claimed "they came to be monitored by UNTAG" and 
determine whether or not the SADF had been confined to base. 
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SW APO had under estimated the ruthlessness of Koevoet and the speed at 
which it could be deployed. SW APO's intelligence regarding the presence of 
SW APOL (Koevoet) also seems to have been very poor, as on 1 April the 
SW APO leadership were very surprised when they were ambushed by 
Koevoet, who by all accounts had been lying in wait for them for several 
days.95 
5.3.6) Aftermath of 1 April Incursion 
The most immediate consequences of the PLAN incursion was a substantial 
improvement in South Africa's credibility as a honest and responsible 
participant in the settlement process, and a corresponding international 
political fallout for the SW APO leadership. This was represented by a 
reduction in support amongst its closest allies, the Front-line States. The 1 
April incursion also hardened many other international actors stance towards 
SWAPO. Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the US, USSR, UK and Front-line 
States pressured SW APO to recall its forces from Namibia, and ensure their 
confinement in camps north of the 16th Parallel under UNTAG monitors. 
This incident, however, generated much support for SWAPO amongst its 
chief constituency, the Ovambo majority in Ovamboland, as the 
SADF/SW APOL were blamed for the bloodshed and not the SW APO 
"invasion" [Jaster, 1990:39]. 
In summary, the period of implementing UN Resolution 435 was turbulent. 
The process was almost derailed with the April 1 1989 incident, but 
international pressure and political will put it back on track. This period also 
95 In a private conversation with the author, a prominent SW APO activist admitted that the 
SW APO leadership , who was in Harare at the time, was taken completely by surprise by the 
news of the Koevoet ambush. 
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provided a window on the state of civil-military relations within SW APO, 
which was in a state of flux. Control of the movement was being contested 
between civilian (diplomatic) component and the security clique. 
5.4 The Electoral Period 
5.4.1) Preparations for the Election 
It was decided that the political campaigning for the first democratic election 
for the Constitutional Assembly would start on 1July1989, with November 
as the election month . To ensure to that the elections would take place in 
accordance with the principles stipulated by UN Resolution 435, the A-G was 
obliged to declare a general amnesty for all Namibians living abroad, remove 
prohibitions on political activity, and repeal or amend the forty-six 
discriminatory laws. This paved the way for the return and repatriation of 
Namibian exiles under the auspices of the UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHRC). 
The first group of senior SW APO leaders returned to Namibia from exile on 
18 June, with Nujoma eventually returning on 14 September. The UNHCR 
had repatriated more than 40,000 Namibian refugees from Angola and 
Zambia by late August. 
Some 200 had been in detention in SW APO-run camps in Angola, and on 
their return made public accusations that the SW APO leadership was 
responsible for torture and human rights abuse in these camps. Several 
organisations that had been active on the detainee issue, especially the 
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Parents Committee (PC) charged that 1,000 or more such prisoners were still 
being detained by SW APO officials in Angola and Zambia.96 
In response to these accusations a fact-finding commission was set up by the 
UNSR, Ahtisaari, under the auspices of the UNTAG, called the United 
Nations Mission on Detainees (UNMD). This mission was sent to 30 SWAPO 
camps in Angola and Zambia in September but was unable to verify the 
charges.97 SW APO leaders in an attempt to limit the political damage, 
declared that any members found guilty of murder or torture of detainees 
would be punished.98 [Jaster,1990:43]. 
Toward the end of 1988 SW APO accepted the text for a new organisational 
constitution, which formed the basis of its 1989 Election Manifesto. The 
Manifesto retained many of the principles of SW APO's previous programmes, 
however, it toned down many of the more radical Marxist elements and 
showed a greater willingness to compromise on economic issues [Putz et 
al, 1989:264]. 
96 In May 1989, the PC brought a court action to secure the release of six people it alleged 
SW APO was holding in detention in Angola. Even though the Supreme Court in Windhoek 
ruled that five of the six had been detained up until May 1989, it lacked the authority to 
release prisoners in Angola. Another detainee pressure group, the Political Committee (PCC) 
was established in Angola by ex-SW APO detainees shortly before their repatriation to 
Namibia. The PCC and PC campaigned for the release of other detainees still held through 
press conferences. They also sought to prevent SW APO from attaining power [Africa 
Watch,1992:98]. There efforts were, however, undermined by the South African security 
operatives who used the detainee issue for their own propaganda purposes. 
97 Of the approximately 1,000 names of the people allegedly still under SW APO detention, 
315 could not be accounted for. The UN report was widely criticised in Namibia. See 
Siegfried Groth's (1995) controversial book, Namibia- The Wall of Silence. The Dark Days of 
the Liberation Struggle (Cape Town: David Philip), and the Africa Watch Report (1992) 
Accountability in Namibia: Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy, for analyses of 
the detainee issue. 
98 To this day the detainees issue and human rights abuses allegedly committed by SW APO 
in exile remains unresolved. After considerable public pressure SW APO published a book 
called Their Blood Waters Our Freedom (1997) which accounts for the death of 6846 cadres, 
with an additional 948 being classified as "missing". This publication was widely criticised in 
Namibia, particularly with respect to the number of people who died from natural causes at 
young ages, and car accident victims. 
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5.4.2) Intimidation and Violence 
The registration period (July to September), was marked by numerous 
incidents of intimidation and violence, particularly between DTA and 
SW APO supporters. Koevoet, even though it had been disbanded, continued 
to function as part of the local police, SW APOL. It carried out brutal actions 
against SW APO in Ovamboland, by breaking up its political rallies, 
assaulting its supporters, and terrorising villages suspected of having pro-
SW APO sympathies.99 This resulted in UNTAG becoming more active in 
these areas and the drawing up of a mutually agreed code of campaign 
conduct which led to the reduction in the violence [Cliffe,1994:128]. Local and 
international pressure forced the A-G to confine 1200 Koevoet members for 
retraining. This proved ineffective so the unit was completely disbanded 
[Jaster, 1990:35,41]. 
Despite continuing levels of violence and allegations of irregularities on all 
sides, 701,000 people, 99% of those eligible to vote, had been registered by the 
mid-September. By late October, the levels of violence and intimidation had 
virtually subsided to the extent that simultaneous SW APO and DTA rallies 
were held in the same small town, Rundu, without incident. 
5.4.3) The Elections 
Namibia's many political parties underwent major changes and consolidation 
as the November elections approached. Most of the parties had a 
99 During this unstable period, Anton Lubowsky, a SW APO lawyer, and one of the few white 
members of SW APO was assassinated on the 12 September. It is widely believed that a 
South African death squad, linked to military intelligence, called the Civil Co-operation 
Bureau (CCB) in collaboration with local policemen, was responsible for the murder. 
However, despite numerous inquests, no person has been arrested in this regard. 
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predominant ethnic b;;ise, and most had come into being following a 
leadership or policy split in a larger party. 
Ten parties registered for the November 1988 elections. There were few 
ideological differences between them. All publicly favoured a multi-party 
democracy; a mixed economy; encouragement of foreign investment and a 
non-aligned foreign policy. The closest thing to an ideological split was 
between those parties, particularly the DTA, which had taken part in the 
political arrangement that had been established by South Africa, and those 
parties, notably SWAPO, which had not. 
There were serious divisions over policy issues. These divisions included: 
whether or not to adopt a Westminster system or a strong executive 
presidency; whether to protect group rights as well as individual rights; 
whether to maintain or gradually loosen economic dependence on South 
Africa; and the extent to which nationalisation should be promoted 
[Jaster, 1990:43-46]. lOO 
The general perception was that SW APO would win the elections, but as 
SWAPO's popular support had not been effectively tested, the nature of its 
victory was anybody's guess. Of much concern to the smaller political parties 
was the stipulation that if a party secured two-thirds of the delegates in the 
Constituent Assembly, it could effectively dictate the content of the 
constitution. With less than two-thirds, SW APO would have to engage in 
coalition politics to get a constitution adopted. 
Voting for the Constituent Assembly took place between 7-11 November 
1989. Turnout was more than 97%, with SWAPO polling 57.3% to win 41 out 
100 For a more detailed analysis of the various parties and programmes see Cliffe [1994: 155-
158] 
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of the 72 seats in the Assembly. The DTA, with covert South African . 
government financial backing managed to block a two-thirds SW APO 
majority by winning over 28% of the vote and 21 seats. 
On 14 November, the UN Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari certified 
the election as "free and fair" [Jaster,1990:43]. This was followed by the 
withdrawal of the last component of SADF troops. By the end of 1989 
UNTAG troops left Namibia. 
In summary, Namibia experienced a fairly violent period in the run up to its 
first democratic general elections. The elections, however, took place without 
any controversy and were declared free and fair by the UN Special 
Representative. This environment was to contribute to elements within 
SW APO re-asserting civil control of the military. 
5.5) The Constituent Assembly Process 
On 21 November, a week after the election result, the Constituent Assembly 
was opened by SW APO President Nujoma. Substantial progress was made in 
a short space of time, especially after SW APO proposed that the Assembly 
adopt the constitutional principles negotiated by the UN and South Africa in 
1982 as a "frame of reference" for the constitution-making process, a major 
conciliatory move on SW APO's part. 
These principles included a bill of individual rights; a stipulation that 
Namibia would be a unitary, democratic state with three branches of 
government; election by universal suffrage; an independent judiciary; and a 
constitution as the supreme law of the land. SW APO's motion was 
unanimously adopted, along with a proposal that individual articles of the 
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constitution would be decided by a simple majority vote, with a two-thirds 
vote needed to adopt the constitution as a whole. 
During this constitution-making process serious differences emerged between 
the two main contenders, SWAPO and the DTA. S\VAPO favoured single 
member constituencies while the DTA and most other smaller parties, 
favoured proportional representation. Disagreement also emerged over the 
powers of the President. SW APO wanted the President to have executive 
powers. The other parties wanted the position to be ceremonial in nature. 
SW APO proposed a legislative body with a single chamber, while the other 
parties wanted a bicameral system. 
By the end of January agreement had been secured by all parties on all the 
above issues. A system of proportional representation was to be adopted. 
Namibia would have an Executive President, but his powers would be 
severely limited. The legislature would be bicameral, however the second 
chamber, the National Council, could review and delay legislation. The 
National Assembly would run for a five year term. 
In the second week of February 1990 the Constituent Assembly unanimously 
adopted the new Constitution. This was followed by the unanimous election 
of Sam Nujoma as President. On the 21 March Namibia became independent, 
and the Constituent Assembly became the National Assembly. 
5.6) Re-enforcing Civil Supremacy 
Civil supremacy was at the forefront of the minds of SW APO decision-makers 
during the transition period, especially after the purges in Angola by the 
security clique. These concerns with civilian control were reflected in 
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SW APO's 1988 Constitution and 1989 Election Manifesto, as well in the 
appointment of cabinet ministers and other government officials. 
5.6.1) SW APO Documents 
In SW APO's 1988 Constitution it was envisaged that, 
the armed forces of Namibia.shall ... always be subordinate to civilian 
authority. 
In its Election Manifesto , SW APO wanted an armed force that would be 
based on national conscription where all Namibians of between age 17 and 45 
would undergo a period of military service for at least two years. PLAN would 
form the permanent core of the Namibian military. The conscription issue, 
apart from being derived from SW APO's belief that everyone should make a 
contribution to the struggle, was also a means to enforce civil supremacy. 
However, the Constituent Assembly process and funding constraints 
prevented SW APO from realising this vision. 
5.6.2) Political Appointments 
With the appointment of cabinet ministers and other government officials, 
the SW APO leadership deftly integrated "old guard" leaders such as Peter 
Muehihange with the more educated second generation of leaders, such as 
Hage Geingob (Prime Minister) and Hidipo Hamutenya (Minister of 
Information and Communications). 
Each member of Cabinet was balanced by an appropriate team of deputy 
ministers and permanent secretaries. "Hard-liners", such as Hamutenya, 
were counterpoised by "soft-liners", such as Tjongareno, Hamutenya's Deputy 
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Minister. The majority of the defence and security personnel from Lubango 
were slotted into the defence and security branches where, in the short run at 
least, they appeared removed from mainstream policy making [Saul & 
Leys,1995:198]. 
5. 7) Demobilisation, Reintegration and the Formation of 
the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) 
5.7.1) Demobilisation 
The demobilisation of the relevant armed forces was to be undertaken within 
the framework of Resolution 435 and the Brazzaville Accords. The objective of 
this demobilisation process was to disarm and repatriate PLAN cadres in 
Angola, and disarm and disband the SW ATF in Namibia. 
By June 1989, the end of the demobilisation process the Namibian Ministry 
of Defence estimated that a total of 57,000 former combatants were 
demobilised [Colletta et al,1996:131]. The breakdown of these demobilised 
soldiers was as follows : 
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In 1990, prior to independence, a Tripartite Military Integration Committee 
was established with representatives from both PLAN and SWATF. It was 
chaired by members ofUNTAG. 
The Committee's function was to develop a structure and force design for the 
post-independence Namibian military [Colletta,1996:149]. It was decided that 
an all new defence force needed to be created, one that moved away from the 
oppressive military culture of the former occupation regime 
[Preston, 1997:459]. The language of official communication would be English, 
and the military would consist of an all-volunteer force with the army being 
the first priority. An airforce and navy would be developed at a later stage. 
5.7.2) The Creation of the Namibian Defence Force 
The Defence Amendment Act, 1990 (No. 20of1990), passed in December 
which amended the original Defence of 1957 (No. 44 of 1957), called for the 
creation of the Namibia Defence Force (NDF). It was envisaged that the 
ND F's primary role would be the protection Namibia's territorial integrity 
from external threats. Its secondary roles included assisting the police in 
containing civil unrest, providing relief in unforeseen environmental 
disasters, and playing a support function in various developmental projects 
[Shiweda, 1997]. 
After the election the First Infantry Battalion of the NDF was established 
with the initial assistance of Kenyan and Canadian contingents from UNTAG 
and then technical supervision of the fifty-seven strong British Military 
Advisory and Training Team (BMATT). BMATT had three roles. First, to 
provide advice on the creation and maintenance of the Ministry of Defence 
and army headquarters. Second, to assist in the formation of the NDF by 
working with the Personnel Directive on the selection and training of officers, 
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NCOs and warrant officers. Third, to supervise the training of rank-and-file 
soldiers [Nathan,1990:13]. 
5.7.3) The Integration Process 
The process of integrating combatants from two distinctly different military 
traditions into the conventional armed force was not without its problems. 
SW APO and the DTA initially agreed that integration of PLAN and SW ATF 
forces into the NDF would take place on the basis of parity (50-50). This 
agreement was realised at the top echelons of the military structure, with 
two of the four heads of directorates at the Ministry of Defence, coming from 
the PLAN camp and two from the former SW ATF forces. 101 The commanding 
officer of the 1st Infantry Battalion was a former PLAN commander, and the 
second in command was a former SWATF captain [Na than, 1990:9]. 
In terms of Proclamation No.8 published on 11July1990, the President 
Nujonia appointed Dimo Hamaambo, former Commander-in-Chief of PLAN, 
as the Chief of the Defence Force. Hamaambo, was later replaced by his 
deputy, Salomon Hawala, which was highly controversial given Hawala's 
reputation in the detention camps in Angola. 
The selection of personnel for the NDF was based on both theoretical and 
practical examination methods. This proved to be a major barrier to entry for 
many illiterate former PLAN insurgents. These former combatants who only 
knew the military life had become accustomed to expect that SW APO would 
provide for them and assumed this would continue after independence, which 
did not happen. It seemed as though only those who had been given the 
opportunity to study and train abroad achieved attractive appointments in 
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the NDF or elsewhere in government. This led to a growing sense of 
resentment among many ex-combatants [Preston,1997:457]. 
Beyond 1990 the parity agreement was set aside. The Ministry of Defence 
adopted an unofficial policy limiting the numbers of former SW ATF members 
in the NDF to ten percent [Preston, 1997:459]. SWATF officers were mainly 
stationed at the military school at Okahanja and not in operational units. By 
1993, the only NDF commander of SWATF background was the Director of 
the military school [Preston, 1997:460]. By the end of 1994 approximately 
eighty percent of the 6,500 strong NDF were former-PLAN cadres. The 
remaining NDF members were either new recruits or former-SWATF, whose 
expertise and professionalism was valued [Colletta et al,1996:149]. 
5. 7.4) Reintegration into Civilian Life 
Neither the international community nor the new Namibian government 
envisaged that any assistance would be necessary for ex-combatants, who 
had not been included in the NDF, to rejoin the civilian way of life. It was 
naively assumed that civilian and military returnees, and demobilised 
SWATF personnel, would be re-integrated into civilian live on their own 
accord. 102 
Many former combatants from both PLAN and SW ATF camps began to 
express their grievances through a number of demonstrations. The 
government, realising the potential security hazard that a significant group 
of unemployed and dissatisfied individuals with military training 
represented, responded by devising a cash payment scheme (which is still 
operational today), designing vocational training programmes in the form of 
101 It took a year to generate trust between the four directors of the MoD [Preston,1997:460]. 
102 Only disabled veterans and San ex-SWATF soldiers received specialised assistance. 
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development brigades, 103 and including ex-combatants in the general refugee 
resettlement programme [Colletta et al, 1996: 129]. However, these efforts 
have only had limited success in addressing these grievances. The problem of 
dissatisfied ex-combatants persists to this day.104 
The demobilisation and integration process proved to be very important for 
SWAPO. It defused the militarist tendency that was developing within the 
movement. The integration of PLAN and SWATF into the NDF, even though 
it was not on the basis of parity, was a means by which "two dangerous forces 
might 'neutralise' each other" [Saul & Leys,1995:58]. 
In summary, the process of demobilising combatants from both sides and 
integrating them into a new Namibia Defence Force was relatively successful, 
even though the re-integration of former combatants who were excluded from 
incorporation into the NDF left much to be desired. This process was to 
strengthen Namibia's democratic outlook as it created a military subordinate 
to the wishes of civilian government. 
5.8) Conclusion 
The peace agreement reached by the South African, Cuban and Angolan 
governments in late1988 had a fundamental impact on SWAPO's struggle for 
las The Namibian Development Brigade drew its inspiration from the highly successful 
Botswana Youth Brigades and the skills training centres that were created for ex-
combatants in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s. The aim of the Namibian Development Brigade 
was to provide training for , amongst others, unskilled former combatants, in agricultural 
production and construction. In 1993 the Development Brigade was converted into a 
parastatal, the Development Brigade Corporation, which has branched out into the realm of 
small business development. 
104 Between 1997 and 1998 there were at least two significant protests by former combatants. 
Dissatisfied former PLAN combatants staged a sit-in in the parliamentary gardens, while 
former-Koevoet members protested at the lack of equity in the distribution of war veterans 
benefits, and threatened to destabilise the country if their demands were not met. Came to 
naught (fhe Namibian 1997-1998, various issues). 
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liberation, as it paved the way for Namibian independence and SWAPO's 
ascension to power via a constitutionally bounded democratic political 
settlement. 
Like most transitions, this process had its share of problems. For instance, 
there was a serious violation of the cease-fire agreement (1 April incident), 
followed by large-scale intimidation in the run-up to the elections. In 
ordinary circumstances these events would have resulted in the scuttling of 
the peace process, and a resumption of armed conflict. However, regional and 
international conditions were such that the parties' to the conflict, namely 
the SADF and SW APO, only realistic option was to pursue a peaceful 
settlement. 
It was a highly volatile period for civil-military relations within SW APO. The 
civilian (diplomatic) component of the movement and the security/mtelligence 
clique were in a state of constant struggle over control of SW APO. The 
security clique, with the advent of the spy drama, was in a dominant position 
at the start of the negotiations in the late 1980s. However, with the 
successful implementation of the negotiated peace settlement and the April 1 
1989 embarrassment , this clique's influential position was undermined. 
Civilian elements within SW APO began to reassert themselves. Civil 
supremacy was reintroduced with the advent of democratic elections, the 
careful selection of cabinet ministers and the formation of the NDF. In short, 
the period of transition was more than a political transition, but a transition 
between revolutionary and democratic traditions of civil supremacy. 
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Chapter 6 
Contemporary Civil-Military Relations in Namibia 
This chapter provides an overview and analysis of civil-military relations in 
contemporary Namibia. It seeks to determine whether a democratic tradition 
of civil supremacy has emerged since independence. 
6.1) Legal Arrangements 
In terms of the Namibian Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-
Chief of the Defence Force with the power to appoint the chief of the Defence 
Force on the recommendation of the Security Commission [Articles 27, 32 
(Sub Article 4C)]. 
The National Assembly has the power to approve budgets and the cabinet 
ministers are accountable to both the President and parliament [Articles 63 
(Sub-Article 2A), 41]. In addition, the National Council, composed of 
representatives from regional councils throughout the country, has the power 
to review bills passed by the National Assembly and has investigative powers 
[Article 59 (Sub-Article 3)]. The Ombudsman, appointed by the President on 
the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission has the power to 
investigate complaints relating the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) as they 
relate to "a balanced structuring of such services of fair admjnistration in 
relation to such services" [Article 91 (Sub-Article B)]. 
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6.2) The Namibian Defence Force 
The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) was established by the Defence 
Amendment Act (Act 20 of 1990) amending the South African Defence Act 
(44/1957), in order to "defend the territory and national interests of 
Namibia". This act sets out, amongst a variety legal requirements, the 
composition and organisation of the Defence Force. The act is supported by a 
Military Discipline Code, which provides the practical framework for the 
administration of the armed forces. The Defence Policy Paper approved by the 
National Assembly in March 1992, presents policy guidelines for the 
composition and organisation of the NDF. According to the Statement on 
Defence Policy (1993) the NDF's role is as follows: to ensure the maintenance 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity; to provide assistance to the civil 
authorities and to the civil community when required; to undertake 
ceremonial functions and to assist the process of reconciliation. 
Over the past eight years the strength of the NDF has varied between 5000 
and 9000 personnel. It is lightly equipped and its structure is currently based 
on 4 Infantry Battalions under the central control of an army head quarters, 
supported by a Logistic Support Battalion and supplied via a Composite 
Depot. 
Garrisons have been established in Windhoek and Grootfontein, and military 
training takes place at the Military School in Okahandja. There is a Combat 
Support Brigade, comprising artillery, anti-tank and air-defence regiments at 
Otjiwarongo base that provides combat support services. The 21st Guard 
Battalion located in Windhoek has responsibility for aspects of Presidential 
security and ceremonial activities [Republic of Namibia,1993:5-6]. 
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Recently, the Namibian Air wing was commissioned. It consists of two 
squadrons: one fixed wing and one helicopter squadron [Interview with Brig. 
M. Shiweda, Chief of Staff, Personnel, Windhoek, 1997]. A maritime wing has 
been created, but is more of a coastguard than a navy as it falls under the 
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources. This maritime wing is staffed by 
100 personnel and has 3 patrol craft [IISS, 1998:258]. 
All battalions undergo a similar pattern of basic training: commanders attend 
''leaders cadre training'' at the military school, followed by standardisation 
cadre training covering basic military subjects. Continuation training is also 
provided with the emphasis on shooting, fitness and admjnistration [Republic 
of Namibia, 1993:6]. 
The NDF has rendered the following services in support of civil authorities 
and communities: mine clearance; repatriation of Namibian nationals from 
Botswana; controlling of locusts in the Caprivi region; apprehension of 
trawlers illegally fishing in territorial waters; joint operations with the 
Namibian Police Force; and fire-fighting Services. NDF personnel were also 
involved in peacekeeping operations, namely in the UN mission to monitor 
the elections in Cambodia in 1993 [National Planning Commission,1995:486]. 
The NDF has only been involved in two additional military encounters. These 
include a brief confrontation with the Botswana Defence force over the 
Kasikili (Sidudu) Island in the Linyanti (Chobe) River in 1995, and recently 
their deployment in conjunction with the Angolan and Zimbabwean armed 
forces in support of Laurent Kabila's regime in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
See Appendix 3 for graphical representation of the NDF structure. 
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6.3) Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
Immediately after independence the Ministry of Defence (MOD) was 
established . 
. According to the Statement on Defence Policy [1993:4-5] the MOD's principal 
roles and responsibilities are to formulate and execute defence policy; to 
provide the central operational and administrative headquarters for the 
NDF; and to act as the body that procures the NDF's equipment. 
The ministry is headed by the Minister of Defence who chairs the Defence 
Staff Council, the MOD's highest management committee. The Minister also 
represents the ministry in the National Assembly and in Cabinet. The 
Minister is supported directly by the Deputy Minister and by the Chief of the 
Defence Force and the Permanent Secretary. The Chief of the Defence Force 
is responsible, under the terms of the Constitution, for the military 
effectiveness of the NDF. The Permanent Secretary is responsible for the 
financial, administrative and political aspects of defence policy and its 
execution. As accounting officer, he is personally responsible to the Minister 
and to the National Assembly for the financial propriety and regularity of 
MOD business and its prudent and efficient administration. 
The Ministry consists of four directorates: Operations, Finance, Personnel, 
Logistics. Each directorate consists of a number of divisions (see Appendix 4). 
The Statement on Defence Policy [1993:8] further maintains that Ministry of 
Defence and the NDF should be: apolitical; well disciplined and accountable 
to government and the people through clearly defined political mechanisms of 
control; militarily capable of defending Namibia's territorial integrity; and 
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finally affordable (bearing in mind national resource constraints, defence 
should not represent an unaffordable burden on the economy). 
The main elements of defence policy are set out each year in the Statement on 
the Defence Estimates (SDE), which describes the Namibian government's 
view on developments that affect Namibia's security, its responses to those 
developments, and the resources that it proposes to devote to defence. 
Defence Expenditure as a percentage of GDP has remained fairly constant 
over the past eight years averaging out at just over 3% [IISS,1990-1998]. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Defence 167 33 45 50 57 65 74 89 
Expenditure 
(US$m) 
Defence 152 25 35 25 35 39 44 51 
Expenditure 
(US$ per capita) 
Defence 15.1 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.5 
Expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
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6.4) Graphical Representation of Civil Supremacy in 
Namibia 
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6.5) Assessing Civil Supremacy in Namibia 
To date there have been no coup d'etats or attempted coups in Namibia. Civil 
supremacy in democratic Namibia is upheld through a combination of 
constitutional mechanisms, such as legislative oversight, budgetary control of 
defence expenditure, a civilian dominated Ministry of Defence, and the 
maintenance of a small professional military. 
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Geographical factors have also contributed to the preservation of civil 
supremacy. The Southern African region (geographically defined), with the 
exception of Angola, has experienced almost a decade of relative peace. As a 
result there has been no immediate external threats to Namibia's territorial 
sovereignty that could allow for undue military influence in political affairs. 
There is, in most cases, transparency in the conduct of military affairs. The 
exception seems to be the NDF's acquisition plans, which remain classified. 
Senior NDF staff are willing to meet with researchers and journalists to 
discuss defence and security matters. The NDF also participates in civilian-
run training courses, which aim to promote civil supremacy. The Defence 
Management Diploma offered by the Graduate School of Public and 
Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand is one 
such course. 
However, there are deviations between the "pure" or classical tradition of 
democratic civil supremacy as discussed in chapter 1 and the current state of 
civil supremacy in Namibia. Five discrepancies can be identified. 
First, the President has the authority to declare war as well as a state of 
emergency [Republic of Namibia, 1989: Article 26]. War results in military 
expansion, growth in the power and influence of government, and its 
intrusions into the lives of citizens to increase - including more taxes and 
limits on individual freedoms [Kohn, 1997: 149]. This constitutional provision 
led to the recent deployment of troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and a: subsequent increase in the defence budget to maintain these 
troops on foreign soil (Pan African News Agency, 13/11198). An abuse of this 
power could undermine the democratic dispensation in Namibia. 
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Second, due to financial considerations, the MOD fulfils the dual role of 
Department of Defence (DOD) and the Headquarters of the Defence Force, co-
locating the Chief of the Defence Force with the seat of civil supremacy, 
namely the Minister of Defence. According to the Statement of Defence Policy 
[1993:4], 
The principal advantage of this design is that it facilitates clear political 
control of higher direction and management of defence. 
However, in reality, this arrangement may hinder civil supremacy as it could 
lead to excessive military influence in the affairs of the civilian-oriented 
DOD. 
Third, the NDF is predominantly involved in non-military tasks, such as 
policing and disaster relief. Disaster relief is uncontroversial as this type of 
military involvement in domestic affairs is infrequent and often lacks 
political significance. However, this is not the case when armed forces are 
used to police domestic unrest or conflict. The use of the armed forces in this 
regard has the potential to weaken a democratic regime as the military 
encroaches on the responsibilities of the police and the neutrality of the 
military is compromised. In the extreme case, where political legitimacy has 
collapsed altogether , the military may become the only prop of the regime, 
safeguarding it from popular rebellion or revolution. When this occurs 
government by consent is replaced by a dictatorship. 
Fourth, government oversight is weak. Most stable democracies have 
developed permanent standing committees in their legislatures, or in their 
party-based parliamentary cabinets, which are devoted to the routine 
oversight of their countries' military establishment. These committees have 
professional staffs specialising in matters of military strategy, budgeting and 
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procurement [Stepan, 1988: 133]. In Namibia, as defence has not been a 
priority area for most politicians, a permanent defence, with adequate 
research capacity, does not exist. 
Fifth, the capacity of civil society to engage in debates around defence and 
security issues is weak.105 No non-governmental organisations or research 
institutes, which deal with defence and security matters, exist. The 
University of Namibia, which operates on a very modest budget, does not 
incorporate military sociology or military strategy routinely into its 
curricula.1os There are only a handful of academics that have an interest in 
military issues. In addition, there are very few citizens who are experts on, 
for example, force structure, budgetary issues, doctrinal questions, and 
specific details of weapons systems. Only the local media provides a forum of 
debate. The Namibian, Namibia's most widely read Newspaper, has reporters 
that are acquainted, to a degree, with defence and security issues. 
6.6) Conclusion 
A democratic tradition of civil supremacy does exist in Namibia, however, 
there is discontinuity (represented by the above-mentioned five deviations) 
between the classical tradition of civil supremacy of the military and the 
current state of affairs. 
As Namibia is a developing country with a relatively small military, the 
classical tradition is a luxury that this country cannot, in reality, afford to 
nurture. If such a rigorous tradition was adhered to, this may in fact 
constitute a misuse of valuable resources that might be better used for 
105 According to Tapscott [1997], civil society in general is weak, which "may be ascribed to policies of the 
colonial government and to SW APO' s political strategies during the independence struggle ... " 
106 The Department of Political and Administrative Studies, however, offers both undergraduate and 
postgraduate courses in internal relations. 
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education, housing and job creation·. With the lack of any immediate external 
military threat, civil supremacy of the armed forces can be maintained 
without employing the full "tool bag'' of techniques and controls. However, in 
order to ensure the civil supremacy is upheld in the foreseeable future , 
civilian politicians need to be vigilant of excessive military influence in 
civilian affairs and aware of analyses of qualified neutral observers. 
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Conclusion 
Civil supremacy rests on a set of ideas, institutions and behaviours that have 
evolved over time. Together these practices limit the possibility of excessive 
military intervention in political affairs and provide a system that endows 
civilian officials with the authority and the machinery to exercise supremacy 
in military affairs. 
The aim of this dissertation was to provide greater clarity on the 
phenomenon of civil supremacy, and in particular how it evolves and how it is 
sustained. A theoretical case study of Namibia was undertaken to achieve 
this objective, with three traditions of civil supremacy, namely colonial, 
revolutionary/insurgent and democratic (as well as the relevant mechanisms 
and techniques), being the focus. This dissertation sought to determine how 
these traditions emerged and developed over time. 
Evolving Traditions 
Colonial Tradition 
Chapter two presented an overview of Namibian history up until 1960. This 
period was characterised by three successive waves of foreign intervention, 
namely Oorlam, German and South African. Each colonising power gained 
control of the territory through the use of armed forces, with the amount of 
military power at their disposal determining the extent of their territorial 
expansion. Only South Africa had the ability to pacify the entire Namibian 
territory. A common feature of all three phases was that political relations of 
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consent was absent with power being exercised in a coercive manner. There 
were, however, three contradictions. 
First, the Germans introduced constitutional mechanisms of civilian supremacy 
and employed a small professional colonial army. Second, South Africa 
instituted more rigorous methods of civil supremacy, such as parliamentary 
oversight, budgetary control and a professional military supported by 
conscripts. Third, through the influence of trade unions and other political 
organisations, democratic demands began to emerge in the workplace in the 
1950s. This state of affairs did not correspond to a pure or classical colonial 
tradition as Namibia was constantly being invaded, thereby preventing a 
single tradition from emerging. 
Revolutionary/Insurgent Tradition 
Chapters three and four dealt with the period from the formation of SW APO in 
1960 until the peace settlement in 1988. This period saw SW APO develop from 
a labour-based movement to a political party, which established an armed wing 
in the mid-1960s. 
Over the first decade or so of the liberation struggle a revolutionary tradition 
began to emerge, with the SW APO political leadership seeking to secure civil 
supremacy through six techniques. First, a small professional "revolutionary" 
armed wing was created. Second, PLAN was placed under the jurisdiction of 
the Secretary of Defence (a political appointment). Third, parallel political 
chains of command (commissars) were constructed within PLAN. Fourth, 
indoctrination and political education of PLAN rank and file were introduced. 
Fifth, there was close political supervision in the appointment of officers to 
sensitive commands. Sixth, geographical methods were introduced. For 
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example, prior to the move to Angola the armed wing was stationed in 
isolated camps in Tanzania, and later Zambia. 
Despite the application of these techniques, the SW APO experience differed 
in three respects from the classical revolutionary model. 
First, up until the mid-1970s, SW ALA (which later was renamed as PLAN) 
was maintained as an army of convenience. SW APO's primary motivation for 
creating an armed wing was for financial reasons as it gave SW APO access to 
funding, especially from the OAU. 
Second, from the late-1970s, due to the influence of Soviet Union and the 
MPLA's armed wing, PLAN became more of a conventional armed force in 
terms of doctrine and outlook. PLAN moved away from fighting a war of 
attrition (the hallmark of the revolutionary/insurgent tradition) to conduct a 
war of conquest, where military victory was envisaged. 
Third, as the insurgency period became more prolonged, so the techniques for 
enforcing and maintaining civil supremacy became less effective. In the mid-
1970s, with the interests of the armed wing (which had become fairly 
assertive) being increasingly neglected, PLAN cadres challenged the civilian 
authority of SW APO. An open rebellion was the result. From the late-1970s, 
with PLAN becoming increasingly dominant within SW APO, and in the 
midst of organisational paranoia, a security (intelligence) organ was 
established in the mid- to late-1980s. This was an attempt by the SWAPO 
Executive to restore the civil-military balance within the movement. The 
introduction of a third aspect to the civil-military equation, however, proved 
to be disastrous as it led to the security clique dominating SW APO. 
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The Transition 
Chapter five provided an analysis of the transition period, where the 
demobilisation of former combatants, the electoral process, the creation of a 
new Namibian Defence Force, and consolidation ofSWAPO's position in 
government was analysed. 
There was more than just a political transition during this period. There was a 
transition from a tradition that resembled the revolutionary/insurgent type to 
the beginnings of a democratic tradition. The civilian (diplomatic) component of 
SW APO and the security/military clique were in a state of constant competition 
over control of the movement. However, the potent position that the security 
clique had achieved with the deepening of the spy drama was undermined by 
diplomatic successes, the achievement of a peace settlement and the April 1 
debacle. This led to the re-emergence of civil supremacy, which was reinforced 
through democratic elections, the careful selection of cabinet ministers and the 
formation of the NDF. 
Democratic Tradition 
Chapter 6 provided an overview of civil-military relations in contemporary 
Namibia. Since independence, a democratic tradition of civil supremacy has 
emerged in Namibia, however, this arrangement digresses in a number of 
ways from the classical democratic tradition of civil supremacy. With limited 
resources, a small military, and no overt security threats to its territorial 
sovereignty, Namibia does not utilise a full "tool bag" of techniques for the 
maintenance of civil supremacy. 
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General Remarks and Conclusions 
From this case study analysis five general conclusions can be formulated 
about how civil supremacy evolves and is sustained. 
First, civil supremacy is not a static phenomenon. It involves a set of fluid 
relationships, a perpetual contest between the strengths of civilian political 
institutions and political strengths of the military. It is a phenomenon that 
evolves (and devolves) over a substantial period of time. 
In the introduction a study by Robert Griffiths was assessed, in which he 
attributed current democratic civil-military relations in Namibia, 
Mozambique and South Africa to be the product of the transition period in 
each country, while acknowledging that the past patterns of civil-military 
relations had a minor influence. This dissertation has shown that in Namibia 
the relationship is in fact reversed. Contemporary civil-military relations, 
and in particular civil-supremacy, does not begin with the transition, but has 
deeper historical origins. For example, the constitutional and professional 
mechanisms that emerged during the eras of German and South African rule 
had an impact on the current democratic civil supremacy tradition in 
Namibia. In addition, the negotiations with the Contact Group, the passing of 
UN Security Council Resolution 435 and developments in response to various 
crises within SW APO in a way predetermined the civil-military relationship 
in post-independence Namibia. 
Second, there ·is often a gap between enforcing and maintaining civil 
supremacy in theory and what happens in practice. The Namibian case study 
has revealed that local conditions and exogenous factors impact on the 
enforcement and maintenance of civil supremacy. Tried and tested 
mechanisms and techniques of the traditional civil-military equation were 
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incapable of sustaining civil supremacy. This was especially the case when 
the basic interests of the military were neglected or during times of severe 
tension or crisis. 
In these situations new thinking and creativity concerning civil supremacy is 
required. However, implementing alternative or new ideas can be risky, as 
was the case with the spy drama. 
Third, the internationalisation of the Namibian conflict, namely the 
interference of a number of powerful international actors, had a critical 
impact on the evolution of civil supremacy in Namibia. This state of affairs 
impeded the natural emergence of the classical or "pure" traditions of civil 
supremacy. Being a small liberation movement that was dependent on 
foreign funding for its survival, SW APO was heavily influenced and at times 
controlled by its hosts (Tanzania, Zambia and by Angola) and patrons (OAU 
and the Soviet Union). The creation of the Contract Group and the linking of 
a Namibian solution to the settlement of the Angolan conflict meant that 
SWAPO had very little room in which to manoeuvre and develop. 
Fourth, this dissertation reveals that, in certain situations, state-centric 
controls and mechanisms of civil supremacy are ineffective. It has alluded to 
the idea that non-state actors and civil society have been involved in the 
evolutionary process of civil supremacy and can play a meaningful role in 
enhancing and maintaining it. However, in the general civil-military 
relations literature, this perspective remains under-researched. 
Fifth, there is an ongoing debate in historical circles between structuralism 
and agency. Structuralism is a mode of thinking and a method of analysis 
that values deep structures over surface phenomena. It is concerned with 
underlying causes, unconscious motivations, and transpersonal forces, 
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shifting attention away from individual human choice. Individuals have a 
negligible impact on the greater scheme of things. Agency, on the other hand, 
maintains that individuals, not structures, are largely responsible for the 
way events unfold. This dissertation strikes a balance between these two 
extremes. 
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Appendix 3. 
(Source: Republic of Namibia, 1993) 
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